Question 20
A core network change board wants to avoid: A BGP session from an adjacent PE can be spoofed by packets arriving many router hops away because the provider leaves TTL-security disabled. Which ongoing safeguard fits best?
Explanation
Correct Answer
Validate peer hop counts before applying TTL-security to multihop sessions. This helps prevent recurrence of the issue: A BGP session from an adjacent PE can be spoofed by packets arriving many router hops away because the provider leaves TTL-security disabled. Acceptance evidence should be: The legitimate adjacent session remains established while a distant test source with unsuitable TTL is rejected.
Incorrect Answers
Require peer and prefix authorization and monitor FlowSpec rule impacts. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: A route server receives a new FlowSpec route and applies a blanket drop to an entire customer prefix without checking the match and validation policy. It is less targeted to this issue than: Validate peer hop counts before applying TTL-security to multihop sessions.
Audit LDP adjacencies and label allocation policy against topology inventory. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: A provider accepts unbounded remote LDP label mappings from an unexpected neighbor in a shared transport environment. It is less targeted to this issue than: Validate peer hop counts before applying TTL-security to multihop sessions.
Run restart and rescheduling persistence drills before production upgrade windows. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: A provider stores a VNF configuration exclusively on the ephemeral container filesystem and loses subscriber policy after an orchestrator restarts the instance. It is less targeted to this issue than: Validate peer hop counts before applying TTL-security to multihop sessions.