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Exam Code: 350-501

Exam Name Implementing and Operating Cisco Service Provider Network Core Technologies (SPCOR)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certifications: CCIE Service Provider , CCNP Service Provider

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Cisco 350-501 Practice Test 5

Question 40

For a carrier automation platform team, the change record describes: Two eBGP routes reach the same prefix with equal local preference, but operations assumes a shorter AS_PATH cannot affect selection and blames a metric change. What preventive validation should be standard?

  1. Keep best-path attribute snapshots alongside policy change tickets.
  2. Document nondefault origin modifications to avoid opaque path changes.
  3. Require ordered attribute comparison in BGP troubleshooting notes.
  4. Distinguish translation versus encapsulation requirements in IPv4-as-a-service profiles.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Keep best-path attribute snapshots alongside policy change tickets. This helps prevent recurrence of the issue: Two eBGP routes reach the same prefix with equal local preference, but operations assumes a shorter AS_PATH cannot affect selection and blames a metric change. Acceptance evidence should be: A controlled pair of paths selects the expected shorter AS path when higher-priority attributes are equal.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Document nondefault origin modifications to avoid opaque path changes. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: A BGP router holds multiple valid paths yet chooses an unanticipated route because one path has a smaller origin code, not because of a mistaken community. It is less targeted to this issue than: Keep best-path attribute snapshots alongside policy change tickets.

C:

Require ordered attribute comparison in BGP troubleshooting notes. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: A provider expects an iBGP-learned path to beat an otherwise equal eBGP path simply because the iBGP router has a lower IGP cost to the next hop. It is less targeted to this issue than: Keep best-path attribute snapshots alongside policy change tickets.

D:

Distinguish translation versus encapsulation requirements in IPv4-as-a-service profiles. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: A provider tries to deliver MAP-T using an IPv4-in-IPv6 encapsulation template and loses packets because the customer expects stateless translation. It is less targeted to this issue than: Keep best-path attribute snapshots alongside policy change tickets.

Question 41

For a multi-tenant data transport provider, the failure is: A new eBGP handoff establishes TCP transport but remains Idle/Active because the peer configuration uses the wrong autonomous-system number. Which authorized correction best addresses it?

  1. Activate the IPv6 unicast address family and required export policies on both intended peers.
  2. Separate inbound inter-AS path influence via prepending from locally controlled outbound local-preference decisions.
  3. Correct remote-as and authenticated neighbor parameters to match the provider-customer agreement.
  4. Apply the appropriate inbound local-preference policy within the AS for its own traffic-engineering objective.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Correct remote-as and authenticated neighbor parameters to match the provider-customer agreement. This directly addresses the fictional service-provider network case: A new eBGP handoff establishes TCP transport but remains Idle/Active because the peer configuration uses the wrong autonomous-system number. The technical mechanism is: BGP peers validate remote AS identity during session establishment after TCP connectivity. Verify success by: The eBGP FSM reaches Established and the peer's AS is recorded correctly.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Activate the IPv6 unicast address family and required export policies on both intended peers. This would respond to a DIFFERENT fictional service-provider network issue: A carrier activates an IPv6-only peering exchange but leaves only IPv4 unicast activated, so the BGP session is Established yet receives no IPv6 prefixes. It does not directly address the current situation: A new eBGP handoff establishes TCP transport but remains Idle/Active because the peer configuration uses the wrong autonomous-system number.

B:

Separate inbound inter-AS path influence via prepending from locally controlled outbound local-preference decisions. This would respond to a DIFFERENT fictional service-provider network issue: A multihomed service-provider customer advertises a /24 prefix with multiple AS prepends yet expects the prepend to influence its own outbound preferred exit. It does not directly address the current situation: A new eBGP handoff establishes TCP transport but remains Idle/Active because the peer configuration uses the wrong autonomous-system number.

D:

Apply the appropriate inbound local-preference policy within the AS for its own traffic-engineering objective. This would respond to a DIFFERENT fictional service-provider network issue: An ISP announces the same customer prefix from two sites but a locally configured outbound route map modifies MED instead of local preference, so egress remains unchanged. It does not directly address the current situation: A new eBGP handoff establishes TCP transport but remains Idle/Active because the peer configuration uses the wrong autonomous-system number.

Question 42

After fixing the following network problem, what should the team verify: A new eBGP handoff establishes TCP transport but remains Idle/Active because the peer configuration uses the wrong autonomous-system number.

  1. Lab inbound path attributes show the prepend toward an upstream while the local routing policy sets the expected outbound exit.
  2. A link-loss test switches eligible prefixes onto the backup next hop within the documented recovery target.
  3. Route verification shows full IPv6 prefix reachability with stable LSP exchange.
  4. The eBGP FSM reaches Established and the peer's AS is recorded correctly.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The eBGP FSM reaches Established and the peer's AS is recorded correctly. This confirms the approved response: Correct remote-as and authenticated neighbor parameters to match the provider-customer agreement. It is relevant because: BGP peers validate remote AS identity during session establishment after TCP connectivity.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Lab inbound path attributes show the prepend toward an upstream while the local routing policy sets the expected outbound exit. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: A multihomed service-provider customer advertises a /24 prefix with multiple AS prepends yet expects the prepend to influence its own outbound preferred exit. The specific correction here is: Correct remote-as and authenticated neighbor parameters to match the provider-customer agreement.

B:

A link-loss test switches eligible prefixes onto the backup next hop within the documented recovery target. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: A provider enables BGP PIC in its core but expects instant convergence even though recursive alternate next hops were not installed for the affected VPN prefixes. The specific correction here is: Correct remote-as and authenticated neighbor parameters to match the provider-customer agreement.

C:

Route verification shows full IPv6 prefix reachability with stable LSP exchange. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: A new IPv6-only service is added to an IS-IS core, but routers run a single topology configuration where the IPv6 reachability bits are not negotiated consistently. The specific correction here is: Correct remote-as and authenticated neighbor parameters to match the provider-customer agreement.

Question 43

A carrier root-cause review considers: A new eBGP handoff establishes TCP transport but remains Idle/Active because the peer configuration uses the wrong autonomous-system number. What underlying mechanism explains this?

  1. BGP peers validate remote AS identity during session establishment after TCP connectivity.
  2. MP-BGP address families have separate route policies and prefix syntax even when sessions share a neighbor.
  3. AS-path prepending primarily affects external systems' route preference and not necessarily an AS's own egress selection.
  4. MAP-T uses stateless IPv4/IPv6 translation, whereas MAP-E relies on IPv4-in-IPv6 encapsulation.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

BGP peers validate remote AS identity during session establishment after TCP connectivity. This explains the investigated issue: A new eBGP handoff establishes TCP transport but remains Idle/Active because the peer configuration uses the wrong autonomous-system number. The approved corrective response is: Correct remote-as and authenticated neighbor parameters to match the provider-customer agreement.

Incorrect Answers

B:

MP-BGP address families have separate route policies and prefix syntax even when sessions share a neighbor. That explains a DIFFERENT scenario: An IPv6 border router accepts an IPv6 customer route under an IPv4 route-policy address-family clause and quietly blocks legitimate IPv6 service NLRI. The mechanism to prioritize for this question is: BGP peers validate remote AS identity during session establishment after TCP connectivity.

C:

AS-path prepending primarily affects external systems' route preference and not necessarily an AS's own egress selection. That explains a DIFFERENT scenario: A multihomed service-provider customer advertises a /24 prefix with multiple AS prepends yet expects the prepend to influence its own outbound preferred exit. The mechanism to prioritize for this question is: BGP peers validate remote AS identity during session establishment after TCP connectivity.

D:

MAP-T uses stateless IPv4/IPv6 translation, whereas MAP-E relies on IPv4-in-IPv6 encapsulation. That explains a DIFFERENT scenario: A provider tries to deliver MAP-T using an IPv4-in-IPv6 encapsulation template and loses packets because the customer expects stateless translation. The mechanism to prioritize for this question is: BGP peers validate remote AS identity during session establishment after TCP connectivity.

Question 44

After addressing: A new eBGP handoff establishes TCP transport but remains Idle/Active because the peer configuration uses the wrong autonomous-system number. Which recurring service assurance check is most useful?

  1. Contract-test BGP import/export with representative community fixtures.
  2. Use a peer inventory to preflight local and remote AS values.
  3. Measure PIC behavior for each platform and address family before claiming fast failover.
  4. Exercise planned supervisor failovers with forwarding and GR timer telemetry.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Use a peer inventory to preflight local and remote AS values. This helps prevent recurrence of the issue: A new eBGP handoff establishes TCP transport but remains Idle/Active because the peer configuration uses the wrong autonomous-system number. Acceptance evidence should be: The eBGP FSM reaches Established and the peer's AS is recorded correctly.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Contract-test BGP import/export with representative community fixtures. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: A core route reflector exports only a subset of service prefixes after a route-policy edit because the import policy unintentionally rejects an entire community group. It is less targeted to this issue than: Use a peer inventory to preflight local and remote AS values.

C:

Measure PIC behavior for each platform and address family before claiming fast failover. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: A provider enables BGP PIC in its core but expects instant convergence even though recursive alternate next hops were not installed for the affected VPN prefixes. It is less targeted to this issue than: Use a peer inventory to preflight local and remote AS values.

D:

Exercise planned supervisor failovers with forwarding and GR timer telemetry. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: A provider enables graceful restart for BGP but withdraws all forwarding entries immediately after a planned route-processor switchover, ignoring forwarding preservation requirements. It is less targeted to this issue than: Use a peer inventory to preflight local and remote AS values.

Question 45

A provider backbone escalation identifies: An IOS XR route policy applies `pass` before a prefix filter and an engineer expects later reject logic to stop evaluation automatically. What should the network team implement?

  1. Preserve and transmit the negotiated community using the supported neighbor settings and route policy.
  2. Express the correct prefix-set length condition for the desired more-specific NLRI and bound it to the intended neighbor.
  3. Inspect ordered BGP best-path attributes and compare AS_PATH length after local preference and other preceding decision rules.
  4. Rewrite the route-policy decisions with explicit conditional drops or controlled acceptance according to IOS XR RPL semantics.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Rewrite the route-policy decisions with explicit conditional drops or controlled acceptance according to IOS XR RPL semantics. This directly addresses the fictional service-provider network case: An IOS XR route policy applies `pass` before a prefix filter and an engineer expects later reject logic to stop evaluation automatically. The technical mechanism is: Routing Policy Language statements have defined evaluation semantics and must not be treated as arbitrary ordered ACL entries. Verify success by: A safe prefix fixture accepts only the specified routes and rejects the unauthorized rest.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Preserve and transmit the negotiated community using the supported neighbor settings and route policy. This would respond to a DIFFERENT fictional service-provider network issue: A provider uses BGP community 65000:123 as a traffic-engineering signal but one edge strips communities on eBGP export, so the upstream never applies the requested policy. It does not directly address the current situation: An IOS XR route policy applies `pass` before a prefix filter and an engineer expects later reject logic to stop evaluation automatically.

B:

Express the correct prefix-set length condition for the desired more-specific NLRI and bound it to the intended neighbor. This would respond to a DIFFERENT fictional service-provider network issue: A route-policy template attempts to match a more-specific /25 by using an exact /24 prefix without a length range, mistakenly accepting only the aggregate. It does not directly address the current situation: An IOS XR route policy applies `pass` before a prefix filter and an engineer expects later reject logic to stop evaluation automatically.

C:

Inspect ordered BGP best-path attributes and compare AS_PATH length after local preference and other preceding decision rules. This would respond to a DIFFERENT fictional service-provider network issue: Two eBGP routes reach the same prefix with equal local preference, but operations assumes a shorter AS_PATH cannot affect selection and blames a metric change. It does not directly address the current situation: An IOS XR route policy applies `pass` before a prefix filter and an engineer expects later reject logic to stop evaluation automatically.

Question 46

A service-provider operations test targets: An IOS XR route policy applies `pass` before a prefix filter and an engineer expects later reject logic to stop evaluation automatically. Which result is required?

  1. A safe prefix fixture accepts only the specified routes and rejects the unauthorized rest.
  2. A transit peer receives only global internet prefixes while VPN routes remain in authorized VRFs.
  3. Test prefixes show the tagged route rejected and only approved routes advertised.
  4. During switchover, eligible traffic continues while routing sessions safely reestablish within the timer budget.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

A safe prefix fixture accepts only the specified routes and rejects the unauthorized rest. This confirms the approved response: Rewrite the route-policy decisions with explicit conditional drops or controlled acceptance according to IOS XR RPL semantics. It is relevant because: Routing Policy Language statements have defined evaluation semantics and must not be treated as arbitrary ordered ACL entries.

Incorrect Answers

B:

A transit peer receives only global internet prefixes while VPN routes remain in authorized VRFs. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: A route reflector exports every VRF route to a public transit peer after route targets are reused carelessly in an import policy. The specific correction here is: Rewrite the route-policy decisions with explicit conditional drops or controlled acceptance according to IOS XR RPL semantics.

C:

Test prefixes show the tagged route rejected and only approved routes advertised. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: A route map denies a tagged customer route but includes a later permit clause matching all prefixes, and operations misinterprets the first match behavior. The specific correction here is: Rewrite the route-policy decisions with explicit conditional drops or controlled acceptance according to IOS XR RPL semantics.

D:

During switchover, eligible traffic continues while routing sessions safely reestablish within the timer budget. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: A provider enables graceful restart for BGP but withdraws all forwarding entries immediately after a planned route-processor switchover, ignoring forwarding preservation requirements. The specific correction here is: Rewrite the route-policy decisions with explicit conditional drops or controlled acceptance according to IOS XR RPL semantics.

Question 47

A provider troubleshooting note states: An IOS XR route policy applies `pass` before a prefix filter and an engineer expects later reject logic to stop evaluation automatically. Which mechanism is central?

  1. Safe provider routing policy needs deterministic predeployment validation because small clause changes alter large-scale reachability.
  2. Routing Policy Language statements have defined evaluation semantics and must not be treated as arbitrary ordered ACL entries.
  3. Route maps evaluate ordered policy clauses, and broad later matches must be carefully scoped.
  4. BGP Prefix Independent Convergence depends on precomputed forwarding alternatives and valid recursive next-hop resolution.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Routing Policy Language statements have defined evaluation semantics and must not be treated as arbitrary ordered ACL entries. This explains the investigated issue: An IOS XR route policy applies `pass` before a prefix filter and an engineer expects later reject logic to stop evaluation automatically. The approved corrective response is: Rewrite the route-policy decisions with explicit conditional drops or controlled acceptance according to IOS XR RPL semantics.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Safe provider routing policy needs deterministic predeployment validation because small clause changes alter large-scale reachability. That explains a DIFFERENT scenario: A policy deployer overwrites an existing RPL route policy in production without a prechange candidate diff, causing accidental withdrawal of one customer aggregate. The mechanism to prioritize for this question is: Routing Policy Language statements have defined evaluation semantics and must not be treated as arbitrary ordered ACL entries.

C:

Route maps evaluate ordered policy clauses, and broad later matches must be carefully scoped. That explains a DIFFERENT scenario: A route map denies a tagged customer route but includes a later permit clause matching all prefixes, and operations misinterprets the first match behavior. The mechanism to prioritize for this question is: Routing Policy Language statements have defined evaluation semantics and must not be treated as arbitrary ordered ACL entries.

D:

BGP Prefix Independent Convergence depends on precomputed forwarding alternatives and valid recursive next-hop resolution. That explains a DIFFERENT scenario: A provider enables BGP PIC in its core but expects instant convergence even though recursive alternate next hops were not installed for the affected VPN prefixes. The mechanism to prioritize for this question is: Routing Policy Language statements have defined evaluation semantics and must not be treated as arbitrary ordered ACL entries.

Question 48

To prevent recurrence of this provider network issue: An IOS XR route policy applies `pass` before a prefix filter and an engineer expects later reject logic to stop evaluation automatically. Which control should be retained?

  1. Label policy changes by inbound versus outbound traffic direction.
  2. Verify community presence in route advertisements at the external boundary.
  3. Maintain positive and negative RPL policy unit tests for each provider peer.
  4. Validate dual-family translation behavior before onboarding IPv6-only customers.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Maintain positive and negative RPL policy unit tests for each provider peer. This helps prevent recurrence of the issue: An IOS XR route policy applies `pass` before a prefix filter and an engineer expects later reject logic to stop evaluation automatically. Acceptance evidence should be: A safe prefix fixture accepts only the specified routes and rejects the unauthorized rest.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Label policy changes by inbound versus outbound traffic direction. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: An ISP announces the same customer prefix from two sites but a locally configured outbound route map modifies MED instead of local preference, so egress remains unchanged. It is less targeted to this issue than: Maintain positive and negative RPL policy unit tests for each provider peer.

B:

Verify community presence in route advertisements at the external boundary. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: A provider uses BGP community 65000:123 as a traffic-engineering signal but one edge strips communities on eBGP export, so the upstream never applies the requested policy. It is less targeted to this issue than: Maintain positive and negative RPL policy unit tests for each provider peer.

D:

Validate dual-family translation behavior before onboarding IPv6-only customers. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: An IPv6-only enterprise application must reach an IPv4-only legacy service, but the provider installs NAT44 and expects it to translate the address families. It is less targeted to this issue than: Maintain positive and negative RPL policy unit tests for each provider peer.

Question 49

At a converged broadband aggregation team, an engineering review finds: Two OSPFv2 neighbors exchange hellos but a recently inserted ACL blocks protocol 89, preventing database synchronization on the transit segment. Which change most directly corrects the service problem?

  1. Permit the required OSPF control traffic between approved peers at the correct interface policy boundary.
  2. Restore the intended IGP reachability to the correct BGP next hop or adjust policy consistently with design.
  3. Align supported BFD session parameters and measure them against the actual transport latency and loss envelope.
  4. Hold the overload condition until the router is ready to carry transit traffic and validate adjacency and route-table convergence.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Permit the required OSPF control traffic between approved peers at the correct interface policy boundary. This directly addresses the fictional service-provider network case: Two OSPFv2 neighbors exchange hellos but a recently inserted ACL blocks protocol 89, preventing database synchronization on the transit segment. The technical mechanism is: Filtering routing-protocol IP traffic can prevent adjacency even when ordinary ICMP reachability succeeds. Verify success by: A lab adjacency reaches Full and the LSDB counts converge without permitting unrelated sources.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Restore the intended IGP reachability to the correct BGP next hop or adjust policy consistently with design. This would respond to a DIFFERENT fictional service-provider network issue: BGP routes are received but a recursive next hop points to a withdrawn loopback, causing the FIB not to install otherwise valid customer NLRI. It does not directly address the current situation: Two OSPFv2 neighbors exchange hellos but a recently inserted ACL blocks protocol 89, preventing database synchronization on the transit segment.

C:

Align supported BFD session parameters and measure them against the actual transport latency and loss envelope. This would respond to a DIFFERENT fictional service-provider network issue: A router's OSPF adjacency flaps after an optical circuit fails over because differing BFD timer expectations cause repeated session-down detection. It does not directly address the current situation: Two OSPFv2 neighbors exchange hellos but a recently inserted ACL blocks protocol 89, preventing database synchronization on the transit segment.

D:

Hold the overload condition until the router is ready to carry transit traffic and validate adjacency and route-table convergence. This would respond to a DIFFERENT fictional service-provider network issue: A provider enables IS-IS overload on a recovering core node then removes the flag before the full route database is synchronized, leading to transient transit blackholes. It does not directly address the current situation: Two OSPFv2 neighbors exchange hellos but a recently inserted ACL blocks protocol 89, preventing database synchronization on the transit segment.

Question 50

For a converged broadband aggregation team, operators addressed: Two OSPFv2 neighbors exchange hellos but a recently inserted ACL blocks protocol 89, preventing database synchronization on the transit segment. What is the strongest acceptance evidence?

  1. Adjacency and LSP integrity counters remain stable during repeated authenticated hello exchanges.
  2. A lab adjacency reaches Full and the LSDB counts converge without permitting unrelated sources.
  3. In a test switchover, BFD stabilizes and the IGP reconverges within the agreed target.
  4. A link-loss test switches eligible prefixes onto the backup next hop within the documented recovery target.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

A lab adjacency reaches Full and the LSDB counts converge without permitting unrelated sources. This confirms the approved response: Permit the required OSPF control traffic between approved peers at the correct interface policy boundary. It is relevant because: Filtering routing-protocol IP traffic can prevent adjacency even when ordinary ICMP reachability succeeds.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Adjacency and LSP integrity counters remain stable during repeated authenticated hello exchanges. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: A service-provider IS-IS adjacency drops intermittently when one side uses authentication while the other still sends unauthenticated LSPs. The specific correction here is: Permit the required OSPF control traffic between approved peers at the correct interface policy boundary.

C:

In a test switchover, BFD stabilizes and the IGP reconverges within the agreed target. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: A router's OSPF adjacency flaps after an optical circuit fails over because differing BFD timer expectations cause repeated session-down detection. The specific correction here is: Permit the required OSPF control traffic between approved peers at the correct interface policy boundary.

D:

A link-loss test switches eligible prefixes onto the backup next hop within the documented recovery target. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: A provider enables BGP PIC in its core but expects instant convergence even though recursive alternate next hops were not installed for the affected VPN prefixes. The specific correction here is: Permit the required OSPF control traffic between approved peers at the correct interface policy boundary.