McAfee-Secured Website

Exam Bundle

Exam Code: SC-900

Exam Name Microsoft Security, Compliance, and Identity Fundamentals

Certification Provider: Microsoft

Corresponding Certification: Microsoft Certified: Security, Compliance, and Identity Fundamentals

Microsoft SC-900 Bundle $44.99

100% Microsoft SC-900 Guaranteed Success With Testking Training Materials

Get Real SC-900 Exam Questions & Expert Verified Answers as Experienced on the Real Exam!

  • Questions & Answers

    SC-900 Questions & Answers

    259 Questions & Answers

    The ultimate exam preparation tool, Questions & Answers mirrors the actual SC-900 exam while allowing you to hone and measure every aspect of your test-taking ability.

  • SC-900 Video Course

    SC-900 Video Course

    147 Video Lectures

    SC-900 Video Course is developed by Microsoft Professionals to help you pass the SC-900 exam.

    Description

    This course will improve your knowledge and skills required to pass Microsoft Security, Compliance, and Identity Fundamentals exam.
  • Study Guide

    SC-900 Study Guide

    413 PDF Pages

    Developed by industry experts, this 413-page guide spells out in painstaking detail all of the information you need to ace SC-900 exam.

Microsoft Security, Compliance, and Identity Fundamentals (SC-900) Practice Tests

Satisfaction Guaranteed

Money Back Guarantee

Testking provides hassle-free money back guarantee with our products. That is because we have 100% trust in the abilities of our professional and experience product team, and our record is a proof of that.

99.6% PASS RATE
Total Cost: $194.97
Bundle Price: $149.98

Purchase Individually

  • Questions & Answers

    Questions & Answers

    259 Questions

    $124.99
  • SC-900 Video Course

    Video Course

    147 Video Lectures

    $39.99
  • Study Guide

    Study Guide

    413 PDF Pages

    $29.99

Microsoft SC-900 Practice Test 11

Question 100

During a migration readiness assessment at Blue Haven Media, the SOC analyst identifies this issue: A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider. The responsible team reports that it has applied the correction. Which evidence BEST verifies that the original issue was resolved?

  1. An unauthorized credential or context is blocked even when the requesting device can reach the application endpoint.
  2. A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.
  3. A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules.
  4. A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected. This is the relevant proof because it tests whether the selected corrective action (Integrate with a trusted identity provider and validate issued authentication tokens before accepting a sign-in) addressed the initiating problem (A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider) in Blue Haven Media's creative files and production workspaces environment, not merely whether a task was marked complete.

Incorrect Answers

A:

An unauthorized credential or context is blocked even when the requesting device can reach the application endpoint. This is useful evidence for a different situation (A hybrid company protects only its physical network edge although employees sign in to cloud services from unmanaged networks) and action (Treat identity as a primary security perimeter and enforce appropriate authentication and authorization at cloud application access). For the reported issue at Blue Haven Media, it does not establish the required outcome: A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.

C:

A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules. This is useful evidence for a different situation (Two independent organizations share a web application but require users to create duplicate local passwords because no trust relationship exists) and action (Evaluate identity federation to accept authentication assertions from an approved external identity provider). For the reported issue at Blue Haven Media, it does not establish the required outcome: A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.

D:

A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications. This is useful evidence for a different situation (An application stores a separate password list for every department instead of relying on the organization's managed directory) and action (Use a suitable directory and identity provider to centralize identity records and lifecycle control). For the reported issue at Blue Haven Media, it does not establish the required outcome: A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.

Question 101

The identity operations team at Cobalt Aerospace supports engineering programs and secure collaboration. An assessment finds: A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider. Which action BEST addresses the described security, identity, or compliance gap?

  1. Evaluate identity federation to accept authentication assertions from an approved external identity provider.
  2. Treat identity as a primary security perimeter and enforce appropriate authentication and authorization at cloud application access.
  3. Use a suitable directory and identity provider to centralize identity records and lifecycle control.
  4. Integrate with a trusted identity provider and validate issued authentication tokens before accepting a sign-in.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Integrate with a trusted identity provider and validate issued authentication tokens before accepting a sign-in. This directly addresses the observed weakness: A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider. For Cobalt Aerospace and its engineering programs and secure collaboration, a meaningful acceptance check would be: A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Evaluate identity federation to accept authentication assertions from an approved external identity provider. This addresses a different security or governance gap: Two independent organizations share a web application but require users to create duplicate local passwords because no trust relationship exists. For Cobalt Aerospace and its engineering programs and secure collaboration, the issue is instead: A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.

B:

Treat identity as a primary security perimeter and enforce appropriate authentication and authorization at cloud application access. This addresses a different security or governance gap: A hybrid company protects only its physical network edge although employees sign in to cloud services from unmanaged networks. For Cobalt Aerospace and its engineering programs and secure collaboration, the issue is instead: A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.

C:

Use a suitable directory and identity provider to centralize identity records and lifecycle control. This addresses a different security or governance gap: An application stores a separate password list for every department instead of relying on the organization's managed directory. For Cobalt Aerospace and its engineering programs and secure collaboration, the issue is instead: A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.

Question 102

The identity operations team at Cobalt Aerospace supports engineering programs and secure collaboration. An assessment finds: A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider. The responsible team reports that it has applied the correction. Which evidence BEST verifies that the original issue was resolved?

  1. A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules.
  2. A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications.
  3. A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.
  4. An unauthorized credential or context is blocked even when the requesting device can reach the application endpoint.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected. This is the relevant proof because it tests whether the selected corrective action (Integrate with a trusted identity provider and validate issued authentication tokens before accepting a sign-in) addressed the initiating problem (A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider) in Cobalt Aerospace's engineering programs and secure collaboration environment, not merely whether a task was marked complete.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules. This is useful evidence for a different situation (Two independent organizations share a web application but require users to create duplicate local passwords because no trust relationship exists) and action (Evaluate identity federation to accept authentication assertions from an approved external identity provider). For the reported issue at Cobalt Aerospace, it does not establish the required outcome: A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.

B:

A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications. This is useful evidence for a different situation (An application stores a separate password list for every department instead of relying on the organization's managed directory) and action (Use a suitable directory and identity provider to centralize identity records and lifecycle control). For the reported issue at Cobalt Aerospace, it does not establish the required outcome: A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.

D:

An unauthorized credential or context is blocked even when the requesting device can reach the application endpoint. This is useful evidence for a different situation (A hybrid company protects only its physical network edge although employees sign in to cloud services from unmanaged networks) and action (Treat identity as a primary security perimeter and enforce appropriate authentication and authorization at cloud application access). For the reported issue at Cobalt Aerospace, it does not establish the required outcome: A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.

Question 103

The identity operations team at Orion Network Services supports subscriber applications and remote operations. An assessment finds: Two independent organizations share a web application but require users to create duplicate local passwords because no trust relationship exists. Which action BEST addresses the described security, identity, or compliance gap?

  1. Integrate with a trusted identity provider and validate issued authentication tokens before accepting a sign-in.
  2. Design identity lifecycle offboarding and regularly review trust relationships and downstream sessions.
  3. Evaluate identity federation to accept authentication assertions from an approved external identity provider.
  4. Document the federation authentication trust separately from locally configured application roles and access policy.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Evaluate identity federation to accept authentication assertions from an approved external identity provider. This directly addresses the observed weakness: Two independent organizations share a web application but require users to create duplicate local passwords because no trust relationship exists. For Orion Network Services and its subscriber applications and remote operations, a meaningful acceptance check would be: A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Integrate with a trusted identity provider and validate issued authentication tokens before accepting a sign-in. This addresses a different security or governance gap: A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider. For Orion Network Services and its subscriber applications and remote operations, the issue is instead: Two independent organizations share a web application but require users to create duplicate local passwords because no trust relationship exists. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules.

B:

Design identity lifecycle offboarding and regularly review trust relationships and downstream sessions. This addresses a different security or governance gap: A former employee retains federated access because the identity lifecycle in the home organization was not connected to downstream application access. For Orion Network Services and its subscriber applications and remote operations, the issue is instead: Two independent organizations share a web application but require users to create duplicate local passwords because no trust relationship exists. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules.

D:

Document the federation authentication trust separately from locally configured application roles and access policy. This addresses a different security or governance gap: A directory administrator believes identity federation automatically copies every authorization permission from a partner tenant. For Orion Network Services and its subscriber applications and remote operations, the issue is instead: Two independent organizations share a web application but require users to create duplicate local passwords because no trust relationship exists. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules.

Question 104

The identity operations team at Orion Network Services supports subscriber applications and remote operations. An assessment finds: Two independent organizations share a web application but require users to create duplicate local passwords because no trust relationship exists. The responsible team reports that it has applied the correction. Which evidence BEST verifies that the original issue was resolved?

  1. A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules.
  2. A valid federated user session still fails a resource authorization check unless the intended local role is assigned.
  3. Disabling the account and revoking active access prevents the former employee from obtaining another trusted session.
  4. A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules. This is the relevant proof because it tests whether the selected corrective action (Evaluate identity federation to accept authentication assertions from an approved external identity provider) addressed the initiating problem (Two independent organizations share a web application but require users to create duplicate local passwords because no trust relationship exists) in Orion Network Services's subscriber applications and remote operations environment, not merely whether a task was marked complete.

Incorrect Answers

B:

A valid federated user session still fails a resource authorization check unless the intended local role is assigned. This is useful evidence for a different situation (A directory administrator believes identity federation automatically copies every authorization permission from a partner tenant) and action (Document the federation authentication trust separately from locally configured application roles and access policy). For the reported issue at Orion Network Services, it does not establish the required outcome: A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules.

C:

Disabling the account and revoking active access prevents the former employee from obtaining another trusted session. This is useful evidence for a different situation (A former employee retains federated access because the identity lifecycle in the home organization was not connected to downstream application access) and action (Design identity lifecycle offboarding and regularly review trust relationships and downstream sessions). For the reported issue at Orion Network Services, it does not establish the required outcome: A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules.

D:

A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected. This is useful evidence for a different situation (A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider) and action (Integrate with a trusted identity provider and validate issued authentication tokens before accepting a sign-in). For the reported issue at Orion Network Services, it does not establish the required outcome: A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules.

Question 105

At Aspen Digital, an access governance review uncovers the following situation affecting client advisory systems and shared files: Two independent organizations share a web application but require users to create duplicate local passwords because no trust relationship exists. Which action BEST addresses the described security, identity, or compliance gap?

  1. Integrate with a trusted identity provider and validate issued authentication tokens before accepting a sign-in.
  2. Design identity lifecycle offboarding and regularly review trust relationships and downstream sessions.
  3. Document the federation authentication trust separately from locally configured application roles and access policy.
  4. Evaluate identity federation to accept authentication assertions from an approved external identity provider.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Evaluate identity federation to accept authentication assertions from an approved external identity provider. This directly addresses the observed weakness: Two independent organizations share a web application but require users to create duplicate local passwords because no trust relationship exists. For Aspen Digital and its client advisory systems and shared files, a meaningful acceptance check would be: A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Integrate with a trusted identity provider and validate issued authentication tokens before accepting a sign-in. This addresses a different security or governance gap: A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider. For Aspen Digital and its client advisory systems and shared files, the issue is instead: Two independent organizations share a web application but require users to create duplicate local passwords because no trust relationship exists. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules.

B:

Design identity lifecycle offboarding and regularly review trust relationships and downstream sessions. This addresses a different security or governance gap: A former employee retains federated access because the identity lifecycle in the home organization was not connected to downstream application access. For Aspen Digital and its client advisory systems and shared files, the issue is instead: Two independent organizations share a web application but require users to create duplicate local passwords because no trust relationship exists. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules.

C:

Document the federation authentication trust separately from locally configured application roles and access policy. This addresses a different security or governance gap: A directory administrator believes identity federation automatically copies every authorization permission from a partner tenant. For Aspen Digital and its client advisory systems and shared files, the issue is instead: Two independent organizations share a web application but require users to create duplicate local passwords because no trust relationship exists. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules.

Question 106

At Aspen Digital, an access governance review uncovers the following situation affecting client advisory systems and shared files: Two independent organizations share a web application but require users to create duplicate local passwords because no trust relationship exists. The responsible team reports that it has applied the correction. Which evidence BEST verifies that the original issue was resolved?

  1. A valid federated user session still fails a resource authorization check unless the intended local role is assigned.
  2. Disabling the account and revoking active access prevents the former employee from obtaining another trusted session.
  3. A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.
  4. A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules. This is the relevant proof because it tests whether the selected corrective action (Evaluate identity federation to accept authentication assertions from an approved external identity provider) addressed the initiating problem (Two independent organizations share a web application but require users to create duplicate local passwords because no trust relationship exists) in Aspen Digital's client advisory systems and shared files environment, not merely whether a task was marked complete.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A valid federated user session still fails a resource authorization check unless the intended local role is assigned. This is useful evidence for a different situation (A directory administrator believes identity federation automatically copies every authorization permission from a partner tenant) and action (Document the federation authentication trust separately from locally configured application roles and access policy). For the reported issue at Aspen Digital, it does not establish the required outcome: A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules.

B:

Disabling the account and revoking active access prevents the former employee from obtaining another trusted session. This is useful evidence for a different situation (A former employee retains federated access because the identity lifecycle in the home organization was not connected to downstream application access) and action (Design identity lifecycle offboarding and regularly review trust relationships and downstream sessions). For the reported issue at Aspen Digital, it does not establish the required outcome: A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules.

C:

A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected. This is useful evidence for a different situation (A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider) and action (Integrate with a trusted identity provider and validate issued authentication tokens before accepting a sign-in). For the reported issue at Aspen Digital, it does not establish the required outcome: A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules.

Question 107

During a controlled policy review at Stonehaven Logistics, the tenant administration team identifies this issue: Two independent organizations share a web application but require users to create duplicate local passwords because no trust relationship exists. Which action BEST addresses the described security, identity, or compliance gap?

  1. Integrate with a trusted identity provider and validate issued authentication tokens before accepting a sign-in.
  2. Evaluate identity federation to accept authentication assertions from an approved external identity provider.
  3. Design identity lifecycle offboarding and regularly review trust relationships and downstream sessions.
  4. Document the federation authentication trust separately from locally configured application roles and access policy.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Evaluate identity federation to accept authentication assertions from an approved external identity provider. This directly addresses the observed weakness: Two independent organizations share a web application but require users to create duplicate local passwords because no trust relationship exists. For Stonehaven Logistics and its warehouse scheduling and shipping records, a meaningful acceptance check would be: A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Integrate with a trusted identity provider and validate issued authentication tokens before accepting a sign-in. This addresses a different security or governance gap: A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider. For Stonehaven Logistics and its warehouse scheduling and shipping records, the issue is instead: Two independent organizations share a web application but require users to create duplicate local passwords because no trust relationship exists. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules.

C:

Design identity lifecycle offboarding and regularly review trust relationships and downstream sessions. This addresses a different security or governance gap: A former employee retains federated access because the identity lifecycle in the home organization was not connected to downstream application access. For Stonehaven Logistics and its warehouse scheduling and shipping records, the issue is instead: Two independent organizations share a web application but require users to create duplicate local passwords because no trust relationship exists. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules.

D:

Document the federation authentication trust separately from locally configured application roles and access policy. This addresses a different security or governance gap: A directory administrator believes identity federation automatically copies every authorization permission from a partner tenant. For Stonehaven Logistics and its warehouse scheduling and shipping records, the issue is instead: Two independent organizations share a web application but require users to create duplicate local passwords because no trust relationship exists. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules.

Question 108

During a controlled policy review at Stonehaven Logistics, the tenant administration team identifies this issue: Two independent organizations share a web application but require users to create duplicate local passwords because no trust relationship exists. The responsible team reports that it has applied the correction. Which evidence BEST verifies that the original issue was resolved?

  1. A valid federated user session still fails a resource authorization check unless the intended local role is assigned.
  2. A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules.
  3. A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.
  4. Disabling the account and revoking active access prevents the former employee from obtaining another trusted session.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules. This is the relevant proof because it tests whether the selected corrective action (Evaluate identity federation to accept authentication assertions from an approved external identity provider) addressed the initiating problem (Two independent organizations share a web application but require users to create duplicate local passwords because no trust relationship exists) in Stonehaven Logistics's warehouse scheduling and shipping records environment, not merely whether a task was marked complete.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A valid federated user session still fails a resource authorization check unless the intended local role is assigned. This is useful evidence for a different situation (A directory administrator believes identity federation automatically copies every authorization permission from a partner tenant) and action (Document the federation authentication trust separately from locally configured application roles and access policy). For the reported issue at Stonehaven Logistics, it does not establish the required outcome: A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules.

C:

A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected. This is useful evidence for a different situation (A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider) and action (Integrate with a trusted identity provider and validate issued authentication tokens before accepting a sign-in). For the reported issue at Stonehaven Logistics, it does not establish the required outcome: A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules.

D:

Disabling the account and revoking active access prevents the former employee from obtaining another trusted session. This is useful evidence for a different situation (A former employee retains federated access because the identity lifecycle in the home organization was not connected to downstream application access) and action (Design identity lifecycle offboarding and regularly review trust relationships and downstream sessions). For the reported issue at Stonehaven Logistics, it does not establish the required outcome: A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules.

Question 109

During a migration readiness assessment at Horizon Energy Services, the tenant administration team identifies this issue: A single sign-on deployment is expected to grant every application role simply because the user authenticated once. Which action BEST addresses the described security, identity, or compliance gap?

  1. Document the federation authentication trust separately from locally configured application roles and access policy.
  2. Separate authentication of the identity from subsequent authorization to the payroll resource.
  3. Keep application authorization decisions separate from the convenience of a shared single sign-on session.
  4. Assign the nonhuman workload a governed service identity and scoped authorization instead of a personal account.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Keep application authorization decisions separate from the convenience of a shared single sign-on session. This directly addresses the observed weakness: A single sign-on deployment is expected to grant every application role simply because the user authenticated once. For Horizon Energy Services and its remote field-worker sign-ins and operations, a meaningful acceptance check would be: A user signs in once but is denied an application role that was never assigned.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Document the federation authentication trust separately from locally configured application roles and access policy. This addresses a different security or governance gap: A directory administrator believes identity federation automatically copies every authorization permission from a partner tenant. For Horizon Energy Services and its remote field-worker sign-ins and operations, the issue is instead: A single sign-on deployment is expected to grant every application role simply because the user authenticated once. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A user signs in once but is denied an application role that was never assigned.

B:

Separate authentication of the identity from subsequent authorization to the payroll resource. This addresses a different security or governance gap: A user enters correct credentials but cannot open a restricted payroll application and the help desk treats the failure as unsuccessful authentication. For Horizon Energy Services and its remote field-worker sign-ins and operations, the issue is instead: A single sign-on deployment is expected to grant every application role simply because the user authenticated once. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A user signs in once but is denied an application role that was never assigned.

D:

Assign the nonhuman workload a governed service identity and scoped authorization instead of a personal account. This addresses a different security or governance gap: A scheduled data export is run using a shared employee password because the team assumes only human beings can have identities. For Horizon Energy Services and its remote field-worker sign-ins and operations, the issue is instead: A single sign-on deployment is expected to grant every application role simply because the user authenticated once. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A user signs in once but is denied an application role that was never assigned.

Question 110

During a migration readiness assessment at Horizon Energy Services, the tenant administration team identifies this issue: A single sign-on deployment is expected to grant every application role simply because the user authenticated once. The responsible team reports that it has applied the correction. Which evidence BEST verifies that the original issue was resolved?

  1. A valid federated user session still fails a resource authorization check unless the intended local role is assigned.
  2. The export runs with an auditable workload identity and an unrelated privilege request is denied.
  3. A user signs in once but is denied an application role that was never assigned.
  4. Sign-in evidence confirms the person was authenticated while the resource audit records a distinct permission denial.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

A user signs in once but is denied an application role that was never assigned. This is the relevant proof because it tests whether the selected corrective action (Keep application authorization decisions separate from the convenience of a shared single sign-on session) addressed the initiating problem (A single sign-on deployment is expected to grant every application role simply because the user authenticated once) in Horizon Energy Services's remote field-worker sign-ins and operations environment, not merely whether a task was marked complete.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A valid federated user session still fails a resource authorization check unless the intended local role is assigned. This is useful evidence for a different situation (A directory administrator believes identity federation automatically copies every authorization permission from a partner tenant) and action (Document the federation authentication trust separately from locally configured application roles and access policy). For the reported issue at Horizon Energy Services, it does not establish the required outcome: A user signs in once but is denied an application role that was never assigned.

B:

The export runs with an auditable workload identity and an unrelated privilege request is denied. This is useful evidence for a different situation (A scheduled data export is run using a shared employee password because the team assumes only human beings can have identities) and action (Assign the nonhuman workload a governed service identity and scoped authorization instead of a personal account). For the reported issue at Horizon Energy Services, it does not establish the required outcome: A user signs in once but is denied an application role that was never assigned.

D:

Sign-in evidence confirms the person was authenticated while the resource audit records a distinct permission denial. This is useful evidence for a different situation (A user enters correct credentials but cannot open a restricted payroll application and the help desk treats the failure as unsuccessful authentication) and action (Separate authentication of the identity from subsequent authorization to the payroll resource). For the reported issue at Horizon Energy Services, it does not establish the required outcome: A user signs in once but is denied an application role that was never assigned.