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Exam Code: SC-900

Exam Name Microsoft Security, Compliance, and Identity Fundamentals

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Corresponding Certification: Microsoft Certified: Security, Compliance, and Identity Fundamentals

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Microsoft SC-900 Practice Test 10

Question 90

During a migration readiness assessment at Seabright Municipal Works, the identity operations team identifies this issue: A hybrid company protects only its physical network edge although employees sign in to cloud services from unmanaged networks. The responsible team reports that it has applied the correction. Which evidence BEST verifies that the original issue was resolved?

  1. A valid federated user session still fails a resource authorization check unless the intended local role is assigned.
  2. A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.
  3. Sign-in evidence confirms the person was authenticated while the resource audit records a distinct permission denial.
  4. An unauthorized credential or context is blocked even when the requesting device can reach the application endpoint.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

An unauthorized credential or context is blocked even when the requesting device can reach the application endpoint. This is the relevant proof because it tests whether the selected corrective action (Treat identity as a primary security perimeter and enforce appropriate authentication and authorization at cloud application access) addressed the initiating problem (A hybrid company protects only its physical network edge although employees sign in to cloud services from unmanaged networks) in Seabright Municipal Works's public-sector records and operations environment, not merely whether a task was marked complete.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A valid federated user session still fails a resource authorization check unless the intended local role is assigned. This is useful evidence for a different situation (A directory administrator believes identity federation automatically copies every authorization permission from a partner tenant) and action (Document the federation authentication trust separately from locally configured application roles and access policy). For the reported issue at Seabright Municipal Works, it does not establish the required outcome: An unauthorized credential or context is blocked even when the requesting device can reach the application endpoint.

B:

A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected. This is useful evidence for a different situation (A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider) and action (Integrate with a trusted identity provider and validate issued authentication tokens before accepting a sign-in). For the reported issue at Seabright Municipal Works, it does not establish the required outcome: An unauthorized credential or context is blocked even when the requesting device can reach the application endpoint.

C:

Sign-in evidence confirms the person was authenticated while the resource audit records a distinct permission denial. This is useful evidence for a different situation (A user enters correct credentials but cannot open a restricted payroll application and the help desk treats the failure as unsuccessful authentication) and action (Separate authentication of the identity from subsequent authorization to the payroll resource). For the reported issue at Seabright Municipal Works, it does not establish the required outcome: An unauthorized credential or context is blocked even when the requesting device can reach the application endpoint.

Question 91

During a new-service rollout at Marshfield Bank, the identity operations team identifies this issue: An application stores a separate password list for every department instead of relying on the organization's managed directory. Which action BEST addresses the described security, identity, or compliance gap?

  1. Integrate with a trusted identity provider and validate issued authentication tokens before accepting a sign-in.
  2. Use a suitable directory and identity provider to centralize identity records and lifecycle control.
  3. Document the federation authentication trust separately from locally configured application roles and access policy.
  4. Keep application authorization decisions separate from the convenience of a shared single sign-on session.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Use a suitable directory and identity provider to centralize identity records and lifecycle control. This directly addresses the observed weakness: An application stores a separate password list for every department instead of relying on the organization's managed directory. For Marshfield Bank and its payments and confidential client information, a meaningful acceptance check would be: A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Integrate with a trusted identity provider and validate issued authentication tokens before accepting a sign-in. This addresses a different security or governance gap: A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider. For Marshfield Bank and its payments and confidential client information, the issue is instead: An application stores a separate password list for every department instead of relying on the organization's managed directory. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications.

C:

Document the federation authentication trust separately from locally configured application roles and access policy. This addresses a different security or governance gap: A directory administrator believes identity federation automatically copies every authorization permission from a partner tenant. For Marshfield Bank and its payments and confidential client information, the issue is instead: An application stores a separate password list for every department instead of relying on the organization's managed directory. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications.

D:

Keep application authorization decisions separate from the convenience of a shared single sign-on session. This addresses a different security or governance gap: A single sign-on deployment is expected to grant every application role simply because the user authenticated once. For Marshfield Bank and its payments and confidential client information, the issue is instead: An application stores a separate password list for every department instead of relying on the organization's managed directory. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications.

Question 92

During a new-service rollout at Marshfield Bank, the identity operations team identifies this issue: An application stores a separate password list for every department instead of relying on the organization's managed directory. The responsible team reports that it has applied the correction. Which evidence BEST verifies that the original issue was resolved?

  1. A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications.
  2. A user signs in once but is denied an application role that was never assigned.
  3. A valid federated user session still fails a resource authorization check unless the intended local role is assigned.
  4. A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications. This is the relevant proof because it tests whether the selected corrective action (Use a suitable directory and identity provider to centralize identity records and lifecycle control) addressed the initiating problem (An application stores a separate password list for every department instead of relying on the organization's managed directory) in Marshfield Bank's payments and confidential client information environment, not merely whether a task was marked complete.

Incorrect Answers

B:

A user signs in once but is denied an application role that was never assigned. This is useful evidence for a different situation (A single sign-on deployment is expected to grant every application role simply because the user authenticated once) and action (Keep application authorization decisions separate from the convenience of a shared single sign-on session). For the reported issue at Marshfield Bank, it does not establish the required outcome: A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications.

C:

A valid federated user session still fails a resource authorization check unless the intended local role is assigned. This is useful evidence for a different situation (A directory administrator believes identity federation automatically copies every authorization permission from a partner tenant) and action (Document the federation authentication trust separately from locally configured application roles and access policy). For the reported issue at Marshfield Bank, it does not establish the required outcome: A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications.

D:

A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected. This is useful evidence for a different situation (A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider) and action (Integrate with a trusted identity provider and validate issued authentication tokens before accepting a sign-in). For the reported issue at Marshfield Bank, it does not establish the required outcome: A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications.

Question 93

The compliance analyst at Sapphire Data Systems supports customer tenants and managed cloud services. An assessment finds: An application stores a separate password list for every department instead of relying on the organization's managed directory. Which action BEST addresses the described security, identity, or compliance gap?

  1. Document the federation authentication trust separately from locally configured application roles and access policy.
  2. Keep application authorization decisions separate from the convenience of a shared single sign-on session.
  3. Integrate with a trusted identity provider and validate issued authentication tokens before accepting a sign-in.
  4. Use a suitable directory and identity provider to centralize identity records and lifecycle control.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Use a suitable directory and identity provider to centralize identity records and lifecycle control. This directly addresses the observed weakness: An application stores a separate password list for every department instead of relying on the organization's managed directory. For Sapphire Data Systems and its customer tenants and managed cloud services, a meaningful acceptance check would be: A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Document the federation authentication trust separately from locally configured application roles and access policy. This addresses a different security or governance gap: A directory administrator believes identity federation automatically copies every authorization permission from a partner tenant. For Sapphire Data Systems and its customer tenants and managed cloud services, the issue is instead: An application stores a separate password list for every department instead of relying on the organization's managed directory. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications.

B:

Keep application authorization decisions separate from the convenience of a shared single sign-on session. This addresses a different security or governance gap: A single sign-on deployment is expected to grant every application role simply because the user authenticated once. For Sapphire Data Systems and its customer tenants and managed cloud services, the issue is instead: An application stores a separate password list for every department instead of relying on the organization's managed directory. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications.

C:

Integrate with a trusted identity provider and validate issued authentication tokens before accepting a sign-in. This addresses a different security or governance gap: A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider. For Sapphire Data Systems and its customer tenants and managed cloud services, the issue is instead: An application stores a separate password list for every department instead of relying on the organization's managed directory. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications.

Question 94

The compliance analyst at Sapphire Data Systems supports customer tenants and managed cloud services. An assessment finds: An application stores a separate password list for every department instead of relying on the organization's managed directory. The responsible team reports that it has applied the correction. Which evidence BEST verifies that the original issue was resolved?

  1. A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.
  2. A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications.
  3. A valid federated user session still fails a resource authorization check unless the intended local role is assigned.
  4. A user signs in once but is denied an application role that was never assigned.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications. This is the relevant proof because it tests whether the selected corrective action (Use a suitable directory and identity provider to centralize identity records and lifecycle control) addressed the initiating problem (An application stores a separate password list for every department instead of relying on the organization's managed directory) in Sapphire Data Systems's customer tenants and managed cloud services environment, not merely whether a task was marked complete.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected. This is useful evidence for a different situation (A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider) and action (Integrate with a trusted identity provider and validate issued authentication tokens before accepting a sign-in). For the reported issue at Sapphire Data Systems, it does not establish the required outcome: A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications.

C:

A valid federated user session still fails a resource authorization check unless the intended local role is assigned. This is useful evidence for a different situation (A directory administrator believes identity federation automatically copies every authorization permission from a partner tenant) and action (Document the federation authentication trust separately from locally configured application roles and access policy). For the reported issue at Sapphire Data Systems, it does not establish the required outcome: A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications.

D:

A user signs in once but is denied an application role that was never assigned. This is useful evidence for a different situation (A single sign-on deployment is expected to grant every application role simply because the user authenticated once) and action (Keep application authorization decisions separate from the convenience of a shared single sign-on session). For the reported issue at Sapphire Data Systems, it does not establish the required outcome: A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications.

Question 95

At Linden Manufacturing, an access governance review uncovers the following situation affecting plant operations and product design information: An application stores a separate password list for every department instead of relying on the organization's managed directory. Which action BEST addresses the described security, identity, or compliance gap?

  1. Use a suitable directory and identity provider to centralize identity records and lifecycle control.
  2. Document the federation authentication trust separately from locally configured application roles and access policy.
  3. Keep application authorization decisions separate from the convenience of a shared single sign-on session.
  4. Integrate with a trusted identity provider and validate issued authentication tokens before accepting a sign-in.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Use a suitable directory and identity provider to centralize identity records and lifecycle control. This directly addresses the observed weakness: An application stores a separate password list for every department instead of relying on the organization's managed directory. For Linden Manufacturing and its plant operations and product design information, a meaningful acceptance check would be: A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Document the federation authentication trust separately from locally configured application roles and access policy. This addresses a different security or governance gap: A directory administrator believes identity federation automatically copies every authorization permission from a partner tenant. For Linden Manufacturing and its plant operations and product design information, the issue is instead: An application stores a separate password list for every department instead of relying on the organization's managed directory. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications.

C:

Keep application authorization decisions separate from the convenience of a shared single sign-on session. This addresses a different security or governance gap: A single sign-on deployment is expected to grant every application role simply because the user authenticated once. For Linden Manufacturing and its plant operations and product design information, the issue is instead: An application stores a separate password list for every department instead of relying on the organization's managed directory. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications.

D:

Integrate with a trusted identity provider and validate issued authentication tokens before accepting a sign-in. This addresses a different security or governance gap: A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider. For Linden Manufacturing and its plant operations and product design information, the issue is instead: An application stores a separate password list for every department instead of relying on the organization's managed directory. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications.

Question 96

At Linden Manufacturing, an access governance review uncovers the following situation affecting plant operations and product design information: An application stores a separate password list for every department instead of relying on the organization's managed directory. The responsible team reports that it has applied the correction. Which evidence BEST verifies that the original issue was resolved?

  1. A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications.
  2. A user signs in once but is denied an application role that was never assigned.
  3. A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.
  4. A valid federated user session still fails a resource authorization check unless the intended local role is assigned.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications. This is the relevant proof because it tests whether the selected corrective action (Use a suitable directory and identity provider to centralize identity records and lifecycle control) addressed the initiating problem (An application stores a separate password list for every department instead of relying on the organization's managed directory) in Linden Manufacturing's plant operations and product design information environment, not merely whether a task was marked complete.

Incorrect Answers

B:

A user signs in once but is denied an application role that was never assigned. This is useful evidence for a different situation (A single sign-on deployment is expected to grant every application role simply because the user authenticated once) and action (Keep application authorization decisions separate from the convenience of a shared single sign-on session). For the reported issue at Linden Manufacturing, it does not establish the required outcome: A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications.

C:

A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected. This is useful evidence for a different situation (A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider) and action (Integrate with a trusted identity provider and validate issued authentication tokens before accepting a sign-in). For the reported issue at Linden Manufacturing, it does not establish the required outcome: A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications.

D:

A valid federated user session still fails a resource authorization check unless the intended local role is assigned. This is useful evidence for a different situation (A directory administrator believes identity federation automatically copies every authorization permission from a partner tenant) and action (Document the federation authentication trust separately from locally configured application roles and access policy). For the reported issue at Linden Manufacturing, it does not establish the required outcome: A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications.

Question 97

At Lakeview Insurance, a protection architecture discussion uncovers the following situation affecting broker collaboration and claim applications: A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider. Which action BEST addresses the described security, identity, or compliance gap?

  1. Evaluate identity federation to accept authentication assertions from an approved external identity provider.
  2. Use a suitable directory and identity provider to centralize identity records and lifecycle control.
  3. Treat identity as a primary security perimeter and enforce appropriate authentication and authorization at cloud application access.
  4. Integrate with a trusted identity provider and validate issued authentication tokens before accepting a sign-in.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Integrate with a trusted identity provider and validate issued authentication tokens before accepting a sign-in. This directly addresses the observed weakness: A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider. For Lakeview Insurance and its broker collaboration and claim applications, a meaningful acceptance check would be: A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Evaluate identity federation to accept authentication assertions from an approved external identity provider. This addresses a different security or governance gap: Two independent organizations share a web application but require users to create duplicate local passwords because no trust relationship exists. For Lakeview Insurance and its broker collaboration and claim applications, the issue is instead: A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.

B:

Use a suitable directory and identity provider to centralize identity records and lifecycle control. This addresses a different security or governance gap: An application stores a separate password list for every department instead of relying on the organization's managed directory. For Lakeview Insurance and its broker collaboration and claim applications, the issue is instead: A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.

C:

Treat identity as a primary security perimeter and enforce appropriate authentication and authorization at cloud application access. This addresses a different security or governance gap: A hybrid company protects only its physical network edge although employees sign in to cloud services from unmanaged networks. For Lakeview Insurance and its broker collaboration and claim applications, the issue is instead: A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.

Question 98

At Lakeview Insurance, a protection architecture discussion uncovers the following situation affecting broker collaboration and claim applications: A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider. The responsible team reports that it has applied the correction. Which evidence BEST verifies that the original issue was resolved?

  1. A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules.
  2. A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications.
  3. A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.
  4. An unauthorized credential or context is blocked even when the requesting device can reach the application endpoint.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected. This is the relevant proof because it tests whether the selected corrective action (Integrate with a trusted identity provider and validate issued authentication tokens before accepting a sign-in) addressed the initiating problem (A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider) in Lakeview Insurance's broker collaboration and claim applications environment, not merely whether a task was marked complete.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules. This is useful evidence for a different situation (Two independent organizations share a web application but require users to create duplicate local passwords because no trust relationship exists) and action (Evaluate identity federation to accept authentication assertions from an approved external identity provider). For the reported issue at Lakeview Insurance, it does not establish the required outcome: A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.

B:

A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications. This is useful evidence for a different situation (An application stores a separate password list for every department instead of relying on the organization's managed directory) and action (Use a suitable directory and identity provider to centralize identity records and lifecycle control). For the reported issue at Lakeview Insurance, it does not establish the required outcome: A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.

D:

An unauthorized credential or context is blocked even when the requesting device can reach the application endpoint. This is useful evidence for a different situation (A hybrid company protects only its physical network edge although employees sign in to cloud services from unmanaged networks) and action (Treat identity as a primary security perimeter and enforce appropriate authentication and authorization at cloud application access). For the reported issue at Lakeview Insurance, it does not establish the required outcome: A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.

Question 99

During a migration readiness assessment at Blue Haven Media, the SOC analyst identifies this issue: A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider. Which action BEST addresses the described security, identity, or compliance gap?

  1. Use a suitable directory and identity provider to centralize identity records and lifecycle control.
  2. Integrate with a trusted identity provider and validate issued authentication tokens before accepting a sign-in.
  3. Evaluate identity federation to accept authentication assertions from an approved external identity provider.
  4. Treat identity as a primary security perimeter and enforce appropriate authentication and authorization at cloud application access.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Integrate with a trusted identity provider and validate issued authentication tokens before accepting a sign-in. This directly addresses the observed weakness: A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider. For Blue Haven Media and its creative files and production workspaces, a meaningful acceptance check would be: A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Use a suitable directory and identity provider to centralize identity records and lifecycle control. This addresses a different security or governance gap: An application stores a separate password list for every department instead of relying on the organization's managed directory. For Blue Haven Media and its creative files and production workspaces, the issue is instead: A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.

C:

Evaluate identity federation to accept authentication assertions from an approved external identity provider. This addresses a different security or governance gap: Two independent organizations share a web application but require users to create duplicate local passwords because no trust relationship exists. For Blue Haven Media and its creative files and production workspaces, the issue is instead: A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.

D:

Treat identity as a primary security perimeter and enforce appropriate authentication and authorization at cloud application access. This addresses a different security or governance gap: A hybrid company protects only its physical network edge although employees sign in to cloud services from unmanaged networks. For Blue Haven Media and its creative files and production workspaces, the issue is instead: A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.

Question 100

During a migration readiness assessment at Blue Haven Media, the SOC analyst identifies this issue: A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider. The responsible team reports that it has applied the correction. Which evidence BEST verifies that the original issue was resolved?

  1. An unauthorized credential or context is blocked even when the requesting device can reach the application endpoint.
  2. A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.
  3. A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules.
  4. A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected. This is the relevant proof because it tests whether the selected corrective action (Integrate with a trusted identity provider and validate issued authentication tokens before accepting a sign-in) addressed the initiating problem (A development team generates homegrown proof-of-login strings instead of trusting the organization's designated identity provider) in Blue Haven Media's creative files and production workspaces environment, not merely whether a task was marked complete.

Incorrect Answers

A:

An unauthorized credential or context is blocked even when the requesting device can reach the application endpoint. This is useful evidence for a different situation (A hybrid company protects only its physical network edge although employees sign in to cloud services from unmanaged networks) and action (Treat identity as a primary security perimeter and enforce appropriate authentication and authorization at cloud application access). For the reported issue at Blue Haven Media, it does not establish the required outcome: A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.

C:

A partner user signs in with the home identity while access to the application remains governed by local authorization rules. This is useful evidence for a different situation (Two independent organizations share a web application but require users to create duplicate local passwords because no trust relationship exists) and action (Evaluate identity federation to accept authentication assertions from an approved external identity provider). For the reported issue at Blue Haven Media, it does not establish the required outcome: A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.

D:

A user account removal in the managed identity system removes its ability to sign in to integrated departmental applications. This is useful evidence for a different situation (An application stores a separate password list for every department instead of relying on the organization's managed directory) and action (Use a suitable directory and identity provider to centralize identity records and lifecycle control). For the reported issue at Blue Haven Media, it does not establish the required outcome: A properly signed and audience-matched identity token is accepted while an altered or wrong-audience token is rejected.