Question 440
For an ISP route assurance team, the change record describes: A provider changes MED inbound on one customer edge and expects all distant autonomous systems to prefer that link for inbound traffic. What preventive validation should be standard?
Explanation
Correct Answer
Record upstream acceptance of traffic-engineering communities and MED policy. This helps prevent recurrence of the issue: A provider changes MED inbound on one customer edge and expects all distant autonomous systems to prefer that link for inbound traffic. Acceptance evidence should be: A test peer honors the agreed MED when comparing eligible paths from the same neighboring AS.
Incorrect Answers
Review candidate redistribution tables under a default-deny policy. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: An edge router injects all OSPF internals into BGP without tagging or policy, exposing infrastructure loopbacks to a customer upstream. It is less targeted to this issue than: Record upstream acceptance of traffic-engineering communities and MED policy.
Verify v4 and v6 filter family independently during peering certification. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: An IPv6 border router accepts an IPv6 customer route under an IPv4 route-policy address-family clause and quietly blocks legitimate IPv6 service NLRI. It is less targeted to this issue than: Record upstream acceptance of traffic-engineering communities and MED policy.
Validate dual-family translation behavior before onboarding IPv6-only customers. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: An IPv6-only enterprise application must reach an IPv4-only legacy service, but the provider installs NAT44 and expects it to translate the address families. It is less targeted to this issue than: Record upstream acceptance of traffic-engineering communities and MED policy.