Question 630
After implementing the design, the architecture team must validate: A branch payment terminal uses a documented application but unexpectedly contacts unrelated command-and-control domains. What observed evidence best establishes the intended state?
Explanation
Correct Answer
Legitimate payment service traffic passes; suspicious external callback tests trigger logging and blocking. It validates the recommended action: Combine App-ID access restrictions with threat and DNS prevention suited to the edge architecture. The design principle is: An allowed application identity does not guarantee all destination behavior is safe.
Incorrect Answers
The former employee fails the next authorized-resource test after identity sync completes. That observation supports a DIFFERENT situation: A branch employee's identity-based rule permits access after their HR role has been revoked. Here the selected design is: Combine App-ID access restrictions with threat and DNS prevention suited to the edge architecture.
A safe malicious-domain test is blocked with a DNS threat log while valid names resolve. That observation supports a DIFFERENT situation: A remote storefront experiences malicious DNS queries but the SD-WAN path service is healthy. Here the selected design is: Combine App-ID access restrictions with threat and DNS prevention suited to the edge architecture.
Equivalent identities and apps receive intended controls from branch and mobile networks. That observation supports a DIFFERENT situation: A hybrid workforce needs consistent security for branch users and mobile users. Here the selected design is: Combine App-ID access restrictions with threat and DNS prevention suited to the edge architecture.