Question 460
A follow-up assurance review considers this problem: A platform stores software provenance hashes only in a mutable database controlled by the same build team. Which outcome best shows the intended improvement?
Explanation
Correct Answer
This is direct test evidence of the control objective in the case: A platform stores software provenance hashes only in a mutable database controlled by the same build team. It demonstrates that the proposed response, publish signed attestations to a restricted tamper-evident transparency mechanism with independent verification., produces the measurable result a modified build record is detected and prior trusted releases remain verifiable. The observation tests a relevant security outcome rather than an unrelated control or reporting activity.
Incorrect Answers
This measurement is tied to “A global chat service requires recipient authentication but its encryption setup only proves server identity” and the control “Add mutually authenticated endpoint identities and explicit key confirmation for sensitive channels”. It cannot confirm that “Publish signed attestations to a restricted tamper-evident transparency mechanism with independent verification” has achieved “A modified build record is detected and prior trusted releases remain verifiable” for the issue in this question.
Observation “A modified archived message fails integrity verification and the original version can be authenticated.” would be useful for “A hospital archives regulated emails but cannot verify whether messages were modified after storage”, but it does not prove that the response to “A platform stores software provenance hashes only in a mutable database controlled by the same build team” achieved the relevant outcome, a modified build record is detected and prior trusted releases remain verifiable.
In the problem “A platform stores software provenance hashes only in a mutable database controlled by the same build team”, evidence “A copied certificate alone cannot authenticate without the associated private key.” is not decisive because it tests “An identity service issues passwordless certificates but does not validate client possession of the corresponding private key”; the requested validation is a modified build record is detected and prior trusted releases remain verifiable.