McAfee-Secured Website

Exam Bundle

Exam Code: CAS-005

Exam Name CompTIA SecurityX

Certification Provider: CompTIA

Corresponding Certification: CASP

CompTIA CAS-005 Bundle $44.99

100% CompTIA CAS-005 Guaranteed Success With Testking Training Materials

Get Real CAS-005 Exam Questions & Expert Verified Answers as Experienced on the Real Exam!

  • Questions & Answers

    CAS-005 Questions & Answers

    482 Questions & Answers

    The ultimate exam preparation tool, Questions & Answers mirrors the actual CAS-005 exam while allowing you to hone and measure every aspect of your test-taking ability.

  • CAS-005 Video Course

    CAS-005 Video Course

    180 Video Lectures

    CAS-005 Video Course is developed by CompTIA Professionals to help you pass the CAS-005 exam.

    Description

    This course will improve your knowledge and skills required to pass CompTIA SecurityX exam.
  • Study Guide

    CAS-005 Study Guide

    903 PDF Pages

    Developed by industry experts, this 903-page guide spells out in painstaking detail all of the information you need to ace CAS-005 exam.

CompTIA SecurityX (CAS-005) Practice Tests

Satisfaction Guaranteed

Money Back Guarantee

Testking provides hassle-free money back guarantee with our products. That is because we have 100% trust in the abilities of our professional and experience product team, and our record is a proof of that.

99.6% PASS RATE
Total Cost: $194.97
Bundle Price: $149.98

Purchase Individually

  • Questions & Answers

    Questions & Answers

    482 Questions

    $124.99
  • CAS-005 Video Course

    Video Course

    180 Video Lectures

    $39.99
  • Study Guide

    Study Guide

    903 PDF Pages

    $29.99

CompTIA CAS-005 Practice Test 46

Question 450

After the team responds to the following issue, which finding best demonstrates the desired security outcome? A legal document exchange service needs proof that a signer approved a specific contract revision.

  1. A modified archived message fails integrity verification and the original version can be authenticated.
  2. An altered update fails signature verification while the original approved release installs.
  3. Modification of a signed contract invalidates verification and the signer is traceable to the approved identity.
  4. Poisoned test responses fail while approved resolution reaches the expected signed records.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

This is direct test evidence of the control objective in the case: A legal document exchange service needs proof that a signer approved a specific contract revision. It demonstrates that the proposed response, use verifiable digital signatures over canonical document content with trustworthy identity and timestamp evidence., produces the measurable result modification of a signed contract invalidates verification and the signer is traceable to the approved identity. The observation tests a relevant security outcome rather than an unrelated control or reporting activity.

Incorrect Answers

A:

In the problem “A legal document exchange service needs proof that a signer approved a specific contract revision”, evidence “A modified archived message fails integrity verification and the original version can be authenticated.” is not decisive because it tests “A hospital archives regulated emails but cannot verify whether messages were modified after storage”; the requested validation is modification of a signed contract invalidates verification and the signer is traceable to the approved identity.

B:

For the issue “A legal document exchange service needs proof that a signer approved a specific contract revision”, measuring “An altered update fails signature verification while the original approved release installs.” would validate “A software vendor distributes update packages but clients cannot determine whether a binary was modified after signing” instead of the required control effect: modification of a signed contract invalidates verification and the signer is traceable to the approved identity.

D:

Observation “Poisoned test responses fail while approved resolution reaches the expected signed records.” would be useful for “A branch site's DNS resolver returns spoofed responses after a malicious local host sends forged DNS replies”, but it does not prove that the response to “A legal document exchange service needs proof that a signer approved a specific contract revision” achieved the relevant outcome, modification of a signed contract invalidates verification and the signer is traceable to the approved identity.

Question 451

A senior engineer examines the following finding: A cloud provider retires a disk containing encrypted customer data but cannot demonstrate destruction of its data encryption key. Which action most directly addresses the requirement?

  1. Publish signed attestations to a restricted tamper-evident transparency mechanism with independent verification.
  2. Apply signed message or archive integrity controls with immutable evidence records.
  3. Implement documented cryptographic erasure with irreversible key destruction and verification records.
  4. Enforce cryptographic device identity and per-device message authentication at ingestion.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Implement documented cryptographic erasure with irreversible key destruction and verification records. The acceptance check is that retired encrypted blocks cannot be recovered using the destroyed key and the action has audit evidence. That outcome checks whether the requirement is met, rather than treating completion of a security task as proof of effectiveness.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The option “Publish signed attestations to a restricted tamper-evident transparency mechanism with independent verification.” assumes an issue like “A platform stores software provenance hashes only in a mutable database controlled by the same build team”, not the specific observed weakness “A cloud provider retires a disk containing encrypted customer data but cannot demonstrate destruction of its data encryption key”; it leaves the evidence goal unmet: retired encrypted blocks cannot be recovered using the destroyed key and the action has audit evidence.

B:

This choice would be evaluated by “A modified archived message fails integrity verification and the original version can be authenticated” when dealing with “A hospital archives regulated emails but cannot verify whether messages were modified after storage”. It does not deliver the distinct control “Implement documented cryptographic erasure with irreversible key destruction and verification records” needed for “A cloud provider retires a disk containing encrypted customer data but cannot demonstrate destruction of its data encryption key”.

D:

Although “Enforce cryptographic device identity and per-device message authentication at ingestion.” is a reasonable response to “An IoT fleet sends telemetry to an aggregator that accepts messages from any device claiming an enrolled serial number”, this case instead concerns “A cloud provider retires a disk containing encrypted customer data but cannot demonstrate destruction of its data encryption key”, for which success requires that retired encrypted blocks cannot be recovered using the destroyed key and the action has audit evidence.

Question 452

Which test or documented result best shows that the underlying issue was properly addressed? A cloud provider retires a disk containing encrypted customer data but cannot demonstrate destruction of its data encryption key.

  1. Retired encrypted blocks cannot be recovered using the destroyed key and the action has audit evidence.
  2. A test case exits quarantine only after authorized clearance and records the complete action trail.
  3. A test analyst can run authorized aggregate analytics but cannot decrypt individual identifiers.
  4. Test recipients cannot trivially reverse identifiers to known customers from public datasets.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

This is direct test evidence of the control objective in the case: A cloud provider retires a disk containing encrypted customer data but cannot demonstrate destruction of its data encryption key. It demonstrates that the proposed response, implement documented cryptographic erasure with irreversible key destruction and verification records., produces the measurable result retired encrypted blocks cannot be recovered using the destroyed key and the action has audit evidence. The observation tests a relevant security outcome rather than an unrelated control or reporting activity.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Observation “A test case exits quarantine only after authorized clearance and records the complete action trail.” would be useful for “An automated threat feed applies quarantine labels that never expire after an incident has been closed”, but it does not prove that the response to “A cloud provider retires a disk containing encrypted customer data but cannot demonstrate destruction of its data encryption key” achieved the relevant outcome, retired encrypted blocks cannot be recovered using the destroyed key and the action has audit evidence.

C:

In the problem “A cloud provider retires a disk containing encrypted customer data but cannot demonstrate destruction of its data encryption key”, evidence “A test analyst can run authorized aggregate analytics but cannot decrypt individual identifiers.” is not decisive because it tests “A developer proposes encrypting personal identifiers for analytics but gives every analyst decryption-key permissions”; the requested validation is retired encrypted blocks cannot be recovered using the destroyed key and the action has audit evidence.

D:

For the issue “A cloud provider retires a disk containing encrypted customer data but cannot demonstrate destruction of its data encryption key”, measuring “Test recipients cannot trivially reverse identifiers to known customers from public datasets.” would validate “A developer uses unsalted SHA-256 hashes as anonymized customer identifiers in publicly shared usage data” instead of the required control effect: retired encrypted blocks cannot be recovered using the destroyed key and the action has audit evidence.

Question 453

An enterprise faces this security constraint: An internal application sends confidential backups over plaintext transport between regional data centers. Which proposal best addresses the stated risk?

  1. Use authenticated encrypted transport tunnels with approved certificate validation.
  2. Require certificate-bound proof of possession during authentication.
  3. Use an authenticated session establishment and efficient symmetric protection suited to constrained hardware.
  4. Enforce current signing certificate status and authenticated firmware rollback policy.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Use authenticated encrypted transport tunnels with approved certificate validation. The acceptance check is that packet capture confirms backup content remains encrypted and endpoint identity is verified. That outcome checks whether the requirement is met, rather than treating completion of a security task as proof of effectiveness.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Although “Require certificate-bound proof of possession during authentication.” is a reasonable response to “An identity service issues passwordless certificates but does not validate client possession of the corresponding private key”, this case instead concerns “An internal application sends confidential backups over plaintext transport between regional data centers”, for which success requires that packet capture confirms backup content remains encrypted and endpoint identity is verified.

C:

The option “Use an authenticated session establishment and efficient symmetric protection suited to constrained hardware.” assumes an issue like “A low-power field sensor cannot handle large asymmetric cryptographic operations for every small telemetry message”, not the specific observed weakness “An internal application sends confidential backups over plaintext transport between regional data centers”; it leaves the evidence goal unmet: packet capture confirms backup content remains encrypted and endpoint identity is verified.

D:

“Enforce current signing certificate status and authenticated firmware rollback policy” addresses “A network device's firmware update process accepts images signed by a revoked vendor key”, with “A revoked-signature firmware image is denied and the previous approved image remains recoverable” as its acceptance test. Here the specific problem is “An enterprise faces this security constraint: An internal application sends confidential backups over plaintext transport between regional data centers”: it requires “Use authenticated encrypted transport tunnels with approved certificate validation” and evidence that “Packet capture confirms backup content remains encrypted and endpoint identity is verified”.

Question 454

A follow-up assurance review considers this problem: An internal application sends confidential backups over plaintext transport between regional data centers. Which outcome best shows the intended improvement?

  1. A staged maintenance test preserves plant process continuity and confirms dependency restoration.
  2. Modification of a signed contract invalidates verification and the signer is traceable to the approved identity.
  3. Retired encrypted blocks cannot be recovered using the destroyed key and the action has audit evidence.
  4. Packet capture confirms backup content remains encrypted and endpoint identity is verified.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

This is direct test evidence of the control objective in the case: An internal application sends confidential backups over plaintext transport between regional data centers. It demonstrates that the proposed response, use authenticated encrypted transport tunnels with approved certificate validation., produces the measurable result packet capture confirms backup content remains encrypted and endpoint identity is verified. The observation tests a relevant security outcome rather than an unrelated control or reporting activity.

Incorrect Answers

A:

In the problem “An internal application sends confidential backups over plaintext transport between regional data centers”, evidence “A staged maintenance test preserves plant process continuity and confirms dependency restoration.” is not decisive because it tests “A utility's safety engineers cannot document which OT assets depend on an unsupported Windows host before patching”; the requested validation is packet capture confirms backup content remains encrypted and endpoint identity is verified.

B:

For the issue “An internal application sends confidential backups over plaintext transport between regional data centers”, measuring “Modification of a signed contract invalidates verification and the signer is traceable to the approved identity.” would validate “A legal document exchange service needs proof that a signer approved a specific contract revision” instead of the required control effect: packet capture confirms backup content remains encrypted and endpoint identity is verified.

C:

“Retired encrypted blocks cannot be recovered using the destroyed key and the action has audit evidence” would verify “Implement documented cryptographic erasure with irreversible key destruction and verification records” for the situation “A cloud provider retires a disk containing encrypted customer data but cannot demonstrate destruction of its data encryption key”. Here the required evidence is “Packet capture confirms backup content remains encrypted and endpoint identity is verified” after “Use authenticated encrypted transport tunnels with approved certificate validation”; the alternative observation does not test that control.

Question 455

An enterprise security review reports: A developer uses unsalted SHA-256 hashes as anonymized customer identifiers in publicly shared usage data. Which response best addresses the underlying security issue?

  1. Separate encrypted data processing duties from key-recovery authority and enforce least-privilege key access.
  2. Assess reidentification risk and use privacy-preserving tokenization or aggregation with restricted mapping access.
  3. Evaluate privacy-preserving computation or approved restricted processing rather than broad plaintext export.
  4. Publish signed attestations to a restricted tamper-evident transparency mechanism with independent verification.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Assess reidentification risk and use privacy-preserving tokenization or aggregation with restricted mapping access. The acceptance check is that test recipients cannot trivially reverse identifiers to known customers from public datasets. That outcome checks whether the requirement is met, rather than treating completion of a security task as proof of effectiveness.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The option “Separate encrypted data processing duties from key-recovery authority and enforce least-privilege key access.” assumes an issue like “A developer proposes encrypting personal identifiers for analytics but gives every analyst decryption-key permissions”, not the specific observed weakness “A developer uses unsalted SHA-256 hashes as anonymized customer identifiers in publicly shared usage data”; it leaves the evidence goal unmet: test recipients cannot trivially reverse identifiers to known customers from public datasets.

C:

“Evaluate privacy-preserving computation or approved restricted processing rather than broad plaintext export” addresses “A bank wants to search encrypted customer data by moving plaintext records into a general analyst database”, with “A pilot returns the required query result without storing broadly readable raw customer records” as its acceptance test. Here the specific problem is “A developer uses unsalted SHA-256 hashes as anonymized customer identifiers in publicly shared usage data”: it requires “Assess reidentification risk and use privacy-preserving tokenization or aggregation with restricted mapping access” and evidence that “Test recipients cannot trivially reverse identifiers to known customers from public datasets”.

D:

Although “Publish signed attestations to a restricted tamper-evident transparency mechanism with independent verification.” is a reasonable response to “A platform stores software provenance hashes only in a mutable database controlled by the same build team”, this case instead concerns “A developer uses unsalted SHA-256 hashes as anonymized customer identifiers in publicly shared usage data”, for which success requires that test recipients cannot trivially reverse identifiers to known customers from public datasets.

Question 456

After the team responds to the following issue, which finding best demonstrates the desired security outcome? A developer uses unsalted SHA-256 hashes as anonymized customer identifiers in publicly shared usage data.

  1. A test unauthorized host cannot unlock the drive and custody transfers are recorded.
  2. A test analyst can run authorized aggregate analytics but cannot decrypt individual identifiers.
  3. Analysts can join permitted reports but cannot derive original payment identifiers without authorized token reversal.
  4. Test recipients cannot trivially reverse identifiers to known customers from public datasets.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

This is direct test evidence of the control objective in the case: A developer uses unsalted SHA-256 hashes as anonymized customer identifiers in publicly shared usage data. It demonstrates that the proposed response, assess reidentification risk and use privacy-preserving tokenization or aggregation with restricted mapping access., produces the measurable result test recipients cannot trivially reverse identifiers to known customers from public datasets. The observation tests a relevant security outcome rather than an unrelated control or reporting activity.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“A test unauthorized host cannot unlock the drive and custody transfers are recorded” would verify “Select approved self-encrypting drive controls with protected key release and handling logs” for the situation “A portable hard drive used for emergency data export has no tamper response and relies on a reusable software-only password”. Here the required evidence is “Test recipients cannot trivially reverse identifiers to known customers from public datasets” after “Assess reidentification risk and use privacy-preserving tokenization or aggregation with restricted mapping access”; the alternative observation does not test that control.

B:

Observation “A test analyst can run authorized aggregate analytics but cannot decrypt individual identifiers.” would be useful for “A developer proposes encrypting personal identifiers for analytics but gives every analyst decryption-key permissions”, but it does not prove that the response to “A developer uses unsalted SHA-256 hashes as anonymized customer identifiers in publicly shared usage data” achieved the relevant outcome, test recipients cannot trivially reverse identifiers to known customers from public datasets.

C:

In the problem “A developer uses unsalted SHA-256 hashes as anonymized customer identifiers in publicly shared usage data”, evidence “Analysts can join permitted reports but cannot derive original payment identifiers without authorized token reversal.” is not decisive because it tests “A payment platform stores full cardholder identifiers in analytics reports despite a requirement to prevent analysts from recovering raw numbers”; the requested validation is test recipients cannot trivially reverse identifiers to known customers from public datasets.

Question 457

During an authorized security assessment, the team discovers: A hospital archives regulated emails but cannot verify whether messages were modified after storage. What should be prioritized?

  1. Apply endpoint data controls and remote session restrictions according to classification.
  2. Apply signed message or archive integrity controls with immutable evidence records.
  3. Implement documented cryptographic erasure with irreversible key destruction and verification records.
  4. Publish signed attestations to a restricted tamper-evident transparency mechanism with independent verification.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Apply signed message or archive integrity controls with immutable evidence records. The acceptance check is that a modified archived message fails integrity verification and the original version can be authenticated. That outcome checks whether the requirement is met, rather than treating completion of a security task as proof of effectiveness.

Incorrect Answers

A:

For “A remote desktop host permits clipboard transfer of classified reports into an untrusted local session”, “Apply endpoint data controls and remote session restrictions according to classification” has a clear validation signal: “A test confidential document cannot be exported via prohibited clipboard channels”. But “A hospital archives regulated emails but cannot verify whether messages were modified after storage” calls for “Apply signed message or archive integrity controls with immutable evidence records”; the other intervention cannot demonstrate “A modified archived message fails integrity verification and the original version can be authenticated”.

C:

The option “Implement documented cryptographic erasure with irreversible key destruction and verification records.” assumes an issue like “A cloud provider retires a disk containing encrypted customer data but cannot demonstrate destruction of its data encryption key”, not the specific observed weakness “A hospital archives regulated emails but cannot verify whether messages were modified after storage”; it leaves the evidence goal unmet: a modified archived message fails integrity verification and the original version can be authenticated.

D:

This choice would be evaluated by “A modified build record is detected and prior trusted releases remain verifiable” when dealing with “A cross-functional security group is considering a decision: A platform stores software provenance hashes only in a mutable database controlled by the same build team”. It does not deliver the distinct control “Apply signed message or archive integrity controls with immutable evidence records” needed for “A hospital archives regulated emails but cannot verify whether messages were modified after storage”.

Question 458

Which test or documented result best shows that the underlying issue was properly addressed? A hospital archives regulated emails but cannot verify whether messages were modified after storage.

  1. A controlled nonce-collision test fails and approved message authentication remains intact.
  2. An altered update fails signature verification while the original approved release installs.
  3. A modified archived message fails integrity verification and the original version can be authenticated.
  4. Modification of a signed contract invalidates verification and the signer is traceable to the approved identity.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

This is direct test evidence of the control objective in the case: A hospital archives regulated emails but cannot verify whether messages were modified after storage. It demonstrates that the proposed response, apply signed message or archive integrity controls with immutable evidence records., produces the measurable result a modified archived message fails integrity verification and the original version can be authenticated. The observation tests a relevant security outcome rather than an unrelated control or reporting activity.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“A controlled nonce-collision test fails and approved message authentication remains intact” would verify “Enforce unique nonces per encryption key and reject unsafe reuse in the cryptographic library integration” for the situation “A cross-functional security group is considering a decision: A service encrypts records using AES-GCM but reuses a nonce with the same key for different messages”. Here the required evidence is “A modified archived message fails integrity verification and the original version can be authenticated” after “Apply signed message or archive integrity controls with immutable evidence records”; the alternative observation does not test that control.

B:

For the issue “A hospital archives regulated emails but cannot verify whether messages were modified after storage”, measuring “An altered update fails signature verification while the original approved release installs.” would validate “A software vendor distributes update packages but clients cannot determine whether a binary was modified after signing” instead of the required control effect: a modified archived message fails integrity verification and the original version can be authenticated.

D:

Observation “Modification of a signed contract invalidates verification and the signer is traceable to the approved identity.” would be useful for “A legal document exchange service needs proof that a signer approved a specific contract revision”, but it does not prove that the response to “A hospital archives regulated emails but cannot verify whether messages were modified after storage” achieved the relevant outcome, a modified archived message fails integrity verification and the original version can be authenticated.

Question 459

A cross-functional security group is considering a decision: A platform stores software provenance hashes only in a mutable database controlled by the same build team. What is the most appropriate control or investigation response?

  1. Apply signed message or archive integrity controls with immutable evidence records.
  2. Use browser isolation and restricted download paths for high-risk external browsing.
  3. Publish signed attestations to a restricted tamper-evident transparency mechanism with independent verification.
  4. Implement documented cryptographic erasure with irreversible key destruction and verification records.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Publish signed attestations to a restricted tamper-evident transparency mechanism with independent verification. The acceptance check is that a modified build record is detected and prior trusted releases remain verifiable. That outcome checks whether the requirement is met, rather than treating completion of a security task as proof of effectiveness.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The option “Apply signed message or archive integrity controls with immutable evidence records.” assumes an issue like “A hospital archives regulated emails but cannot verify whether messages were modified after storage”, not the specific observed weakness “A platform stores software provenance hashes only in a mutable database controlled by the same build team”; it leaves the evidence goal unmet: a modified build record is detected and prior trusted releases remain verifiable.

B:

“Use browser isolation and restricted download paths for high-risk external browsing” addresses “An enterprise faces this security constraint: A data-science workstation requires browser access to untrusted research websites while retaining sensitive local credentials”, with “A test malicious page cannot access local secrets or execute code on the researcher workstation” as its acceptance test. Here the specific problem is “A cross-functional security group is considering a decision: A platform stores software provenance hashes only in a mutable database controlled by the same build team”: it requires “Publish signed attestations to a restricted tamper-evident transparency mechanism with independent verification” and evidence that “A modified build record is detected and prior trusted releases remain verifiable”.

D:

Although “Implement documented cryptographic erasure with irreversible key destruction and verification records.” is a reasonable response to “A cloud provider retires a disk containing encrypted customer data but cannot demonstrate destruction of its data encryption key”, this case instead concerns “A platform stores software provenance hashes only in a mutable database controlled by the same build team”, for which success requires that a modified build record is detected and prior trusted releases remain verifiable.

Question 460

A follow-up assurance review considers this problem: A platform stores software provenance hashes only in a mutable database controlled by the same build team. Which outcome best shows the intended improvement?

  1. A test impostor client cannot establish a trusted protected session.
  2. A modified archived message fails integrity verification and the original version can be authenticated.
  3. A copied certificate alone cannot authenticate without the associated private key.
  4. A modified build record is detected and prior trusted releases remain verifiable.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

This is direct test evidence of the control objective in the case: A platform stores software provenance hashes only in a mutable database controlled by the same build team. It demonstrates that the proposed response, publish signed attestations to a restricted tamper-evident transparency mechanism with independent verification., produces the measurable result a modified build record is detected and prior trusted releases remain verifiable. The observation tests a relevant security outcome rather than an unrelated control or reporting activity.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This measurement is tied to “A global chat service requires recipient authentication but its encryption setup only proves server identity” and the control “Add mutually authenticated endpoint identities and explicit key confirmation for sensitive channels”. It cannot confirm that “Publish signed attestations to a restricted tamper-evident transparency mechanism with independent verification” has achieved “A modified build record is detected and prior trusted releases remain verifiable” for the issue in this question.

B:

Observation “A modified archived message fails integrity verification and the original version can be authenticated.” would be useful for “A hospital archives regulated emails but cannot verify whether messages were modified after storage”, but it does not prove that the response to “A platform stores software provenance hashes only in a mutable database controlled by the same build team” achieved the relevant outcome, a modified build record is detected and prior trusted releases remain verifiable.

C:

In the problem “A platform stores software provenance hashes only in a mutable database controlled by the same build team”, evidence “A copied certificate alone cannot authenticate without the associated private key.” is not decisive because it tests “An identity service issues passwordless certificates but does not validate client possession of the corresponding private key”; the requested validation is a modified build record is detected and prior trusted releases remain verifiable.