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Exam Code: CAS-005

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CompTIA CAS-005 Practice Test 37

Question 360

After the team responds to the following issue, which finding best demonstrates the desired security outcome? An enterprise deploys new servers with Secure Boot disabled, permitting unsigned early-boot components.

  1. A test unsigned bootloader is rejected before the operating system starts.
  2. External USB boot attempts fail and unsigned image modifications cannot persist.
  3. A simulated untrusted enclave result is rejected while the approved enclave produces accepted evidence.
  4. A signed assertion for another service is rejected without creating a clinical user session.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

This is direct test evidence of the control objective in the case: An enterprise deploys new servers with Secure Boot disabled, permitting unsigned early-boot components. It demonstrates that the proposed response, enforce verified Secure Boot trust chains in firmware and provisioning policy., produces the measurable result a test unsigned bootloader is rejected before the operating system starts. The observation tests a relevant security outcome rather than an unrelated control or reporting activity.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Observation “External USB boot attempts fail and unsigned image modifications cannot persist.” would be useful for “A fleet of embedded devices has limited physical protections and a known USB boot bypass that could replace the firmware”, but it does not prove that the response to “An enterprise deploys new servers with Secure Boot disabled, permitting unsigned early-boot components” achieved the relevant outcome, a test unsigned bootloader is rejected before the operating system starts.

C:

In the problem “An enterprise deploys new servers with Secure Boot disabled, permitting unsigned early-boot components”, evidence “A simulated untrusted enclave result is rejected while the approved enclave produces accepted evidence.” is not decisive because it tests “A secure enclave stores sensitive calculations but its calling application accepts results without validating enclave measurements”; the requested validation is a test unsigned bootloader is rejected before the operating system starts.

D:

“Restrict accepted assertions to the intended service-provider entity ID and valid recipient” should produce “A signed assertion for another service is rejected without creating a clinical user session” in its own test case. The present requirement is instead checked by “A test unsigned bootloader is rejected before the operating system starts”, which validates “Enforce verified Secure Boot trust chains in firmware and provisioning policy” rather than the alternate control.

Question 361

A cross-functional security group is considering a decision: A security analyst needs to know whether endpoint firmware changed after shipment, but traditional file checks provide no boot-chain integrity. What is the most appropriate control or investigation response?

  1. Enforce trusted resolvers, response validation, and segmentation of unauthorized DNS responders.
  2. Enforce current signing certificate status and authenticated firmware rollback policy.
  3. Select approved self-encrypting drive controls with protected key release and handling logs.
  4. Collect TPM-based measured boot attestations against trusted baseline values.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Collect TPM-based measured boot attestations against trusted baseline values. The acceptance check is that altered firmware measurements fail attestation and the endpoint is quarantined. That outcome checks whether the requirement is met, rather than treating completion of a security task as proof of effectiveness.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The proposal “Enforce trusted resolvers, response validation, and segmentation of unauthorized DNS responders” manages “A branch site's DNS resolver returns spoofed responses after a malicious local host sends forged DNS replies”, where successful operation means “Poisoned test responses fail while approved resolution reaches the expected signed records”. The present issue instead needs “Collect TPM-based measured boot attestations against trusted baseline values” to establish “Altered firmware measurements fail attestation and the endpoint is quarantined”.

B:

Although “Enforce current signing certificate status and authenticated firmware rollback policy.” is a reasonable response to “A network device's firmware update process accepts images signed by a revoked vendor key”, this case instead concerns “A security analyst needs to know whether endpoint firmware changed after shipment, but traditional file checks provide no boot-chain integrity”, for which success requires that altered firmware measurements fail attestation and the endpoint is quarantined.

C:

The option “Select approved self-encrypting drive controls with protected key release and handling logs.” assumes an issue like “A portable hard drive used for emergency data export has no tamper response and relies on a reusable software-only password”, not the specific observed weakness “A security analyst needs to know whether endpoint firmware changed after shipment, but traditional file checks provide no boot-chain integrity”; it leaves the evidence goal unmet: altered firmware measurements fail attestation and the endpoint is quarantined.

Question 362

Which test or documented result best shows that the underlying issue was properly addressed? A security analyst needs to know whether endpoint firmware changed after shipment, but traditional file checks provide no boot-chain integrity.

  1. A swapped module fails attestation and the change record identifies the maintenance event.
  2. Altered firmware measurements fail attestation and the endpoint is quarantined.
  3. A revoked-signature firmware image is denied and the previous approved image remains recoverable.
  4. A deliberately altered host is detected and remediated to approved settings.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

This is direct test evidence of the control objective in the case: A security analyst needs to know whether endpoint firmware changed after shipment, but traditional file checks provide no boot-chain integrity. It demonstrates that the proposed response, collect TPM-based measured boot attestations against trusted baseline values., produces the measurable result altered firmware measurements fail attestation and the endpoint is quarantined. The observation tests a relevant security outcome rather than an unrelated control or reporting activity.

Incorrect Answers

A:

In the problem “A security analyst needs to know whether endpoint firmware changed after shipment, but traditional file checks provide no boot-chain integrity”, evidence “A swapped module fails attestation and the change record identifies the maintenance event.” is not decisive because it tests “A government workstation lacks a process to detect replacement of its trusted hardware security module during maintenance”; the requested validation is altered firmware measurements fail attestation and the endpoint is quarantined.

C:

“Enforce current signing certificate status and authenticated firmware rollback policy” should produce “A revoked-signature firmware image is denied and the previous approved image remains recoverable” in its own test case. The present requirement is instead checked by “Altered firmware measurements fail attestation and the endpoint is quarantined”, which validates “Collect TPM-based measured boot attestations against trusted baseline values” rather than the alternate control.

D:

Observation “A deliberately altered host is detected and remediated to approved settings.” would be useful for “A server group receives inconsistent hardening changes because administrators modify each host manually after provisioning”, but it does not prove that the response to “A security analyst needs to know whether endpoint firmware changed after shipment, but traditional file checks provide no boot-chain integrity” achieved the relevant outcome, altered firmware measurements fail attestation and the endpoint is quarantined.

Question 363

In a control effectiveness review, the issue is: A device manufacturer ships an industrial gateway with a physical debug port that bypasses software authentication. Which intervention is most defensible for the situation?

  1. Disable or protect debug interfaces and use tamper-resistant enclosure controls tied to manufacturing policy.
  2. Enforce verified Secure Boot trust chains in firmware and provisioning policy.
  3. Restrict legacy flows and require phishing-resistant authentication for privileged access.
  4. Move critical CA private-key operations into approved HSM-backed controls with dual authorization and audit.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Disable or protect debug interfaces and use tamper-resistant enclosure controls tied to manufacturing policy. The acceptance check is that an unauthorized probe cannot access privileged device functions without triggering protective logging. That outcome checks whether the requirement is met, rather than treating completion of a security task as proof of effectiveness.

Incorrect Answers

B:

This choice would be evaluated by “A test unsigned bootloader is rejected before the operating system starts” when dealing with “An enterprise deploys new servers with Secure Boot disabled, permitting unsigned early-boot components”. It does not deliver the distinct control “Disable or protect debug interfaces and use tamper-resistant enclosure controls tied to manufacturing policy” needed for “A device manufacturer ships an industrial gateway with a physical debug port that bypasses software authentication”.

C:

The proposal “Restrict legacy flows and require phishing-resistant authentication for privileged access” manages “A company introduces passkeys but privileged accounts still accept password-only legacy authentication from external networks”, where successful operation means “Password-only sign-ins to privileged accounts are denied while registered passkeys function”. The present issue instead needs “Disable or protect debug interfaces and use tamper-resistant enclosure controls tied to manufacturing policy” to establish “An unauthorized probe cannot access privileged device functions without triggering protective logging”.

D:

Although “Move critical CA private-key operations into approved HSM-backed controls with dual authorization and audit.” is a reasonable response to “A data center stores certificate-issuing keys in software on a general-purpose administration server”, this case instead concerns “A device manufacturer ships an industrial gateway with a physical debug port that bypasses software authentication”, for which success requires that an unauthorized probe cannot access privileged device functions without triggering protective logging.

Question 364

A follow-up assurance review considers this problem: A device manufacturer ships an industrial gateway with a physical debug port that bypasses software authentication. Which outcome best shows the intended improvement?

  1. An unauthorized probe cannot access privileged device functions without triggering protective logging.
  2. External USB boot attempts fail and unsigned image modifications cannot persist.
  3. A test unauthorized host cannot unlock the drive and custody transfers are recorded.
  4. A test user completes authorized driver installation but cannot perform unrelated privileged changes.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

This is direct test evidence of the control objective in the case: A device manufacturer ships an industrial gateway with a physical debug port that bypasses software authentication. It demonstrates that the proposed response, disable or protect debug interfaces and use tamper-resistant enclosure controls tied to manufacturing policy., produces the measurable result an unauthorized probe cannot access privileged device functions without triggering protective logging. The observation tests a relevant security outcome rather than an unrelated control or reporting activity.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Observation “External USB boot attempts fail and unsigned image modifications cannot persist.” would be useful for “A fleet of embedded devices has limited physical protections and a known USB boot bypass that could replace the firmware”, but it does not prove that the response to “A device manufacturer ships an industrial gateway with a physical debug port that bypasses software authentication” achieved the relevant outcome, an unauthorized probe cannot access privileged device functions without triggering protective logging.

C:

In the problem “A device manufacturer ships an industrial gateway with a physical debug port that bypasses software authentication”, evidence “A test unauthorized host cannot unlock the drive and custody transfers are recorded.” is not decisive because it tests “A portable hard drive used for emergency data export has no tamper response and relies on a reusable software-only password”; the requested validation is an unauthorized probe cannot access privileged device functions without triggering protective logging.

D:

For the issue “A device manufacturer ships an industrial gateway with a physical debug port that bypasses software authentication”, measuring “A test user completes authorized driver installation but cannot perform unrelated privileged changes.” would validate “An IT team gives support personnel permanent local administrator rights for occasional printer driver installations” instead of the required control effect: an unauthorized probe cannot access privileged device functions without triggering protective logging.

Question 365

A security architect is asked to resolve this problem: A financial institution handles high-volume cryptographic signing on ordinary CPU software while key custody rules require separate hardware protection. Select the MOST directly relevant action.

  1. Use an HSM-backed signing service with performance-tested batching or hardware acceleration.
  2. Bind disk unlock secrets to the hardware root of trust with recovery escrow under separate authority.
  3. Adopt separate minimally privileged service identities with restricted inter-host authentication.
  4. Enforce current signing certificate status and authenticated firmware rollback policy.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Use an HSM-backed signing service with performance-tested batching or hardware acceleration. The acceptance check is that the service meets throughput requirements and raw signing keys remain inside the approved module. That outcome checks whether the requirement is met, rather than treating completion of a security task as proof of effectiveness.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Although “Bind disk unlock secrets to the hardware root of trust with recovery escrow under separate authority.” is a reasonable response to “A laptop encryption product relies on a recoverable key saved on the same unencrypted disk partition as user data”, this case instead concerns “A financial institution handles high-volume cryptographic signing on ordinary CPU software while key custody rules require separate hardware protection”, for which success requires that the service meets throughput requirements and raw signing keys remain inside the approved module.

C:

The option “Adopt separate minimally privileged service identities with restricted inter-host authentication.” assumes an issue like “A server runs the same service under a full administrator account on every host, enabling broad lateral movement if one host is breached”, not the specific observed weakness “A financial institution handles high-volume cryptographic signing on ordinary CPU software while key custody rules require separate hardware protection”; it leaves the evidence goal unmet: the service meets throughput requirements and raw signing keys remain inside the approved module.

D:

“Enforce current signing certificate status and authenticated firmware rollback policy” addresses “A network device's firmware update process accepts images signed by a revoked vendor key”, with “A revoked-signature firmware image is denied and the previous approved image remains recoverable” as its acceptance test. Here the specific problem is “A financial institution handles high-volume cryptographic signing on ordinary CPU software while key custody rules require separate hardware protection”: it requires “Use an HSM-backed signing service with performance-tested batching or hardware acceleration” and evidence that “The service meets throughput requirements and raw signing keys remain inside the approved module”.

Question 366

After the team responds to the following issue, which finding best demonstrates the desired security outcome? A financial institution handles high-volume cryptographic signing on ordinary CPU software while key custody rules require separate hardware protection.

  1. The service meets throughput requirements and raw signing keys remain inside the approved module.
  2. A revoked-signature firmware image is denied and the previous approved image remains recoverable.
  3. A simulated untrusted enclave result is rejected while the approved enclave produces accepted evidence.
  4. Test logs contain no reusable secret and API calls remain attributable to approved automation.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

This is direct test evidence of the control objective in the case: A financial institution handles high-volume cryptographic signing on ordinary CPU software while key custody rules require separate hardware protection. It demonstrates that the proposed response, use an HSM-backed signing service with performance-tested batching or hardware acceleration., produces the measurable result the service meets throughput requirements and raw signing keys remain inside the approved module. The observation tests a relevant security outcome rather than an unrelated control or reporting activity.

Incorrect Answers

B:

For the issue “A financial institution handles high-volume cryptographic signing on ordinary CPU software while key custody rules require separate hardware protection”, measuring “A revoked-signature firmware image is denied and the previous approved image remains recoverable.” would validate “A network device's firmware update process accepts images signed by a revoked vendor key” instead of the required control effect: the service meets throughput requirements and raw signing keys remain inside the approved module.

C:

In “An enterprise faces this security constraint: A secure enclave stores sensitive calculations but its calling application accepts results without validating enclave measurements”, “A simulated untrusted enclave result is rejected while the approved enclave produces accepted evidence” is the acceptance signal for “Bind application trust to enclave identity and approved attestation measurements”. The required proof for the selected response “Use an HSM-backed signing service with performance-tested batching or hardware acceleration” is “The service meets throughput requirements and raw signing keys remain inside the approved module”.

D:

Observation “Test logs contain no reusable secret and API calls remain attributable to approved automation.” would be useful for “A Python remediation script logs cloud API keys while fetching vulnerability results from a provider SDK”, but it does not prove that the response to “A financial institution handles high-volume cryptographic signing on ordinary CPU software while key custody rules require separate hardware protection” achieved the relevant outcome, the service meets throughput requirements and raw signing keys remain inside the approved module.

Question 367

A senior engineer examines the following finding: A government workstation lacks a process to detect replacement of its trusted hardware security module during maintenance. Which action most directly addresses the requirement?

  1. Implement staged deployment, service-health checks, and proven rollback gates before expanding the patch ring.
  2. Disable or protect debug interfaces and use tamper-resistant enclosure controls tied to manufacturing policy.
  3. Implement asset-bound module attestation and tamper-evident receiving and change checks.
  4. Bind application trust to enclave identity and approved attestation measurements.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Implement asset-bound module attestation and tamper-evident receiving and change checks. The acceptance check is that a swapped module fails attestation and the change record identifies the maintenance event. That outcome checks whether the requirement is met, rather than treating completion of a security task as proof of effectiveness.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The option “Implement staged deployment, service-health checks, and proven rollback gates before expanding the patch ring.” assumes an issue like “A security team deploys automated patching to critical ERP servers without maintenance orchestration or rollback testing”, not the specific observed weakness “A government workstation lacks a process to detect replacement of its trusted hardware security module during maintenance”; it leaves the evidence goal unmet: a swapped module fails attestation and the change record identifies the maintenance event.

B:

For “A device manufacturer ships an industrial gateway with a physical debug port that bypasses software authentication”, “Disable or protect debug interfaces and use tamper-resistant enclosure controls tied to manufacturing policy” has a clear validation signal: “An unauthorized probe cannot access privileged device functions without triggering protective logging”. But “A government workstation lacks a process to detect replacement of its trusted hardware security module during maintenance” calls for “Implement asset-bound module attestation and tamper-evident receiving and change checks”; the other intervention cannot demonstrate “A swapped module fails attestation and the change record identifies the maintenance event”.

D:

Although “Bind application trust to enclave identity and approved attestation measurements.” is a reasonable response to “A secure enclave stores sensitive calculations but its calling application accepts results without validating enclave measurements”, this case instead concerns “A government workstation lacks a process to detect replacement of its trusted hardware security module during maintenance”, for which success requires that a swapped module fails attestation and the change record identifies the maintenance event.

Question 368

Which test or documented result best shows that the underlying issue was properly addressed? A government workstation lacks a process to detect replacement of its trusted hardware security module during maintenance.

  1. A test unauthorized host cannot unlock the drive and custody transfers are recorded.
  2. An unauthorized application segment fails connectivity while approved application flows work.
  3. Altered firmware measurements fail attestation and the endpoint is quarantined.
  4. A swapped module fails attestation and the change record identifies the maintenance event.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

This is direct test evidence of the control objective in the case: A government workstation lacks a process to detect replacement of its trusted hardware security module during maintenance. It demonstrates that the proposed response, implement asset-bound module attestation and tamper-evident receiving and change checks., produces the measurable result a swapped module fails attestation and the change record identifies the maintenance event. The observation tests a relevant security outcome rather than an unrelated control or reporting activity.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“A test unauthorized host cannot unlock the drive and custody transfers are recorded” would verify “Select approved self-encrypting drive controls with protected key release and handling logs” for the situation “A portable hard drive used for emergency data export has no tamper response and relies on a reusable software-only password”. Here the required evidence is “A swapped module fails attestation and the change record identifies the maintenance event” after “Implement asset-bound module attestation and tamper-evident receiving and change checks”; the alternative observation does not test that control.

B:

Observation “An unauthorized application segment fails connectivity while approved application flows work.” would be useful for “A microsegmentation rule is intended to block application-to-database access but a permissive network ACL overrides the new rule”, but it does not prove that the response to “A government workstation lacks a process to detect replacement of its trusted hardware security module during maintenance” achieved the relevant outcome, a swapped module fails attestation and the change record identifies the maintenance event.

C:

In the problem “A government workstation lacks a process to detect replacement of its trusted hardware security module during maintenance”, evidence “Altered firmware measurements fail attestation and the endpoint is quarantined.” is not decisive because it tests “A security analyst needs to know whether endpoint firmware changed after shipment, but traditional file checks provide no boot-chain integrity”; the requested validation is a swapped module fails attestation and the change record identifies the maintenance event.

Question 369

An enterprise faces this security constraint: A secure enclave stores sensitive calculations but its calling application accepts results without validating enclave measurements. Which proposal best addresses the stated risk?

  1. Enforce verified Secure Boot trust chains in firmware and provisioning policy.
  2. Bind application trust to enclave identity and approved attestation measurements.
  3. Move critical CA private-key operations into approved HSM-backed controls with dual authorization and audit.
  4. Correct certificate chain delivery and endpoint trust enrollment for approved issuing authorities.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Bind application trust to enclave identity and approved attestation measurements. The acceptance check is that a simulated untrusted enclave result is rejected while the approved enclave produces accepted evidence. That outcome checks whether the requirement is met, rather than treating completion of a security task as proof of effectiveness.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This choice would be evaluated by “A test unsigned bootloader is rejected before the operating system starts” when dealing with “An enterprise deploys new servers with Secure Boot disabled, permitting unsigned early-boot components”. It does not deliver the distinct control “Bind application trust to enclave identity and approved attestation measurements” needed for “An enterprise faces this security constraint: A secure enclave stores sensitive calculations but its calling application accepts results without validating enclave measurements”.

C:

The option “Move critical CA private-key operations into approved HSM-backed controls with dual authorization and audit.” assumes an issue like “A data center stores certificate-issuing keys in software on a general-purpose administration server”, not the specific observed weakness “A secure enclave stores sensitive calculations but its calling application accepts results without validating enclave measurements”; it leaves the evidence goal unmet: a simulated untrusted enclave result is rejected while the approved enclave produces accepted evidence.

D:

This choice would be evaluated by “Trusted clients validate the full chain and unknown or expired issuers are denied” when dealing with “An enterprise faces this security constraint: An application gateway's TLS certificate chains to an unknown internal root after a PKI migration”. It does not deliver the distinct control “Bind application trust to enclave identity and approved attestation measurements” needed for “An enterprise faces this security constraint: A secure enclave stores sensitive calculations but its calling application accepts results without validating enclave measurements”.

Question 370

A follow-up assurance review considers this problem: A secure enclave stores sensitive calculations but its calling application accepts results without validating enclave measurements. Which outcome best shows the intended improvement?

  1. A simulated untrusted enclave result is rejected while the approved enclave produces accepted evidence.
  2. A test unsigned bootloader is rejected before the operating system starts.
  3. Removing the disk cannot reveal usable protected contents without the approved recovery process.
  4. Simulated network retries create one authorized account change and one auditable result.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

This is direct test evidence of the control objective in the case: A secure enclave stores sensitive calculations but its calling application accepts results without validating enclave measurements. It demonstrates that the proposed response, bind application trust to enclave identity and approved attestation measurements., produces the measurable result a simulated untrusted enclave result is rejected while the approved enclave produces accepted evidence. The observation tests a relevant security outcome rather than an unrelated control or reporting activity.

Incorrect Answers

B:

For the issue “A secure enclave stores sensitive calculations but its calling application accepts results without validating enclave measurements”, measuring “A test unsigned bootloader is rejected before the operating system starts.” would validate “An enterprise deploys new servers with Secure Boot disabled, permitting unsigned early-boot components” instead of the required control effect: a simulated untrusted enclave result is rejected while the approved enclave produces accepted evidence.

C:

This measurement is tied to “A laptop encryption product relies on a recoverable key saved on the same unencrypted disk partition as user data” and the control “Bind disk unlock secrets to the hardware root of trust with recovery escrow under separate authority”. It cannot confirm that “Bind application trust to enclave identity and approved attestation measurements” has achieved “A simulated untrusted enclave result is rejected while the approved enclave produces accepted evidence” for the issue in this question.

D:

Observation “Simulated network retries create one authorized account change and one auditable result.” would be useful for “A SOC playbook's webhook retries duplicate the same account-disable action and break an incident recovery workflow”, but it does not prove that the response to “A secure enclave stores sensitive calculations but its calling application accepts results without validating enclave measurements” achieved the relevant outcome, a simulated untrusted enclave result is rejected while the approved enclave produces accepted evidence.