McAfee-Secured Website

Exam Bundle

Exam Code: 350-501

Exam Name Implementing and Operating Cisco Service Provider Network Core Technologies (SPCOR)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certifications: CCIE Service Provider , CCNP Service Provider

Cisco 350-501 Bundle $28.79

100% Cisco 350-501 Guaranteed Success With Testking Training Materials

Get Real 350-501 Exam Questions & Expert Verified Answers as Experienced on the Real Exam!

  • Questions & Answers

    350-501 Questions & Answers

    528 Questions & Answers

    The ultimate exam preparation tool, Questions & Answers mirrors the actual 350-501 exam while allowing you to hone and measure every aspect of your test-taking ability.

  • 350-501 Video Course

    350-501 Video Course

    253 Video Lectures

    350-501 Video Course is developed by Cisco Professionals to help you pass the 350-501 exam.

    Description

    This course will improve your knowledge and skills required to pass Implementing and Operating Cisco Service Provider Network Core Technologies (SPCOR) exam.
  • Study Guide

    350-501 Study Guide

    1160 PDF Pages

    Developed by industry experts, this 1160-page guide spells out in painstaking detail all of the information you need to ace 350-501 exam.

Implementing and Operating Cisco Service Provider Network Core Technologies (SPCOR) (350-501) Practice Tests

Satisfaction Guaranteed

Money Back Guarantee

Testking provides hassle-free money back guarantee with our products. That is because we have 100% trust in the abilities of our professional and experience product team, and our record is a proof of that.

99.6% PASS RATE
Total Cost: $189.97
Bundle Price: $161.18

Purchase Individually

  • Questions & Answers

    Questions & Answers

    528 Questions

    $124.99
  • 350-501 Video Course

    Video Course

    253 Video Lectures

    $39.99
  • Study Guide

    Study Guide

    1160 PDF Pages

    $24.99

Cisco 350-501 Practice Test 38

Question 370

For an optical transport engineering team, operators addressed: Two providers exchange YANG model payloads that use identical local leaf names but different module namespaces, so parsing associates traffic counters with the wrong schema. What is the strongest acceptance evidence?

  1. The targeted interface changes while other interfaces remain byte-for-byte unchanged.
  2. A fixture containing the two modules resolves both leaf values to their correct models without ambiguity.
  3. Counter retrieval succeeds and a controlled mutation remains rejected by schema or datastore rules.
  4. A compatibility test only edits leaves present in each device's advertised schema, with unsupported devices safely excluded.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

A fixture containing the two modules resolves both leaf values to their correct models without ambiguity. This confirms the approved response: Preserve the full module namespace and revision for each data path and parse namespace-qualified fields. It is relevant because: YANG namespaces and revisions give modeled nodes meaning beyond their unqualified display names.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The targeted interface changes while other interfaces remain byte-for-byte unchanged. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: A YANG list declares an interface name as its key but a RESTCONF update sends a request to the list root without an instance identifier, modifying the wrong scope. The specific correction here is: Preserve the full module namespace and revision for each data path and parse namespace-qualified fields.

C:

Counter retrieval succeeds and a controlled mutation remains rejected by schema or datastore rules. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: A network operator attempts to PATCH a YANG counter marked `config false`, then blames access control when the edit is rejected. The specific correction here is: Preserve the full module namespace and revision for each data path and parse namespace-qualified fields.

D:

A compatibility test only edits leaves present in each device's advertised schema, with unsupported devices safely excluded. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: A controller deploys a single RESTCONF configuration template to devices running different firmware but fails when one model revision lacks the targeted leaf. The specific correction here is: Preserve the full module namespace and revision for each data path and parse namespace-qualified fields.

Question 371

Which network protocol or forwarding behavior explains the following issue: Two providers exchange YANG model payloads that use identical local leaf names but different module namespaces, so parsing associates traffic counters with the wrong schema.

  1. Keyed YANG list entries require instance identification to address one configuration object.
  2. YANG `config false` identifies state data not intended for writable configuration transactions.
  3. YANG namespaces and revisions give modeled nodes meaning beyond their unqualified display names.
  4. Cisco programmability can expose structured state through NETCONF, RESTCONF or streaming telemetry rather than one universal device protocol.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

YANG namespaces and revisions give modeled nodes meaning beyond their unqualified display names. This explains the investigated issue: Two providers exchange YANG model payloads that use identical local leaf names but different module namespaces, so parsing associates traffic counters with the wrong schema. The approved corrective response is: Preserve the full module namespace and revision for each data path and parse namespace-qualified fields.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Keyed YANG list entries require instance identification to address one configuration object. That explains a DIFFERENT scenario: A YANG list declares an interface name as its key but a RESTCONF update sends a request to the list root without an instance identifier, modifying the wrong scope. The mechanism to prioritize for this question is: YANG namespaces and revisions give modeled nodes meaning beyond their unqualified display names.

B:

YANG `config false` identifies state data not intended for writable configuration transactions. That explains a DIFFERENT scenario: A network operator attempts to PATCH a YANG counter marked `config false`, then blames access control when the edit is rejected. The mechanism to prioritize for this question is: YANG namespaces and revisions give modeled nodes meaning beyond their unqualified display names.

D:

Cisco programmability can expose structured state through NETCONF, RESTCONF or streaming telemetry rather than one universal device protocol. That explains a DIFFERENT scenario: A provider telemetry collector expects every IOS XR interface state query to use a generic SNMP community string while the device exposes a supported model-driven operational endpoint. The mechanism to prioritize for this question is: YANG namespaces and revisions give modeled nodes meaning beyond their unqualified display names.

Question 372

A core network change board wants to avoid: Two providers exchange YANG model payloads that use identical local leaf names but different module namespaces, so parsing associates traffic counters with the wrong schema. Which ongoing safeguard fits best?

  1. Inspect writable-state metadata when generating automation forms from YANG models.
  2. Test list-key encoding and cross-interface isolation for every API client.
  3. Audit state locking, encryption and access controls on every workspace.
  4. Pin model versions and retain schema-validation fixtures during integration upgrades.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Pin model versions and retain schema-validation fixtures during integration upgrades. This helps prevent recurrence of the issue: Two providers exchange YANG model payloads that use identical local leaf names but different module namespaces, so parsing associates traffic counters with the wrong schema. Acceptance evidence should be: A fixture containing the two modules resolves both leaf values to their correct models without ambiguity.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Inspect writable-state metadata when generating automation forms from YANG models. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: A network operator attempts to PATCH a YANG counter marked `config false`, then blames access control when the edit is rejected. It is less targeted to this issue than: Pin model versions and retain schema-validation fixtures during integration upgrades.

B:

Test list-key encoding and cross-interface isolation for every API client. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: A YANG list declares an interface name as its key but a RESTCONF update sends a request to the list root without an instance identifier, modifying the wrong scope. It is less targeted to this issue than: Pin model versions and retain schema-validation fixtures during integration upgrades.

C:

Audit state locking, encryption and access controls on every workspace. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: Two Terraform jobs edit the same service-provider cloud network workspace in parallel, creating conflicting route-table state and duplicate resources. It is less targeted to this issue than: Pin model versions and retain schema-validation fixtures during integration upgrades.

Question 373

A carrier service activation check discovers: A Terraform plan proposes deleting an NSO integration virtual machine because its resource label was renamed in source code without preserving state identity. Which action best restores the intended behavior?

  1. Use a protected shared state backend with locking and a single reviewed apply workflow.
  2. Use an appropriate supported state move or resource refactor after reviewing destructive plan actions.
  3. Scope inventory groups and host limits to approved lab or PoP devices before network configuration tasks run.
  4. Inspect NETCONF capabilities and target an actually supported datastore and commit behavior.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Use an appropriate supported state move or resource refactor after reviewing destructive plan actions. This directly addresses the fictional service-provider network case: A Terraform plan proposes deleting an NSO integration virtual machine because its resource label was renamed in source code without preserving state identity. The technical mechanism is: Infrastructure as code maps declarations to state addresses, and renaming an address can look like delete-and-recreate. Verify success by: A revised plan preserves the deployed service VM and updates only the intended metadata.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Use a protected shared state backend with locking and a single reviewed apply workflow. This would respond to a DIFFERENT fictional service-provider network issue: Two Terraform jobs edit the same service-provider cloud network workspace in parallel, creating conflicting route-table state and duplicate resources. It does not directly address the current situation: A Terraform plan proposes deleting an NSO integration virtual machine because its resource label was renamed in source code without preserving state identity.

C:

Scope inventory groups and host limits to approved lab or PoP devices before network configuration tasks run. This would respond to a DIFFERENT fictional service-provider network issue: An Ansible network playbook uses `hosts: all` and changes every backbone router though the request approved only an isolated PoP. It does not directly address the current situation: A Terraform plan proposes deleting an NSO integration virtual machine because its resource label was renamed in source code without preserving state identity.

D:

Inspect NETCONF capabilities and target an actually supported datastore and commit behavior. This would respond to a DIFFERENT fictional service-provider network issue: A network controller sends NETCONF `edit-config` to a device but selects the candidate datastore on a platform that advertises running-only support. It does not directly address the current situation: A Terraform plan proposes deleting an NSO integration virtual machine because its resource label was renamed in source code without preserving state identity.

Question 374

Following a supported configuration correction, the original issue was: A Terraform plan proposes deleting an NSO integration virtual machine because its resource label was renamed in source code without preserving state identity. Which observation verifies success?

  1. The second apply is blocked or serialized until state reconciliation completes and the final plan matches desired topology.
  2. Dry-run output lists only the intended routers and unrelated devices show no changes.
  3. A revised plan preserves the deployed service VM and updates only the intended metadata.
  4. A controlled counter sequence generates telemetry at the intended cadence and collector load meets capacity targets.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

A revised plan preserves the deployed service VM and updates only the intended metadata. This confirms the approved response: Use an appropriate supported state move or resource refactor after reviewing destructive plan actions. It is relevant because: Infrastructure as code maps declarations to state addresses, and renaming an address can look like delete-and-recreate.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The second apply is blocked or serialized until state reconciliation completes and the final plan matches desired topology. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: Two Terraform jobs edit the same service-provider cloud network workspace in parallel, creating conflicting route-table state and duplicate resources. The specific correction here is: Use an appropriate supported state move or resource refactor after reviewing destructive plan actions.

B:

Dry-run output lists only the intended routers and unrelated devices show no changes. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: An Ansible network playbook uses `hosts: all` and changes every backbone router though the request approved only an isolated PoP. The specific correction here is: Use an appropriate supported state move or resource refactor after reviewing destructive plan actions.

D:

A controlled counter sequence generates telemetry at the intended cadence and collector load meets capacity targets. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: A provider subscribes to a gNMI counter in SAMPLE mode but expects only updates when the value changes, saturating the collector with unnecessary periodic messages. The specific correction here is: Use an appropriate supported state move or resource refactor after reviewing destructive plan actions.

Question 375

At a carrier automation platform team, an engineer examines: A Terraform plan proposes deleting an NSO integration virtual machine because its resource label was renamed in source code without preserving state identity. Which technical principle is most applicable?

  1. Ansible host selection controls deployment blast radius independently of the syntax of the configured tasks.
  2. IaC state must be coordinated to prevent concurrent operations from clobbering resource identity and dependencies.
  3. Shared initial-enrollment secrets amplify the impact of a single compromise and undermine device accountability.
  4. Infrastructure as code maps declarations to state addresses, and renaming an address can look like delete-and-recreate.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Infrastructure as code maps declarations to state addresses, and renaming an address can look like delete-and-recreate. This explains the investigated issue: A Terraform plan proposes deleting an NSO integration virtual machine because its resource label was renamed in source code without preserving state identity. The approved corrective response is: Use an appropriate supported state move or resource refactor after reviewing destructive plan actions.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Ansible host selection controls deployment blast radius independently of the syntax of the configured tasks. That explains a DIFFERENT scenario: An Ansible network playbook uses `hosts: all` and changes every backbone router though the request approved only an isolated PoP. The mechanism to prioritize for this question is: Infrastructure as code maps declarations to state addresses, and renaming an address can look like delete-and-recreate.

B:

IaC state must be coordinated to prevent concurrent operations from clobbering resource identity and dependencies. That explains a DIFFERENT scenario: Two Terraform jobs edit the same service-provider cloud network workspace in parallel, creating conflicting route-table state and duplicate resources. The mechanism to prioritize for this question is: Infrastructure as code maps declarations to state addresses, and renaming an address can look like delete-and-recreate.

C:

Shared initial-enrollment secrets amplify the impact of a single compromise and undermine device accountability. That explains a DIFFERENT scenario: A staging center reuses one bootstrap credential for hundreds of service-provider routers, making it impossible to revoke a single compromised device without disabling the entire fleet. The mechanism to prioritize for this question is: Infrastructure as code maps declarations to state addresses, and renaming an address can look like delete-and-recreate.

Question 376

For a carrier automation platform team, the change record describes: A Terraform plan proposes deleting an NSO integration virtual machine because its resource label was renamed in source code without preserving state identity. What preventive validation should be standard?

  1. Require explicit human approval for any plan that destroys active network service components.
  2. Audit state locking, encryption and access controls on every workspace.
  3. Gate production Ansible runs on reviewed inventory and diff previews.
  4. Audit bootstrap credential issuance and retirement per asset.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Require explicit human approval for any plan that destroys active network service components. This helps prevent recurrence of the issue: A Terraform plan proposes deleting an NSO integration virtual machine because its resource label was renamed in source code without preserving state identity. Acceptance evidence should be: A revised plan preserves the deployed service VM and updates only the intended metadata.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Audit state locking, encryption and access controls on every workspace. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: Two Terraform jobs edit the same service-provider cloud network workspace in parallel, creating conflicting route-table state and duplicate resources. It is less targeted to this issue than: Require explicit human approval for any plan that destroys active network service components.

C:

Gate production Ansible runs on reviewed inventory and diff previews. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: An Ansible network playbook uses `hosts: all` and changes every backbone router though the request approved only an isolated PoP. It is less targeted to this issue than: Require explicit human approval for any plan that destroys active network service components.

D:

Audit bootstrap credential issuance and retirement per asset. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: A staging center reuses one bootstrap credential for hundreds of service-provider routers, making it impossible to revoke a single compromised device without disabling the entire fleet. It is less targeted to this issue than: Require explicit human approval for any plan that destroys active network service components.

Question 377

For a multi-tenant data transport provider, the failure is: A staging center reuses one bootstrap credential for hundreds of service-provider routers, making it impossible to revoke a single compromised device without disabling the entire fleet. Which authorized correction best addresses it?

  1. Implement secure ZTP with authenticated bootstrapping, image trust and the provider's approved certificate or signed configuration controls.
  2. Renew and install the correct trust chain and verify system time before repeating secure enrollment.
  3. Issue scoped device-specific bootstrap credentials or authenticated identities with lifecycle and revocation controls.
  4. Inspect NETCONF capabilities and target an actually supported datastore and commit behavior.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Issue scoped device-specific bootstrap credentials or authenticated identities with lifecycle and revocation controls. This directly addresses the fictional service-provider network case: A staging center reuses one bootstrap credential for hundreds of service-provider routers, making it impossible to revoke a single compromised device without disabling the entire fleet. The technical mechanism is: Shared initial-enrollment secrets amplify the impact of a single compromise and undermine device accountability. Verify success by: Revoking one test device prevents its reenrollment while unaffected lab routers enroll normally.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Implement secure ZTP with authenticated bootstrapping, image trust and the provider's approved certificate or signed configuration controls. This would respond to a DIFFERENT fictional service-provider network issue: A new PE uses zero-touch provisioning over an untrusted access network but downloads a bootstrap configuration from an unsigned public HTTP server. It does not directly address the current situation: A staging center reuses one bootstrap credential for hundreds of service-provider routers, making it impossible to revoke a single compromised device without disabling the entire fleet.

B:

Renew and install the correct trust chain and verify system time before repeating secure enrollment. This would respond to a DIFFERENT fictional service-provider network issue: A ZTP controller provisions a router using an expired certificate chain and the operations team disables validation globally to make the download succeed. It does not directly address the current situation: A staging center reuses one bootstrap credential for hundreds of service-provider routers, making it impossible to revoke a single compromised device without disabling the entire fleet.

D:

Inspect NETCONF capabilities and target an actually supported datastore and commit behavior. This would respond to a DIFFERENT fictional service-provider network issue: A network controller sends NETCONF `edit-config` to a device but selects the candidate datastore on a platform that advertises running-only support. It does not directly address the current situation: A staging center reuses one bootstrap credential for hundreds of service-provider routers, making it impossible to revoke a single compromised device without disabling the entire fleet.

Question 378

After fixing the following network problem, what should the team verify: A staging center reuses one bootstrap credential for hundreds of service-provider routers, making it impossible to revoke a single compromised device without disabling the entire fleet.

  1. A disposable router accepts the authorized bootstrap and rejects a tampered or unsigned configuration.
  2. Validly signed bootstrap content loads while expired or untrusted material fails with an explicit recorded error.
  3. Test records align with the expected traffic window across multiple provider edges.
  4. Revoking one test device prevents its reenrollment while unaffected lab routers enroll normally.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Revoking one test device prevents its reenrollment while unaffected lab routers enroll normally. This confirms the approved response: Issue scoped device-specific bootstrap credentials or authenticated identities with lifecycle and revocation controls. It is relevant because: Shared initial-enrollment secrets amplify the impact of a single compromise and undermine device accountability.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A disposable router accepts the authorized bootstrap and rejects a tampered or unsigned configuration. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: A new PE uses zero-touch provisioning over an untrusted access network but downloads a bootstrap configuration from an unsigned public HTTP server. The specific correction here is: Issue scoped device-specific bootstrap credentials or authenticated identities with lifecycle and revocation controls.

B:

Validly signed bootstrap content loads while expired or untrusted material fails with an explicit recorded error. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: A ZTP controller provisions a router using an expired certificate chain and the operations team disables validation globally to make the download succeed. The specific correction here is: Issue scoped device-specific bootstrap credentials or authenticated identities with lifecycle and revocation controls.

C:

Test records align with the expected traffic window across multiple provider edges. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: A NetFlow collector receives records with event times 15 minutes behind the source because the PE clock is unsynchronized, scrambling incident and capacity correlations. The specific correction here is: Issue scoped device-specific bootstrap credentials or authenticated identities with lifecycle and revocation controls.

Question 379

A carrier root-cause review considers: A staging center reuses one bootstrap credential for hundreds of service-provider routers, making it impossible to revoke a single compromised device without disabling the entire fleet. What underlying mechanism explains this?

  1. Shared initial-enrollment secrets amplify the impact of a single compromise and undermine device accountability.
  2. ZTP automates initial enrollment and therefore needs strong device and bootstrap-source authenticity to avoid fleet-wide compromise.
  3. Certificate validity and time synchronization are foundational to secure zero-touch device enrollment.
  4. NSO can coordinate model-driven multi-device service intent and transaction management beyond independent scripting.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Shared initial-enrollment secrets amplify the impact of a single compromise and undermine device accountability. This explains the investigated issue: A staging center reuses one bootstrap credential for hundreds of service-provider routers, making it impossible to revoke a single compromised device without disabling the entire fleet. The approved corrective response is: Issue scoped device-specific bootstrap credentials or authenticated identities with lifecycle and revocation controls.

Incorrect Answers

B:

ZTP automates initial enrollment and therefore needs strong device and bootstrap-source authenticity to avoid fleet-wide compromise. That explains a DIFFERENT scenario: A new PE uses zero-touch provisioning over an untrusted access network but downloads a bootstrap configuration from an unsigned public HTTP server. The mechanism to prioritize for this question is: Shared initial-enrollment secrets amplify the impact of a single compromise and undermine device accountability.

C:

Certificate validity and time synchronization are foundational to secure zero-touch device enrollment. That explains a DIFFERENT scenario: A ZTP controller provisions a router using an expired certificate chain and the operations team disables validation globally to make the download succeed. The mechanism to prioritize for this question is: Shared initial-enrollment secrets amplify the impact of a single compromise and undermine device accountability.

D:

NSO can coordinate model-driven multi-device service intent and transaction management beyond independent scripting. That explains a DIFFERENT scenario: A wholesale provider manages one L3VPN service through separate scripts on five routers and cannot roll back when the third router rejects a policy. The mechanism to prioritize for this question is: Shared initial-enrollment secrets amplify the impact of a single compromise and undermine device accountability.

Question 380

After addressing: A staging center reuses one bootstrap credential for hundreds of service-provider routers, making it impossible to revoke a single compromised device without disabling the entire fleet. Which recurring service assurance check is most useful?

  1. Monitor bootstrap certificate expiry and NTP readiness during staging.
  2. Audit bootstrap credential issuance and retirement per asset.
  3. Test bootstrap signature and certificate failure modes before rolling out a new router model.
  4. Validate endpoint scheme, port and trust chain before each API integration rollout.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Audit bootstrap credential issuance and retirement per asset. This helps prevent recurrence of the issue: A staging center reuses one bootstrap credential for hundreds of service-provider routers, making it impossible to revoke a single compromised device without disabling the entire fleet. Acceptance evidence should be: Revoking one test device prevents its reenrollment while unaffected lab routers enroll normally.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Monitor bootstrap certificate expiry and NTP readiness during staging. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: A ZTP controller provisions a router using an expired certificate chain and the operations team disables validation globally to make the download succeed. It is less targeted to this issue than: Audit bootstrap credential issuance and retirement per asset.

C:

Test bootstrap signature and certificate failure modes before rolling out a new router model. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: A new PE uses zero-touch provisioning over an untrusted access network but downloads a bootstrap configuration from an unsigned public HTTP server. It is less targeted to this issue than: Audit bootstrap credential issuance and retirement per asset.

D:

Validate endpoint scheme, port and trust chain before each API integration rollout. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: An operations client sends an unencrypted HTTP call to a management endpoint that requires TLS and reports a protocol failure as an unreachable routing prefix. It is less targeted to this issue than: Audit bootstrap credential issuance and retirement per asset.