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Exam Code: 350-501

Exam Name Implementing and Operating Cisco Service Provider Network Core Technologies (SPCOR)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certifications: CCIE Service Provider , CCNP Service Provider

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Cisco 350-501 Practice Test 18

Question 170

After fixing the following network problem, what should the team verify: A provider expects an iBGP-learned path to beat an otherwise equal eBGP path simply because the iBGP router has a lower IGP cost to the next hop.

  1. Candidate traces identify the final tie-breaker and forwarding remains consistent across repeated resets.
  2. A fixture shows the expected origin-type comparison only after preceding attributes tie.
  3. The lab adjacency reaches Full and the stub router installs the designated default route.
  4. A lab best-path trace shows the expected externally learned candidate winning when earlier attributes tie.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

A lab best-path trace shows the expected externally learned candidate winning when earlier attributes tie. This confirms the approved response: Review the eBGP-versus-iBGP preference step and adjust routing policy only if the intended traffic engineering requires it. It is relevant because: Common BGP best-path algorithms prefer eBGP over iBGP before later tie-breakers such as internal next-hop cost.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Candidate traces identify the final tie-breaker and forwarding remains consistent across repeated resets. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: BGP flips between two equal candidates because a team ignores the router-id and neighbor-address tie-breakers after all higher-ranked attributes match. The specific correction here is: Review the eBGP-versus-iBGP preference step and adjust routing policy only if the intended traffic engineering requires it.

B:

A fixture shows the expected origin-type comparison only after preceding attributes tie. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: A BGP router holds multiple valid paths yet chooses an unanticipated route because one path has a smaller origin code, not because of a mistaken community. The specific correction here is: Review the eBGP-versus-iBGP preference step and adjust routing policy only if the intended traffic engineering requires it.

C:

The lab adjacency reaches Full and the stub router installs the designated default route. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: An OSPF stub area loses its expected default route when an engineer configures stub mode on the access router but not consistently on the area border router. The specific correction here is: Review the eBGP-versus-iBGP preference step and adjust routing policy only if the intended traffic engineering requires it.

Question 171

A carrier root-cause review considers: A provider expects an iBGP-learned path to beat an otherwise equal eBGP path simply because the iBGP router has a lower IGP cost to the next hop. What underlying mechanism explains this?

  1. Common BGP best-path algorithms prefer eBGP over iBGP before later tie-breakers such as internal next-hop cost.
  2. Local preference is an AS-wide policy attribute typically considered before AS_PATH length.
  3. BGP best-path selection includes deterministic final tie-breakers when major attributes are equal.
  4. OSPF auto-cost derives from a configurable reference bandwidth and can underdifferentiate fast interfaces.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Common BGP best-path algorithms prefer eBGP over iBGP before later tie-breakers such as internal next-hop cost. This explains the investigated issue: A provider expects an iBGP-learned path to beat an otherwise equal eBGP path simply because the iBGP router has a lower IGP cost to the next hop. The approved corrective response is: Review the eBGP-versus-iBGP preference step and adjust routing policy only if the intended traffic engineering requires it.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Local preference is an AS-wide policy attribute typically considered before AS_PATH length. That explains a DIFFERENT scenario: A carrier's inbound customer route has local preference 200 but another exit's route has a shorter AS_PATH, and the team incorrectly expects the short path to win. The mechanism to prioritize for this question is: Common BGP best-path algorithms prefer eBGP over iBGP before later tie-breakers such as internal next-hop cost.

C:

BGP best-path selection includes deterministic final tie-breakers when major attributes are equal. That explains a DIFFERENT scenario: BGP flips between two equal candidates because a team ignores the router-id and neighbor-address tie-breakers after all higher-ranked attributes match. The mechanism to prioritize for this question is: Common BGP best-path algorithms prefer eBGP over iBGP before later tie-breakers such as internal next-hop cost.

D:

OSPF auto-cost derives from a configurable reference bandwidth and can underdifferentiate fast interfaces. That explains a DIFFERENT scenario: A customer circuit has high latency but OSPF chooses it over the primary because reference bandwidth was never updated for modern high-speed links. The mechanism to prioritize for this question is: Common BGP best-path algorithms prefer eBGP over iBGP before later tie-breakers such as internal next-hop cost.

Question 172

After addressing: A provider expects an iBGP-learned path to beat an otherwise equal eBGP path simply because the iBGP router has a lower IGP cost to the next hop. Which recurring service assurance check is most useful?

  1. Keep best-path attribute snapshots alongside policy change tickets.
  2. Require ordered attribute comparison in BGP troubleshooting notes.
  3. Document nondefault origin modifications to avoid opaque path changes.
  4. Record upstream acceptance of traffic-engineering communities and MED policy.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Require ordered attribute comparison in BGP troubleshooting notes. This helps prevent recurrence of the issue: A provider expects an iBGP-learned path to beat an otherwise equal eBGP path simply because the iBGP router has a lower IGP cost to the next hop. Acceptance evidence should be: A lab best-path trace shows the expected externally learned candidate winning when earlier attributes tie.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Keep best-path attribute snapshots alongside policy change tickets. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: Two eBGP routes reach the same prefix with equal local preference, but operations assumes a shorter AS_PATH cannot affect selection and blames a metric change. It is less targeted to this issue than: Require ordered attribute comparison in BGP troubleshooting notes.

C:

Document nondefault origin modifications to avoid opaque path changes. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: A BGP router holds multiple valid paths yet chooses an unanticipated route because one path has a smaller origin code, not because of a mistaken community. It is less targeted to this issue than: Require ordered attribute comparison in BGP troubleshooting notes.

D:

Record upstream acceptance of traffic-engineering communities and MED policy. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: A provider changes MED inbound on one customer edge and expects all distant autonomous systems to prefer that link for inbound traffic. It is less targeted to this issue than: Require ordered attribute comparison in BGP troubleshooting notes.

Question 173

A provider backbone escalation identifies: A carrier activates an IPv6-only peering exchange but leaves only IPv4 unicast activated, so the BGP session is Established yet receives no IPv6 prefixes. What should the network team implement?

  1. Establish proper next-hop reachability via the IGP or an approved next-hop-self policy at the correct border.
  2. Correct remote-as and authenticated neighbor parameters to match the provider-customer agreement.
  3. Use an appropriate NAT64/DNS64 service design or approved application gateway for IPv6-to-IPv4 reachability.
  4. Activate the IPv6 unicast address family and required export policies on both intended peers.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Activate the IPv6 unicast address family and required export policies on both intended peers. This directly addresses the fictional service-provider network case: A carrier activates an IPv6-only peering exchange but leaves only IPv4 unicast activated, so the BGP session is Established yet receives no IPv6 prefixes. The technical mechanism is: BGP session establishment is distinct from activation of a specific MP-BGP address family. Verify success by: A lab route count shows approved IPv6 NLRI exchanged without unintended IPv4 injection.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Establish proper next-hop reachability via the IGP or an approved next-hop-self policy at the correct border. This would respond to a DIFFERENT fictional service-provider network issue: An iBGP core advertises a prefix with a next hop that access routers cannot resolve, causing BGP routes to be present but inactive. It does not directly address the current situation: A carrier activates an IPv6-only peering exchange but leaves only IPv4 unicast activated, so the BGP session is Established yet receives no IPv6 prefixes.

B:

Correct remote-as and authenticated neighbor parameters to match the provider-customer agreement. This would respond to a DIFFERENT fictional service-provider network issue: A new eBGP handoff establishes TCP transport but remains Idle/Active because the peer configuration uses the wrong autonomous-system number. It does not directly address the current situation: A carrier activates an IPv6-only peering exchange but leaves only IPv4 unicast activated, so the BGP session is Established yet receives no IPv6 prefixes.

C:

Use an appropriate NAT64/DNS64 service design or approved application gateway for IPv6-to-IPv4 reachability. This would respond to a DIFFERENT fictional service-provider network issue: An IPv6-only enterprise application must reach an IPv4-only legacy service, but the provider installs NAT44 and expects it to translate the address families. It does not directly address the current situation: A carrier activates an IPv6-only peering exchange but leaves only IPv4 unicast activated, so the BGP session is Established yet receives no IPv6 prefixes.

Question 174

A service-provider operations test targets: A carrier activates an IPv6-only peering exchange but leaves only IPv4 unicast activated, so the BGP session is Established yet receives no IPv6 prefixes. Which result is required?

  1. A lab route count shows approved IPv6 NLRI exchanged without unintended IPv4 injection.
  2. Route-policy trace shows only approved prefixes accepted while unrelated customer families stay filtered.
  3. Lab inbound path attributes show the prepend toward an upstream while the local routing policy sets the expected outbound exit.
  4. Candidate traces identify the final tie-breaker and forwarding remains consistent across repeated resets.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

A lab route count shows approved IPv6 NLRI exchanged without unintended IPv4 injection. This confirms the approved response: Activate the IPv6 unicast address family and required export policies on both intended peers. It is relevant because: BGP session establishment is distinct from activation of a specific MP-BGP address family.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Route-policy trace shows only approved prefixes accepted while unrelated customer families stay filtered. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: A core route reflector exports only a subset of service prefixes after a route-policy edit because the import policy unintentionally rejects an entire community group. The specific correction here is: Activate the IPv6 unicast address family and required export policies on both intended peers.

C:

Lab inbound path attributes show the prepend toward an upstream while the local routing policy sets the expected outbound exit. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: A multihomed service-provider customer advertises a /24 prefix with multiple AS prepends yet expects the prepend to influence its own outbound preferred exit. The specific correction here is: Activate the IPv6 unicast address family and required export policies on both intended peers.

D:

Candidate traces identify the final tie-breaker and forwarding remains consistent across repeated resets. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: BGP flips between two equal candidates because a team ignores the router-id and neighbor-address tie-breakers after all higher-ranked attributes match. The specific correction here is: Activate the IPv6 unicast address family and required export policies on both intended peers.

Question 175

A provider troubleshooting note states: A carrier activates an IPv6-only peering exchange but leaves only IPv4 unicast activated, so the BGP session is Established yet receives no IPv6 prefixes. Which mechanism is central?

  1. BGP peers validate remote AS identity during session establishment after TCP connectivity.
  2. BGP session establishment is distinct from activation of a specific MP-BGP address family.
  3. BGP Add-Path requires capability agreement and path identifiers to advertise more than one route per NLRI to a peer.
  4. High availability must account for postfailure capacity, not merely the existence of an alternate topology path.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

BGP session establishment is distinct from activation of a specific MP-BGP address family. This explains the investigated issue: A carrier activates an IPv6-only peering exchange but leaves only IPv4 unicast activated, so the BGP session is Established yet receives no IPv6 prefixes. The approved corrective response is: Activate the IPv6 unicast address family and required export policies on both intended peers.

Incorrect Answers

A:

BGP peers validate remote AS identity during session establishment after TCP connectivity. That explains a DIFFERENT scenario: A new eBGP handoff establishes TCP transport but remains Idle/Active because the peer configuration uses the wrong autonomous-system number. The mechanism to prioritize for this question is: BGP session establishment is distinct from activation of a specific MP-BGP address family.

C:

BGP Add-Path requires capability agreement and path identifiers to advertise more than one route per NLRI to a peer. That explains a DIFFERENT scenario: Two route reflectors advertise paths from the same client without Add-Path negotiation, and access PEs see one path even though each reflector knows multiple candidates. The mechanism to prioritize for this question is: BGP session establishment is distinct from activation of a specific MP-BGP address family.

D:

High availability must account for postfailure capacity, not merely the existence of an alternate topology path. That explains a DIFFERENT scenario: A core routing node performs maintenance with all traffic temporarily pinned to one uplink, exceeding the designed capacity even though connectivity stays up. The mechanism to prioritize for this question is: BGP session establishment is distinct from activation of a specific MP-BGP address family.

Question 176

To prevent recurrence of this provider network issue: A carrier activates an IPv6-only peering exchange but leaves only IPv4 unicast activated, so the BGP session is Established yet receives no IPv6 prefixes. Which control should be retained?

  1. Track Add-Path capabilities and route scale in peering acceptance tests.
  2. Validate next-hop recursion for every new iBGP export policy.
  3. Audit per-neighbor AF activation during dual-stack turn-up.
  4. Include protocol-specific reachability and adjacency checks after ACL changes.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Audit per-neighbor AF activation during dual-stack turn-up. This helps prevent recurrence of the issue: A carrier activates an IPv6-only peering exchange but leaves only IPv4 unicast activated, so the BGP session is Established yet receives no IPv6 prefixes. Acceptance evidence should be: A lab route count shows approved IPv6 NLRI exchanged without unintended IPv4 injection.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Track Add-Path capabilities and route scale in peering acceptance tests. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: Two route reflectors advertise paths from the same client without Add-Path negotiation, and access PEs see one path even though each reflector knows multiple candidates. It is less targeted to this issue than: Audit per-neighbor AF activation during dual-stack turn-up.

B:

Validate next-hop recursion for every new iBGP export policy. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: An iBGP core advertises a prefix with a next hop that access routers cannot resolve, causing BGP routes to be present but inactive. It is less targeted to this issue than: Audit per-neighbor AF activation during dual-stack turn-up.

D:

Include protocol-specific reachability and adjacency checks after ACL changes. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: Two OSPFv2 neighbors exchange hellos but a recently inserted ACL blocks protocol 89, preventing database synchronization on the transit segment. It is less targeted to this issue than: Audit per-neighbor AF activation during dual-stack turn-up.

Question 177

At a multi-region fiber backbone operator, an engineering review finds: A route map denies a tagged customer route but includes a later permit clause matching all prefixes, and operations misinterprets the first match behavior. Which change most directly corrects the service problem?

  1. Inspect sequence order and matching conditions and construct an explicit allowlist for intended routes.
  2. Preserve and transmit the negotiated community using the supported neighbor settings and route policy.
  3. Generate a reviewed intended-state diff and test representative prefixes before committing the revised policy.
  4. Verify IS-IS IPv6 address family and multitopology participation on all transit adjacencies along the route.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Inspect sequence order and matching conditions and construct an explicit allowlist for intended routes. This directly addresses the fictional service-provider network case: A route map denies a tagged customer route but includes a later permit clause matching all prefixes, and operations misinterprets the first match behavior. The technical mechanism is: Route maps evaluate ordered policy clauses, and broad later matches must be carefully scoped. Verify success by: Test prefixes show the tagged route rejected and only approved routes advertised.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Preserve and transmit the negotiated community using the supported neighbor settings and route policy. This would respond to a DIFFERENT fictional service-provider network issue: A provider uses BGP community 65000:123 as a traffic-engineering signal but one edge strips communities on eBGP export, so the upstream never applies the requested policy. It does not directly address the current situation: A route map denies a tagged customer route but includes a later permit clause matching all prefixes, and operations misinterprets the first match behavior.

C:

Generate a reviewed intended-state diff and test representative prefixes before committing the revised policy. This would respond to a DIFFERENT fictional service-provider network issue: A policy deployer overwrites an existing RPL route policy in production without a prechange candidate diff, causing accidental withdrawal of one customer aggregate. It does not directly address the current situation: A route map denies a tagged customer route but includes a later permit clause matching all prefixes, and operations misinterprets the first match behavior.

D:

Verify IS-IS IPv6 address family and multitopology participation on all transit adjacencies along the route. This would respond to a DIFFERENT fictional service-provider network issue: An IPv6 service prefix disappears after enabling IS-IS multitopology, and operations only checks the IPv4 SPF database. It does not directly address the current situation: A route map denies a tagged customer route but includes a later permit clause matching all prefixes, and operations misinterprets the first match behavior.

Question 178

For a multi-region fiber backbone operator, operators addressed: A route map denies a tagged customer route but includes a later permit clause matching all prefixes, and operations misinterprets the first match behavior. What is the strongest acceptance evidence?

  1. Tests accept the specified /25 and deny an unrelated /25 outside the controlled prefix.
  2. Test prefixes show the tagged route rejected and only approved routes advertised.
  3. A safe prefix fixture accepts only the specified routes and rejects the unauthorized rest.
  4. A packet or RIB inspection confirms unique path identifiers and the approved number of alternative routes.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Test prefixes show the tagged route rejected and only approved routes advertised. This confirms the approved response: Inspect sequence order and matching conditions and construct an explicit allowlist for intended routes. It is relevant because: Route maps evaluate ordered policy clauses, and broad later matches must be carefully scoped.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Tests accept the specified /25 and deny an unrelated /25 outside the controlled prefix. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: A route-policy template attempts to match a more-specific /25 by using an exact /24 prefix without a length range, mistakenly accepting only the aggregate. The specific correction here is: Inspect sequence order and matching conditions and construct an explicit allowlist for intended routes.

C:

A safe prefix fixture accepts only the specified routes and rejects the unauthorized rest. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: An IOS XR route policy applies `pass` before a prefix filter and an engineer expects later reject logic to stop evaluation automatically. The specific correction here is: Inspect sequence order and matching conditions and construct an explicit allowlist for intended routes.

D:

A packet or RIB inspection confirms unique path identifiers and the approved number of alternative routes. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: Two route reflectors advertise paths from the same client without Add-Path negotiation, and access PEs see one path even though each reflector knows multiple candidates. The specific correction here is: Inspect sequence order and matching conditions and construct an explicit allowlist for intended routes.

Question 179

Which network protocol or forwarding behavior explains the following issue: A route map denies a tagged customer route but includes a later permit clause matching all prefixes, and operations misinterprets the first match behavior.

  1. Routing Policy Language statements have defined evaluation semantics and must not be treated as arbitrary ordered ACL entries.
  2. BGP communities are optional policy metadata and must be explicitly propagated when the design depends on them.
  3. Route maps evaluate ordered policy clauses, and broad later matches must be carefully scoped.
  4. IS-IS Level 1 routing remains within an area, while Level 2 carries interarea reachability.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Route maps evaluate ordered policy clauses, and broad later matches must be carefully scoped. This explains the investigated issue: A route map denies a tagged customer route but includes a later permit clause matching all prefixes, and operations misinterprets the first match behavior. The approved corrective response is: Inspect sequence order and matching conditions and construct an explicit allowlist for intended routes.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Routing Policy Language statements have defined evaluation semantics and must not be treated as arbitrary ordered ACL entries. That explains a DIFFERENT scenario: An IOS XR route policy applies `pass` before a prefix filter and an engineer expects later reject logic to stop evaluation automatically. The mechanism to prioritize for this question is: Route maps evaluate ordered policy clauses, and broad later matches must be carefully scoped.

B:

BGP communities are optional policy metadata and must be explicitly propagated when the design depends on them. That explains a DIFFERENT scenario: A provider uses BGP community 65000:123 as a traffic-engineering signal but one edge strips communities on eBGP export, so the upstream never applies the requested policy. The mechanism to prioritize for this question is: Route maps evaluate ordered policy clauses, and broad later matches must be carefully scoped.

D:

IS-IS Level 1 routing remains within an area, while Level 2 carries interarea reachability. That explains a DIFFERENT scenario: Two provider core routers form an IS-IS L1 adjacency but do not exchange a prefix from another area because the engineer assumes L1 routers have universal interarea visibility. The mechanism to prioritize for this question is: Route maps evaluate ordered policy clauses, and broad later matches must be carefully scoped.

Question 180

A core network change board wants to avoid: A route map denies a tagged customer route but includes a later permit clause matching all prefixes, and operations misinterprets the first match behavior. Which ongoing safeguard fits best?

  1. Require boundary-prefix tests whenever prefix sets are edited.
  2. Maintain positive and negative RPL policy unit tests for each provider peer.
  3. Rotate peer keys through a coordinated overlap and verification plan.
  4. Include tagged and untagged candidate routes in route-map test suites.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Include tagged and untagged candidate routes in route-map test suites. This helps prevent recurrence of the issue: A route map denies a tagged customer route but includes a later permit clause matching all prefixes, and operations misinterprets the first match behavior. Acceptance evidence should be: Test prefixes show the tagged route rejected and only approved routes advertised.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Require boundary-prefix tests whenever prefix sets are edited. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: A route-policy template attempts to match a more-specific /25 by using an exact /24 prefix without a length range, mistakenly accepting only the aggregate. It is less targeted to this issue than: Include tagged and untagged candidate routes in route-map test suites.

B:

Maintain positive and negative RPL policy unit tests for each provider peer. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: An IOS XR route policy applies `pass` before a prefix filter and an engineer expects later reject logic to stop evaluation automatically. It is less targeted to this issue than: Include tagged and untagged candidate routes in route-map test suites.

C:

Rotate peer keys through a coordinated overlap and verification plan. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: A service-provider IS-IS adjacency drops intermittently when one side uses authentication while the other still sends unauthenticated LSPs. It is less targeted to this issue than: Include tagged and untagged candidate routes in route-map test suites.