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Exam Code: 350-501

Exam Name Implementing and Operating Cisco Service Provider Network Core Technologies (SPCOR)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certifications: CCIE Service Provider , CCNP Service Provider

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Cisco 350-501 Practice Test 12

Question 110

A service-provider operations test targets: An Ansible network playbook uses `hosts: all` and changes every backbone router though the request approved only an isolated PoP. Which result is required?

  1. Dry-run output lists only the intended routers and unrelated devices show no changes.
  2. A revised plan preserves the deployed service VM and updates only the intended metadata.
  3. The second apply is blocked or serialized until state reconciliation completes and the final plan matches desired topology.
  4. Counter retrieval succeeds and a controlled mutation remains rejected by schema or datastore rules.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Dry-run output lists only the intended routers and unrelated devices show no changes. This confirms the approved response: Scope inventory groups and host limits to approved lab or PoP devices before network configuration tasks run. It is relevant because: Ansible host selection controls deployment blast radius independently of the syntax of the configured tasks.

Incorrect Answers

B:

A revised plan preserves the deployed service VM and updates only the intended metadata. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: A Terraform plan proposes deleting an NSO integration virtual machine because its resource label was renamed in source code without preserving state identity. The specific correction here is: Scope inventory groups and host limits to approved lab or PoP devices before network configuration tasks run.

C:

The second apply is blocked or serialized until state reconciliation completes and the final plan matches desired topology. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: Two Terraform jobs edit the same service-provider cloud network workspace in parallel, creating conflicting route-table state and duplicate resources. The specific correction here is: Scope inventory groups and host limits to approved lab or PoP devices before network configuration tasks run.

D:

Counter retrieval succeeds and a controlled mutation remains rejected by schema or datastore rules. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: A network operator attempts to PATCH a YANG counter marked `config false`, then blames access control when the edit is rejected. The specific correction here is: Scope inventory groups and host limits to approved lab or PoP devices before network configuration tasks run.

Question 111

A provider troubleshooting note states: An Ansible network playbook uses `hosts: all` and changes every backbone router though the request approved only an isolated PoP. Which mechanism is central?

  1. IaC state must be coordinated to prevent concurrent operations from clobbering resource identity and dependencies.
  2. Ansible host selection controls deployment blast radius independently of the syntax of the configured tasks.
  3. Infrastructure as code maps declarations to state addresses, and renaming an address can look like delete-and-recreate.
  4. SNMPv2c community strings do not offer the cryptographic protections available in properly configured SNMPv3.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Ansible host selection controls deployment blast radius independently of the syntax of the configured tasks. This explains the investigated issue: An Ansible network playbook uses `hosts: all` and changes every backbone router though the request approved only an isolated PoP. The approved corrective response is: Scope inventory groups and host limits to approved lab or PoP devices before network configuration tasks run.

Incorrect Answers

A:

IaC state must be coordinated to prevent concurrent operations from clobbering resource identity and dependencies. That explains a DIFFERENT scenario: Two Terraform jobs edit the same service-provider cloud network workspace in parallel, creating conflicting route-table state and duplicate resources. The mechanism to prioritize for this question is: Ansible host selection controls deployment blast radius independently of the syntax of the configured tasks.

C:

Infrastructure as code maps declarations to state addresses, and renaming an address can look like delete-and-recreate. That explains a DIFFERENT scenario: A Terraform plan proposes deleting an NSO integration virtual machine because its resource label was renamed in source code without preserving state identity. The mechanism to prioritize for this question is: Ansible host selection controls deployment blast radius independently of the syntax of the configured tasks.

D:

SNMPv2c community strings do not offer the cryptographic protections available in properly configured SNMPv3. That explains a DIFFERENT scenario: A provider inventories routers using SNMPv2c with an easily guessed community on a shared management segment and exposes interface inventory to unauthorized clients. The mechanism to prioritize for this question is: Ansible host selection controls deployment blast radius independently of the syntax of the configured tasks.

Question 112

To prevent recurrence of this provider network issue: An Ansible network playbook uses `hosts: all` and changes every backbone router though the request approved only an isolated PoP. Which control should be retained?

  1. Require explicit human approval for any plan that destroys active network service components.
  2. Audit state locking, encryption and access controls on every workspace.
  3. Gate production Ansible runs on reviewed inventory and diff previews.
  4. Retire insecure communities and scan management access policy regularly.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Gate production Ansible runs on reviewed inventory and diff previews. This helps prevent recurrence of the issue: An Ansible network playbook uses `hosts: all` and changes every backbone router though the request approved only an isolated PoP. Acceptance evidence should be: Dry-run output lists only the intended routers and unrelated devices show no changes.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Require explicit human approval for any plan that destroys active network service components. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: A Terraform plan proposes deleting an NSO integration virtual machine because its resource label was renamed in source code without preserving state identity. It is less targeted to this issue than: Gate production Ansible runs on reviewed inventory and diff previews.

B:

Audit state locking, encryption and access controls on every workspace. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: Two Terraform jobs edit the same service-provider cloud network workspace in parallel, creating conflicting route-table state and duplicate resources. It is less targeted to this issue than: Gate production Ansible runs on reviewed inventory and diff previews.

D:

Retire insecure communities and scan management access policy regularly. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: A provider inventories routers using SNMPv2c with an easily guessed community on a shared management segment and exposes interface inventory to unauthorized clients. It is less targeted to this issue than: Gate production Ansible runs on reviewed inventory and diff previews.

Question 113

At a regional service-provider operations center, an engineering review finds: A new PE uses zero-touch provisioning over an untrusted access network but downloads a bootstrap configuration from an unsigned public HTTP server. Which change most directly corrects the service problem?

  1. Implement secure ZTP with authenticated bootstrapping, image trust and the provider's approved certificate or signed configuration controls.
  2. Issue scoped device-specific bootstrap credentials or authenticated identities with lifecycle and revocation controls.
  3. Renew and install the correct trust chain and verify system time before repeating secure enrollment.
  4. Model the service with a supported Cisco NSO package and transactional orchestration across the participating devices.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Implement secure ZTP with authenticated bootstrapping, image trust and the provider's approved certificate or signed configuration controls. This directly addresses the fictional service-provider network case: A new PE uses zero-touch provisioning over an untrusted access network but downloads a bootstrap configuration from an unsigned public HTTP server. The technical mechanism is: ZTP automates initial enrollment and therefore needs strong device and bootstrap-source authenticity to avoid fleet-wide compromise. Verify success by: A disposable router accepts the authorized bootstrap and rejects a tampered or unsigned configuration.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Issue scoped device-specific bootstrap credentials or authenticated identities with lifecycle and revocation controls. This would respond to a DIFFERENT fictional service-provider network issue: A staging center reuses one bootstrap credential for hundreds of service-provider routers, making it impossible to revoke a single compromised device without disabling the entire fleet. It does not directly address the current situation: A new PE uses zero-touch provisioning over an untrusted access network but downloads a bootstrap configuration from an unsigned public HTTP server.

C:

Renew and install the correct trust chain and verify system time before repeating secure enrollment. This would respond to a DIFFERENT fictional service-provider network issue: A ZTP controller provisions a router using an expired certificate chain and the operations team disables validation globally to make the download succeed. It does not directly address the current situation: A new PE uses zero-touch provisioning over an untrusted access network but downloads a bootstrap configuration from an unsigned public HTTP server.

D:

Model the service with a supported Cisco NSO package and transactional orchestration across the participating devices. This would respond to a DIFFERENT fictional service-provider network issue: A wholesale provider manages one L3VPN service through separate scripts on five routers and cannot roll back when the third router rejects a policy. It does not directly address the current situation: A new PE uses zero-touch provisioning over an untrusted access network but downloads a bootstrap configuration from an unsigned public HTTP server.

Question 114

For a regional service-provider operations center, operators addressed: A new PE uses zero-touch provisioning over an untrusted access network but downloads a bootstrap configuration from an unsigned public HTTP server. What is the strongest acceptance evidence?

  1. Revoking one test device prevents its reenrollment while unaffected lab routers enroll normally.
  2. A disposable router accepts the authorized bootstrap and rejects a tampered or unsigned configuration.
  3. Validly signed bootstrap content loads while expired or untrusted material fails with an explicit recorded error.
  4. A compatibility test only edits leaves present in each device's advertised schema, with unsupported devices safely excluded.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

A disposable router accepts the authorized bootstrap and rejects a tampered or unsigned configuration. This confirms the approved response: Implement secure ZTP with authenticated bootstrapping, image trust and the provider's approved certificate or signed configuration controls. It is relevant because: ZTP automates initial enrollment and therefore needs strong device and bootstrap-source authenticity to avoid fleet-wide compromise.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Revoking one test device prevents its reenrollment while unaffected lab routers enroll normally. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: A staging center reuses one bootstrap credential for hundreds of service-provider routers, making it impossible to revoke a single compromised device without disabling the entire fleet. The specific correction here is: Implement secure ZTP with authenticated bootstrapping, image trust and the provider's approved certificate or signed configuration controls.

C:

Validly signed bootstrap content loads while expired or untrusted material fails with an explicit recorded error. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: A ZTP controller provisions a router using an expired certificate chain and the operations team disables validation globally to make the download succeed. The specific correction here is: Implement secure ZTP with authenticated bootstrapping, image trust and the provider's approved certificate or signed configuration controls.

D:

A compatibility test only edits leaves present in each device's advertised schema, with unsupported devices safely excluded. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: A controller deploys a single RESTCONF configuration template to devices running different firmware but fails when one model revision lacks the targeted leaf. The specific correction here is: Implement secure ZTP with authenticated bootstrapping, image trust and the provider's approved certificate or signed configuration controls.

Question 115

Which network protocol or forwarding behavior explains the following issue: A new PE uses zero-touch provisioning over an untrusted access network but downloads a bootstrap configuration from an unsigned public HTTP server.

  1. Shared initial-enrollment secrets amplify the impact of a single compromise and undermine device accountability.
  2. Certificate validity and time synchronization are foundational to secure zero-touch device enrollment.
  3. ZTP automates initial enrollment and therefore needs strong device and bootstrap-source authenticity to avoid fleet-wide compromise.
  4. Transport session success is not equivalent to NETCONF RPC completion or valid datastore modification.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

ZTP automates initial enrollment and therefore needs strong device and bootstrap-source authenticity to avoid fleet-wide compromise. This explains the investigated issue: A new PE uses zero-touch provisioning over an untrusted access network but downloads a bootstrap configuration from an unsigned public HTTP server. The approved corrective response is: Implement secure ZTP with authenticated bootstrapping, image trust and the provider's approved certificate or signed configuration controls.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Shared initial-enrollment secrets amplify the impact of a single compromise and undermine device accountability. That explains a DIFFERENT scenario: A staging center reuses one bootstrap credential for hundreds of service-provider routers, making it impossible to revoke a single compromised device without disabling the entire fleet. The mechanism to prioritize for this question is: ZTP automates initial enrollment and therefore needs strong device and bootstrap-source authenticity to avoid fleet-wide compromise.

B:

Certificate validity and time synchronization are foundational to secure zero-touch device enrollment. That explains a DIFFERENT scenario: A ZTP controller provisions a router using an expired certificate chain and the operations team disables validation globally to make the download succeed. The mechanism to prioritize for this question is: ZTP automates initial enrollment and therefore needs strong device and bootstrap-source authenticity to avoid fleet-wide compromise.

D:

Transport session success is not equivalent to NETCONF RPC completion or valid datastore modification. That explains a DIFFERENT scenario: A NETCONF RPC returns an `<rpc-error>` element but a script reports success because the SSH TCP session remained connected. The mechanism to prioritize for this question is: ZTP automates initial enrollment and therefore needs strong device and bootstrap-source authenticity to avoid fleet-wide compromise.

Question 116

A core network change board wants to avoid: A new PE uses zero-touch provisioning over an untrusted access network but downloads a bootstrap configuration from an unsigned public HTTP server. Which ongoing safeguard fits best?

  1. Monitor bootstrap certificate expiry and NTP readiness during staging.
  2. Audit bootstrap credential issuance and retirement per asset.
  3. Contract-test request headers and payload formats against each platform API version.
  4. Test bootstrap signature and certificate failure modes before rolling out a new router model.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Test bootstrap signature and certificate failure modes before rolling out a new router model. This helps prevent recurrence of the issue: A new PE uses zero-touch provisioning over an untrusted access network but downloads a bootstrap configuration from an unsigned public HTTP server. Acceptance evidence should be: A disposable router accepts the authorized bootstrap and rejects a tampered or unsigned configuration.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Monitor bootstrap certificate expiry and NTP readiness during staging. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: A ZTP controller provisions a router using an expired certificate chain and the operations team disables validation globally to make the download succeed. It is less targeted to this issue than: Test bootstrap signature and certificate failure modes before rolling out a new router model.

B:

Audit bootstrap credential issuance and retirement per asset. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: A staging center reuses one bootstrap credential for hundreds of service-provider routers, making it impossible to revoke a single compromised device without disabling the entire fleet. It is less targeted to this issue than: Test bootstrap signature and certificate failure modes before rolling out a new router model.

C:

Contract-test request headers and payload formats against each platform API version. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: An external Python script posts interface descriptions to a router API but uses an incorrect content type and receives 415 Unsupported Media Type. It is less targeted to this issue than: Test bootstrap signature and certificate failure modes before rolling out a new router model.

Question 117

A carrier service activation check discovers: A router publishes gNMI dial-out telemetry to a collector whose TLS certificate hostname does not match the configured endpoint and fails the handshake. Which action best restores the intended behavior?

  1. Select the appropriate supported ON_CHANGE subscription for eligible leaves or adjust SAMPLE cadence for counters that need periodic sampling.
  2. Install a correctly named trusted collector certificate and verify mutual TLS identities where required.
  3. Configure supported device-initiated gNMI dial-out streaming to an approved collector reachable from the device.
  4. Implement secure ZTP with authenticated bootstrapping, image trust and the provider's approved certificate or signed configuration controls.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Install a correctly named trusted collector certificate and verify mutual TLS identities where required. This directly addresses the fictional service-provider network case: A router publishes gNMI dial-out telemetry to a collector whose TLS certificate hostname does not match the configured endpoint and fails the handshake. The technical mechanism is: TLS authenticates remote endpoint identity using chain and name checks, while mTLS can additionally authenticate the router. Verify success by: A lab connection establishes with expected certificate validation and rejects an endpoint using a mismatched identity.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Select the appropriate supported ON_CHANGE subscription for eligible leaves or adjust SAMPLE cadence for counters that need periodic sampling. This would respond to a DIFFERENT fictional service-provider network issue: A provider subscribes to a gNMI counter in SAMPLE mode but expects only updates when the value changes, saturating the collector with unnecessary periodic messages. It does not directly address the current situation: A router publishes gNMI dial-out telemetry to a collector whose TLS certificate hostname does not match the configured endpoint and fails the handshake.

C:

Configure supported device-initiated gNMI dial-out streaming to an approved collector reachable from the device. This would respond to a DIFFERENT fictional service-provider network issue: A telemetry design requires continuous interface counters from devices behind outbound-only firewalls, but the collector tries to initiate dial-in sessions to inaccessible management addresses. It does not directly address the current situation: A router publishes gNMI dial-out telemetry to a collector whose TLS certificate hostname does not match the configured endpoint and fails the handshake.

D:

Implement secure ZTP with authenticated bootstrapping, image trust and the provider's approved certificate or signed configuration controls. This would respond to a DIFFERENT fictional service-provider network issue: A new PE uses zero-touch provisioning over an untrusted access network but downloads a bootstrap configuration from an unsigned public HTTP server. It does not directly address the current situation: A router publishes gNMI dial-out telemetry to a collector whose TLS certificate hostname does not match the configured endpoint and fails the handshake.

Question 118

Following a supported configuration correction, the original issue was: A router publishes gNMI dial-out telemetry to a collector whose TLS certificate hostname does not match the configured endpoint and fails the handshake. Which observation verifies success?

  1. The router establishes an outbound stream and periodic counter updates arrive without new inbound management openings.
  2. A controlled counter sequence generates telemetry at the intended cadence and collector load meets capacity targets.
  3. A lab connection establishes with expected certificate validation and rejects an endpoint using a mismatched identity.
  4. The intended interface change appears in the supported datastore and the controller reports successful RPC completion.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

A lab connection establishes with expected certificate validation and rejects an endpoint using a mismatched identity. This confirms the approved response: Install a correctly named trusted collector certificate and verify mutual TLS identities where required. It is relevant because: TLS authenticates remote endpoint identity using chain and name checks, while mTLS can additionally authenticate the router.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The router establishes an outbound stream and periodic counter updates arrive without new inbound management openings. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: A telemetry design requires continuous interface counters from devices behind outbound-only firewalls, but the collector tries to initiate dial-in sessions to inaccessible management addresses. The specific correction here is: Install a correctly named trusted collector certificate and verify mutual TLS identities where required.

B:

A controlled counter sequence generates telemetry at the intended cadence and collector load meets capacity targets. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: A provider subscribes to a gNMI counter in SAMPLE mode but expects only updates when the value changes, saturating the collector with unnecessary periodic messages. The specific correction here is: Install a correctly named trusted collector certificate and verify mutual TLS identities where required.

D:

The intended interface change appears in the supported datastore and the controller reports successful RPC completion. This would validate ANOTHER scenario: A network controller sends NETCONF `edit-config` to a device but selects the candidate datastore on a platform that advertises running-only support. The specific correction here is: Install a correctly named trusted collector certificate and verify mutual TLS identities where required.

Question 119

At a wholesale transit provider, an engineer examines: A router publishes gNMI dial-out telemetry to a collector whose TLS certificate hostname does not match the configured endpoint and fails the handshake. Which technical principle is most applicable?

  1. Dial-out telemetry originates at the device, whereas dial-in requires the collector to connect to the device endpoint.
  2. gNMI subscription modes determine whether updates are sampled periodically or emitted on supported state changes.
  3. Certificate validity and time synchronization are foundational to secure zero-touch device enrollment.
  4. TLS authenticates remote endpoint identity using chain and name checks, while mTLS can additionally authenticate the router.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

TLS authenticates remote endpoint identity using chain and name checks, while mTLS can additionally authenticate the router. This explains the investigated issue: A router publishes gNMI dial-out telemetry to a collector whose TLS certificate hostname does not match the configured endpoint and fails the handshake. The approved corrective response is: Install a correctly named trusted collector certificate and verify mutual TLS identities where required.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Dial-out telemetry originates at the device, whereas dial-in requires the collector to connect to the device endpoint. That explains a DIFFERENT scenario: A telemetry design requires continuous interface counters from devices behind outbound-only firewalls, but the collector tries to initiate dial-in sessions to inaccessible management addresses. The mechanism to prioritize for this question is: TLS authenticates remote endpoint identity using chain and name checks, while mTLS can additionally authenticate the router.

B:

gNMI subscription modes determine whether updates are sampled periodically or emitted on supported state changes. That explains a DIFFERENT scenario: A provider subscribes to a gNMI counter in SAMPLE mode but expects only updates when the value changes, saturating the collector with unnecessary periodic messages. The mechanism to prioritize for this question is: TLS authenticates remote endpoint identity using chain and name checks, while mTLS can additionally authenticate the router.

C:

Certificate validity and time synchronization are foundational to secure zero-touch device enrollment. That explains a DIFFERENT scenario: A ZTP controller provisions a router using an expired certificate chain and the operations team disables validation globally to make the download succeed. The mechanism to prioritize for this question is: TLS authenticates remote endpoint identity using chain and name checks, while mTLS can additionally authenticate the router.

Question 120

For a wholesale transit provider, the change record describes: A router publishes gNMI dial-out telemetry to a collector whose TLS certificate hostname does not match the configured endpoint and fails the handshake. What preventive validation should be standard?

  1. Include hostname, expiry and certificate chain tests in gNMI collector deployment.
  2. Record firewall direction and streaming mode in each telemetry service definition.
  3. Capacity-test subscription modes against real supported model leaves before large-scale activation.
  4. Require explicit human approval for any plan that destroys active network service components.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Include hostname, expiry and certificate chain tests in gNMI collector deployment. This helps prevent recurrence of the issue: A router publishes gNMI dial-out telemetry to a collector whose TLS certificate hostname does not match the configured endpoint and fails the handshake. Acceptance evidence should be: A lab connection establishes with expected certificate validation and rejects an endpoint using a mismatched identity.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Record firewall direction and streaming mode in each telemetry service definition. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: A telemetry design requires continuous interface counters from devices behind outbound-only firewalls, but the collector tries to initiate dial-in sessions to inaccessible management addresses. It is less targeted to this issue than: Include hostname, expiry and certificate chain tests in gNMI collector deployment.

C:

Capacity-test subscription modes against real supported model leaves before large-scale activation. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: A provider subscribes to a gNMI counter in SAMPLE mode but expects only updates when the value changes, saturating the collector with unnecessary periodic messages. It is less targeted to this issue than: Include hostname, expiry and certificate chain tests in gNMI collector deployment.

D:

Require explicit human approval for any plan that destroys active network service components. That is a sensible control for ANOTHER scenario: A Terraform plan proposes deleting an NSO integration virtual machine because its resource label was renamed in source code without preserving state identity. It is less targeted to this issue than: Include hostname, expiry and certificate chain tests in gNMI collector deployment.