Exam Bundle

That observation verifies ipfix export compatibility in a different situation, such as when an exporter uses an IPFIX collector but the router sends an incompatible or incorrectly configured NetFlow format. For the reported high-rate sampled flow visibility incident at a managed WAN provider in Amsterdam, the required acceptance evidence is: The collector receives manageable sampled flow records and reports sampling metadata accurately. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies netflow v9 template information in a different situation, such as when the collector receives NetFlow v9 data records but cannot decode fields because the template has not been received. For the reported high-rate sampled flow visibility incident at a managed WAN provider in Amsterdam, the required acceptance evidence is: The collector receives manageable sampled flow records and reports sampling metadata accurately. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies syslog remote destination in a different situation, such as when a router logs events locally but nothing reaches the central collector because logging host was never configured. For the reported high-rate sampled flow visibility incident at a managed WAN provider in Amsterdam, the required acceptance evidence is: The collector receives manageable sampled flow records and reports sampling metadata accurately. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That approach is relevant to acl implicit deny, such as when a router ACL was built with one permit line and unexpectedly blocks all other traffic. That is a different root cause from the time-based acl inactive fault observed at a regional data center in Dallas. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: The intended ACL entry becomes effective only within the documented schedule.

That approach is relevant to acl counter troubleshooting, such as when a new permit rule is blamed for a dropped service even though its hit counter never increases. That is a different root cause from the time-based acl inactive fault observed at a regional data center in Dallas. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: The intended ACL entry becomes effective only within the documented schedule.

That approach is relevant to acl first-match ordering, such as when a broad permit appears before a targeted deny, so traffic to a prohibited TCP port passes. That is a different root cause from the time-based acl inactive fault observed at a regional data center in Dallas. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: The intended ACL entry becomes effective only within the documented schedule.

That observation verifies acl first-match ordering in a different situation, such as when a broad permit appears before a targeted deny, so traffic to a prohibited TCP port passes. For the reported time-based acl inactive incident at a regional data center in Dallas, the required acceptance evidence is: The intended ACL entry becomes effective only within the documented schedule. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies acl counter troubleshooting in a different situation, such as when a new permit rule is blamed for a dropped service even though its hit counter never increases. For the reported time-based acl inactive incident at a regional data center in Dallas, the required acceptance evidence is: The intended ACL entry becomes effective only within the documented schedule. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies extended acl ports in a different situation, such as when an ACL permits a destination address but not the required TCP application port because the entry tests the wrong transport field. For the reported time-based acl inactive incident at a regional data center in Dallas, the required acceptance evidence is: The intended ACL entry becomes effective only within the documented schedule. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That approach is relevant to vpnv4 bgp family, such as when pE loopback BGP peers are Established for ordinary IPv4 unicast but customer VPN prefixes are absent. That is a different root cause from the vpn connectivity asymmetric fault observed at an MPLS service provider in Paris. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: Both sites contain authorized forward and return routes within the same VPN.

That approach is relevant to route-target import missing, such as when the remote PE receives a VPNv4 route but the destination tenant VRF does not import it because RT values do not match. That is a different root cause from the vpn connectivity asymmetric fault observed at an MPLS service provider in Paris. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: Both sites contain authorized forward and return routes within the same VPN.

That approach is relevant to pe core versus customer forwarding, such as when a P router in the MPLS core is expected to contain every customer IPv4 prefix to forward VPN traffic. That is a different root cause from the vpn connectivity asymmetric fault observed at an MPLS service provider in Paris. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: Both sites contain authorized forward and return routes within the same VPN.

That observation verifies pe core versus customer forwarding in a different situation, such as when a P router in the MPLS core is expected to contain every customer IPv4 prefix to forward VPN traffic. For the reported vpn connectivity asymmetric incident at an MPLS service provider in Paris, the required acceptance evidence is: Both sites contain authorized forward and return routes within the same VPN. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies bgp extended community transmission in a different situation, such as when a VPNv4 prefix reaches a PE without its RT extended community, so import policy cannot identify the target VPN. For the reported vpn connectivity asymmetric incident at an MPLS service provider in Paris, the required acceptance evidence is: Both sites contain authorized forward and return routes within the same VPN. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies route distinguisher overlapping tenants in a different situation, such as when two customers both advertise 10.10.0.0/16 and the operator assumes ordinary IPv4 BGP can carry them without unique VPN identity. For the reported vpn connectivity asymmetric incident at an MPLS service provider in Paris, the required acceptance evidence is: Both sites contain authorized forward and return routes within the same VPN. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That approach is relevant to ospf area mismatch, such as when two OSPF routers on one link receive hellos but use different area identifiers, preventing adjacency. That is a different root cause from the ospf inter-area summarization fault observed at a government WAN in Ottawa. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: The other area receives the intended inter-area summary rather than each qualifying component.

That approach is relevant to ospf stub flag mismatch, such as when an OSPF adjacency fails because one side is configured stub and the other side treats the area as normal. That is a different root cause from the ospf inter-area summarization fault observed at a government WAN in Ottawa. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: The other area receives the intended inter-area summary rather than each qualifying component.

That approach is relevant to ibgp loopback update-source, such as when an iBGP session configured to peer loopback-to-loopback remains Idle because the local source defaults to the physical interface. That is a different root cause from the ospf inter-area summarization fault observed at a government WAN in Ottawa. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: The other area receives the intended inter-area summary rather than each qualifying component.

That observation verifies ospf cost path choice in a different situation, such as when an engineer expects OSPF to choose the highest interface speed but configured interface cost forces a different path. For the reported ospf inter-area summarization incident at a government WAN in Ottawa, the required acceptance evidence is: The other area receives the intended inter-area summary rather than each qualifying component. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies eigrp interface summary in a different situation, such as when an EIGRP hub advertises several component prefixes to remote peers despite a policy requiring one regional aggregate. For the reported ospf inter-area summarization incident at a government WAN in Ottawa, the required acceptance evidence is: The other area receives the intended inter-area summary rather than each qualifying component. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies ospf authentication mismatch in a different situation, such as when an OSPF neighbor receives hellos but rejects authenticated packets because key or mode differs across the link. For the reported ospf inter-area summarization incident at a government WAN in Ottawa, the required acceptance evidence is: The other area receives the intended inter-area summary rather than each qualifying component. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That approach is relevant to vty access-class management acl, such as when untrusted subnets can open the router's SSH port even though the routing interfaces have unrelated ACLs. That is a different root cause from the flow monitor interface direction fault observed at an industrial site operations group in Munich. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: Inbound flow counters increase for captured test traffic.

That approach is relevant to tftp transfer firewall, such as when a device can ping its image server but TFTP copy fails because an intermediate ACL blocks the required UDP TFTP exchange. That is a different root cause from the flow monitor interface direction fault observed at an industrial site operations group in Munich. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: Inbound flow counters increase for captured test traffic.

That approach is relevant to ip sla track debounce, such as when a tracked SLA path flaps briefly and repeatedly changes the preferred route due to momentary packet loss. That is a different root cause from the flow monitor interface direction fault observed at an industrial site operations group in Munich. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: Inbound flow counters increase for captured test traffic.

That observation verifies flexible netflow exporter target in a different situation, such as when a flow monitor collects records locally but the collector receives nothing because its exporter destination is wrong. For the reported flow monitor interface direction incident at an industrial site operations group in Munich, the required acceptance evidence is: Inbound flow counters increase for captured test traffic. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies ipfix export compatibility in a different situation, such as when an exporter uses an IPFIX collector but the router sends an incompatible or incorrectly configured NetFlow format. For the reported flow monitor interface direction incident at an industrial site operations group in Munich, the required acceptance evidence is: Inbound flow counters increase for captured test traffic. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies flow record key fields in a different situation, such as when a traffic analyzer needs conversations by source/destination IP and ports but the custom flow record does not match those keys. For the reported flow monitor interface direction incident at an industrial site operations group in Munich, the required acceptance evidence is: Inbound flow counters increase for captured test traffic. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That approach is relevant to ike esp underlay filtering, such as when a DMVPN peer can ping its hub's public interface but IKE or ESP packets are blocked by a WAN ACL. That is a different root cause from the nat-t reachability fault observed at an energy services network in Calgary. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: The spoke behind NAT establishes IPsec and bidirectional encrypted traffic flows.

That approach is relevant to tunnel ipsec profile binding, such as when spoke-to-hub GRE packets are being sent without the required encryption because no tunnel protection profile is attached. That is a different root cause from the nat-t reachability fault observed at an energy services network in Calgary. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: The spoke behind NAT establishes IPsec and bidirectional encrypted traffic flows.

That approach is relevant to static hub mapping at spoke, such as when a spoke cannot send initial NHRP requests because it has no mapping from the hub's tunnel address to the reachable NBMA address. That is a different root cause from the nat-t reachability fault observed at an energy services network in Calgary. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: The spoke behind NAT establishes IPsec and bidirectional encrypted traffic flows.

That observation verifies tunnel ipsec profile binding in a different situation, such as when spoke-to-hub GRE packets are being sent without the required encryption because no tunnel protection profile is attached. For the reported nat-t reachability incident at an energy services network in Calgary, the required acceptance evidence is: The spoke behind NAT establishes IPsec and bidirectional encrypted traffic flows. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies spoke multicast static mapping in a different situation, such as when a DMVPN spoke reaches the hub by unicast but its multicast routing hellos never reach the hub tunnel. For the reported nat-t reachability incident at an energy services network in Calgary, the required acceptance evidence is: The spoke behind NAT establishes IPsec and bidirectional encrypted traffic flows. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies dmvpn nhrp network id mismatch in a different situation, such as when the hub and spoke use different NHRP network identifiers despite otherwise consistent tunnel addressing. For the reported nat-t reachability incident at an energy services network in Calgary, the required acceptance evidence is: The spoke behind NAT establishes IPsec and bidirectional encrypted traffic flows. This other result does not test that condition directly.