Exam Bundle

That observation verifies dmvpn wrong tunnel source in a different situation, such as when a spoke's tunnel source points at an inactive LAN interface instead of its reachable WAN underlay interface. For the reported ipsec ike proposal mismatch incident at a remote clinic network in Melbourne, the required acceptance evidence is: IKE establishes a security association under the approved cryptographic policy. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies nat-t reachability in a different situation, such as when a DMVPN spoke behind NAT cannot establish IPsec because the path filters NAT traversal traffic. For the reported ipsec ike proposal mismatch incident at a remote clinic network in Melbourne, the required acceptance evidence is: IKE establishes a security association under the approved cryptographic policy. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies spoke multicast static mapping in a different situation, such as when a DMVPN spoke reaches the hub by unicast but its multicast routing hellos never reach the hub tunnel. For the reported ipsec ike proposal mismatch incident at a remote clinic network in Melbourne, the required acceptance evidence is: IKE establishes a security association under the approved cryptographic policy. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That approach is relevant to ipv6 nd spoofing, such as when an attacker injects forged Neighbor Advertisements to redirect local IPv6 traffic. That is a different root cause from the ipv6 rogue router advertisements fault observed at a telecommunications branch in Oslo. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: Unauthorized RA frames are blocked and hosts retain the intended IPv6 default router.

That approach is relevant to ra guard trusted boundary, such as when rA Guard is deployed only on the legitimate router-facing port instead of the untrusted host-facing ports. That is a different root cause from the ipv6 rogue router advertisements fault observed at a telecommunications branch in Oslo. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: Unauthorized RA frames are blocked and hosts retain the intended IPv6 default router.

That approach is relevant to ipv6 source guard, such as when a client spoofs an IPv6 source address not associated with its access port and evades ordinary destination filtering. That is a different root cause from the ipv6 rogue router advertisements fault observed at a telecommunications branch in Oslo. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: Unauthorized RA frames are blocked and hosts retain the intended IPv6 default router.

That observation verifies ipv6 source guard in a different situation, such as when a client spoofs an IPv6 source address not associated with its access port and evades ordinary destination filtering. For the reported ipv6 rogue router advertisements incident at a telecommunications branch in Oslo, the required acceptance evidence is: Unauthorized RA frames are blocked and hosts retain the intended IPv6 default router. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies ipv6 nd trust validation in a different situation, such as when a first-hop protection policy is copied from a different VLAN and treats all access ports as trusted for neighbor discovery. For the reported ipv6 rogue router advertisements incident at a telecommunications branch in Oslo, the required acceptance evidence is: Unauthorized RA frames are blocked and hosts retain the intended IPv6 default router. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies ra guard trusted boundary in a different situation, such as when rA Guard is deployed only on the legitimate router-facing port instead of the untrusted host-facing ports. For the reported ipv6 rogue router advertisements incident at a telecommunications branch in Oslo, the required acceptance evidence is: Unauthorized RA frames are blocked and hosts retain the intended IPv6 default router. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That approach is relevant to redistribution route-map omission, such as when a router leaks sensitive static prefixes into OSPF because redistribute static has no route policy. That is a different root cause from the floating static backup fault observed at a distribution company in Oslo. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: The primary protocol remains installed while healthy and the backup static appears after primary withdrawal.

That approach is relevant to bgp next-hop reachability before ad, such as when an eBGP route appears in the BGP table but not the RIB; an operator immediately changes BGP AD without examining the peer-advertised next hop. That is a different root cause from the floating static backup fault observed at a distribution company in Oslo. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: The primary protocol remains installed while healthy and the backup static appears after primary withdrawal.

That approach is relevant to eigrp delay/bandwidth metric, such as when an interface's documented bandwidth differs from its configured EIGRP bandwidth and delay inputs, creating unexpected path costs. That is a different root cause from the floating static backup fault observed at a distribution company in Oslo. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: The primary protocol remains installed while healthy and the backup static appears after primary withdrawal.

That observation verifies eigrp stub leaf in a different situation, such as when a remote branch does not transit traffic yet its router receives network-wide EIGRP query requests for unrelated destinations. For the reported floating static backup incident at a distribution company in Oslo, the required acceptance evidence is: The primary protocol remains installed while healthy and the backup static appears after primary withdrawal. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies eigrp seed metric on redistribution in a different situation, such as when oSPF routes do not appear in EIGRP after redistribution because no usable seed metric was assigned. For the reported floating static backup incident at a distribution company in Oslo, the required acceptance evidence is: The primary protocol remains installed while healthy and the backup static appears after primary withdrawal. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies ospf default originate conditional in a different situation, such as when the border router should originate an OSPF default only while it has a usable upstream default but neighbors receive none. For the reported floating static backup incident at a distribution company in Oslo, the required acceptance evidence is: The primary protocol remains installed while healthy and the backup static appears after primary withdrawal. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That approach is relevant to ip sla state versus reachability, such as when an operator sees the IP SLA probe return an over-threshold result and assumes the same as complete reachability failure. That is a different root cause from the ip sla timeout settings fault observed at a university IT network in Edinburgh. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: Ordinary latency stays within healthy results while genuine outages still trigger failure.

That approach is relevant to ip sla http operation, such as when iCMP probes succeed but an application URL fails, and a network team considers basic ping sufficient proof of service health. That is a different root cause from the ip sla timeout settings fault observed at a university IT network in Edinburgh. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: Ordinary latency stays within healthy results while genuine outages still trigger failure.

That approach is relevant to ip sla track debounce, such as when a tracked SLA path flaps briefly and repeatedly changes the preferred route due to momentary packet loss. That is a different root cause from the ip sla timeout settings fault observed at a university IT network in Edinburgh. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: Ordinary latency stays within healthy results while genuine outages still trigger failure.

That observation verifies ip sla jitter measurement in a different situation, such as when a voice service suffers variation in packet delay but is monitored only with a simple ICMP success rate. For the reported ip sla timeout settings incident at a university IT network in Edinburgh, the required acceptance evidence is: Ordinary latency stays within healthy results while genuine outages still trigger failure. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies ip sla track debounce in a different situation, such as when a tracked SLA path flaps briefly and repeatedly changes the preferred route due to momentary packet loss. For the reported ip sla timeout settings incident at a university IT network in Edinburgh, the required acceptance evidence is: Ordinary latency stays within healthy results while genuine outages still trigger failure. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies ip sla http operation in a different situation, such as when iCMP probes succeed but an application URL fails, and a network team considers basic ping sufficient proof of service health. For the reported ip sla timeout settings incident at a university IT network in Edinburgh, the required acceptance evidence is: Ordinary latency stays within healthy results while genuine outages still trigger failure. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That approach is relevant to acl implicit deny, such as when a router ACL was built with one permit line and unexpectedly blocks all other traffic. That is a different root cause from the time-based acl inactive fault observed at a national retail head office in Sydney. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: The intended ACL entry becomes effective only within the documented schedule.

That approach is relevant to acl counter troubleshooting, such as when a new permit rule is blamed for a dropped service even though its hit counter never increases. That is a different root cause from the time-based acl inactive fault observed at a national retail head office in Sydney. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: The intended ACL entry becomes effective only within the documented schedule.

That approach is relevant to acl first-match ordering, such as when a broad permit appears before a targeted deny, so traffic to a prohibited TCP port passes. That is a different root cause from the time-based acl inactive fault observed at a national retail head office in Sydney. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: The intended ACL entry becomes effective only within the documented schedule.

That observation verifies extended acl ports in a different situation, such as when an ACL permits a destination address but not the required TCP application port because the entry tests the wrong transport field. For the reported time-based acl inactive incident at a national retail head office in Sydney, the required acceptance evidence is: The intended ACL entry becomes effective only within the documented schedule. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies acl first-match ordering in a different situation, such as when a broad permit appears before a targeted deny, so traffic to a prohibited TCP port passes. For the reported time-based acl inactive incident at a national retail head office in Sydney, the required acceptance evidence is: The intended ACL entry becomes effective only within the documented schedule. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies acl counter troubleshooting in a different situation, such as when a new permit rule is blamed for a dropped service even though its hit counter never increases. For the reported time-based acl inactive incident at a national retail head office in Sydney, the required acceptance evidence is: The intended ACL entry becomes effective only within the documented schedule. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That approach is relevant to phase 2 hub split horizon, such as when in a phase 2 EIGRP DMVPN design, one spoke's learned LAN prefix never reaches other spokes because hub split horizon blocks reflection. That is a different root cause from the dmvpn mgre hub fault observed at a remote clinic network in Melbourne. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: Multiple distinct spokes register and forward over the single multipoint hub tunnel.

That approach is relevant to dmvpn nhrp network id mismatch, such as when the hub and spoke use different NHRP network identifiers despite otherwise consistent tunnel addressing. That is a different root cause from the dmvpn mgre hub fault observed at a remote clinic network in Melbourne. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: Multiple distinct spokes register and forward over the single multipoint hub tunnel.

That approach is relevant to spoke nhrp registration age, such as when a hub stops forwarding for one spoke because its NHRP registration repeatedly expires. That is a different root cause from the dmvpn mgre hub fault observed at a remote clinic network in Melbourne. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: Multiple distinct spokes register and forward over the single multipoint hub tunnel.

That observation verifies eigrp dmvpn peer issue in a different situation, such as when dMVPN peers have protected tunnel reachability but EIGRP never forms because routing is not active on tunnel interfaces. For the reported dmvpn mgre hub incident at a remote clinic network in Melbourne, the required acceptance evidence is: Multiple distinct spokes register and forward over the single multipoint hub tunnel. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies dmvpn tunnel key inconsistency in a different situation, such as when gRE-encapsulated packets are rejected because the DMVPN endpoints use incompatible tunnel key settings. For the reported dmvpn mgre hub incident at a remote clinic network in Melbourne, the required acceptance evidence is: Multiple distinct spokes register and forward over the single multipoint hub tunnel. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies nhrp cache verification in a different situation, such as when a direct spoke route exists but its tunnel next hop lacks a corresponding NHRP resolution entry. For the reported dmvpn mgre hub incident at a remote clinic network in Melbourne, the required acceptance evidence is: Multiple distinct spokes register and forward over the single multipoint hub tunnel. This other result does not test that condition directly.