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Exam Code: KEO1

Exam Name: Secure Software Design

Certification Provider: WGU University

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WGU University KEO1 Practice Test 2

Question 10

At fictional Cedarhaven Supplies, a software-security team is conducting a regulated data-protection review while protecting cross-tenant boundaries. The case observation is: A procurement team is adopting a scheduling SaaS product, but the agreement has no explicit requirements for vulnerability notification, data segregation, or secure deletion. The team must select a defensible control or assessment. Which repeatable engineering safeguard would most directly reduce recurrence?

  1. For the a regulated data-protection review at fictional Cedarhaven Supplies, require versioned component approval with scheduled advisories review and a documented replacement path.
  2. For the a regulated data-protection review at fictional Cedarhaven Supplies, maintain a supplier risk register with renewal reviews, evidence expiry dates, breach-notification tests, and documented exit triggers.
  3. For the a regulated data-protection review at fictional Cedarhaven Supplies, test supplier response playbooks and update contacts, service dependencies, and notification obligations regularly.
  4. For the a regulated data-protection review at fictional Cedarhaven Supplies, enforce dependency review, signed artifact policies, inventory monitoring, and exception expiry in the build pipeline.

Explanation

Writer-proposed answer: B (UNVERIFIED)

Preliminary individual option explanations — NOT expert validated

Correct Answer

B:

Secure acquisition establishes assurance requirements before reliance on software outside the buyer's direct development control. A completed vendor review maps each critical control to contract language, tested evidence, a responsible party, and an exit obligation.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This response concerns open-source license and security review. Here, a procurement team is adopting a scheduling SaaS product, but the agreement has no explicit requirements for vulnerability notification, data segregation, or secure deletion. The confirming evidence is: A completed vendor review maps each critical control to contract language, tested evidence, a responsible party, and an exit obligation.

C:

Focusing on supplier incident escalation would leave this problem unresolved: A procurement team is adopting a scheduling SaaS product, but the agreement has no explicit requirements for vulnerability notification, data segregation, or secure deletion.

D:

Transitive dependency provenance concerns another aspect of the problem. Secure acquisition establishes assurance requirements before reliance on software outside the buyer's direct development control.

Question 11

At fictional Ivymoor Transit, a software-security team is conducting a planned system modernization with an auditable vulnerability remediation process. The case observation is: A build includes a new transitive package whose maintainer and upstream source cannot be traced through the dependency manifest. The team must select a defensible control or assessment. Which security design action most directly addresses the documented problem?

  1. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Ivymoor Transit, evaluate supported migration choices, lifecycle dates, compensating controls, and a funded replacement decision before production adoption.
  2. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Ivymoor Transit, perform coordinated legal-license, maintenance, vulnerability, and ownership review before approving the library.
  3. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Ivymoor Transit, resolve the dependency tree, establish trusted package provenance, pin an approved version, and block unverified artifacts until reviewed.
  4. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Ivymoor Transit, define verifiable vendor security requirements and contractual acceptance criteria before purchasing the service.

Explanation

Writer-proposed answer: C (UNVERIFIED)

Preliminary individual option explanations — NOT expert validated

Correct Answer

C:

Provenance and dependency inventory reduce software supply-chain uncertainty but do not by themselves prove a component is vulnerability-free. The reproducible build and software bill of materials identify the complete dependency lineage and a verified approved artifact digest.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This response concerns software end-of-life dependency. Here, a build includes a new transitive package whose maintainer and upstream source cannot be traced through the dependency manifest. The confirming evidence is: The reproducible build and software bill of materials identify the complete dependency lineage and a verified approved artifact digest.

B:

Open-source license and security review concerns a different operational mechanism. Provenance and dependency inventory reduce software supply-chain uncertainty but do not by themselves prove a component is vulnerability-free.

D:

Supplier security requirements concerns another aspect of the problem. Provenance and dependency inventory reduce software supply-chain uncertainty but do not by themselves prove a component is vulnerability-free.

Question 12

At fictional Ivymoor Transit, a software-security team is conducting a planned system modernization with an auditable vulnerability remediation process. The case observation is: A build includes a new transitive package whose maintainer and upstream source cannot be traced through the dependency manifest. The team must select a defensible control or assessment. Which independent verification evidence would most directly show that the proposed action succeeded?

  1. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Ivymoor Transit, a tabletop exercise demonstrates contacts, time thresholds, coordinated triage, and accurate incident communications.
  2. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Ivymoor Transit, independent procurement acceptance references test outcomes, security configuration, risk owner, and remediation conditions.
  3. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Ivymoor Transit, a completed vendor review maps each critical control to contract language, tested evidence, a responsible party, and an exit obligation.
  4. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Ivymoor Transit, the reproducible build and software bill of materials identify the complete dependency lineage and a verified approved artifact digest.

Explanation

Writer-proposed answer: D (UNVERIFIED)

Preliminary individual option explanations — NOT expert validated

Correct Answer

D:

Provenance and dependency inventory reduce software supply-chain uncertainty but do not by themselves prove a component is vulnerability-free. The reproducible build and software bill of materials identify the complete dependency lineage and a verified approved artifact digest.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This response concerns supplier incident escalation. Here, a build includes a new transitive package whose maintainer and upstream source cannot be traced through the dependency manifest. The confirming evidence is: The reproducible build and software bill of materials identify the complete dependency lineage and a verified approved artifact digest.

B:

Acquired software security testing concerns a different operational mechanism. Provenance and dependency inventory reduce software supply-chain uncertainty but do not by themselves prove a component is vulnerability-free.

C:

Focusing on supplier security requirements would leave this problem unresolved: A build includes a new transitive package whose maintainer and upstream source cannot be traced through the dependency manifest.

Question 13

At fictional Ivymoor Transit, a software-security team is conducting a planned system modernization with an auditable vulnerability remediation process. The case observation is: A build includes a new transitive package whose maintainer and upstream source cannot be traced through the dependency manifest. The team must select a defensible control or assessment. Which secure-design principle best explains the appropriate approach?

  1. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Ivymoor Transit, provenance and dependency inventory reduce software supply-chain uncertainty but do not by themselves prove a component is vulnerability-free.
  2. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Ivymoor Transit, external support access is a privileged trust boundary that requires controllable authorization and accountability.
  3. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Ivymoor Transit, data minimization and purpose limitation reduce exposure at third-party integration points.
  4. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Ivymoor Transit, secure acquisition establishes assurance requirements before reliance on software outside the buyer's direct development control.

Explanation

Writer-proposed answer: A (UNVERIFIED)

Preliminary individual option explanations — NOT expert validated

Correct Answer

A:

Provenance and dependency inventory reduce software supply-chain uncertainty but do not by themselves prove a component is vulnerability-free. The reproducible build and software bill of materials identify the complete dependency lineage and a verified approved artifact digest.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Vendor remote-support scope concerns a different operational mechanism. Provenance and dependency inventory reduce software supply-chain uncertainty but do not by themselves prove a component is vulnerability-free.

C:

Focusing on third-party data processing boundary would leave this problem unresolved: A build includes a new transitive package whose maintainer and upstream source cannot be traced through the dependency manifest.

D:

Supplier security requirements concerns another aspect of the problem. Provenance and dependency inventory reduce software supply-chain uncertainty but do not by themselves prove a component is vulnerability-free.

Question 14

At fictional Ivymoor Transit, a software-security team is conducting a planned system modernization with an auditable vulnerability remediation process. The case observation is: A build includes a new transitive package whose maintainer and upstream source cannot be traced through the dependency manifest. The team must select a defensible control or assessment. Which consequence is most directly associated with leaving this documented problem unresolved?

  1. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Ivymoor Transit, the organization may deploy insecure defaults that supplier certifications did not evaluate.
  2. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Ivymoor Transit, an untrusted dependency could introduce malicious code or unsupported components into releases without an obvious direct dependency change.
  3. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Ivymoor Transit, compromise of a supplier account could provide persistent unauthorized access to sensitive production systems.
  4. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Ivymoor Transit, the organization can inherit unmitigated security obligations and have no enforceable response when weaknesses emerge.

Explanation

Writer-proposed answer: B (UNVERIFIED)

Preliminary individual option explanations — NOT expert validated

Correct Answer

B:

Provenance and dependency inventory reduce software supply-chain uncertainty but do not by themselves prove a component is vulnerability-free. The reproducible build and software bill of materials identify the complete dependency lineage and a verified approved artifact digest.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This response concerns acquired software security testing. Here, a build includes a new transitive package whose maintainer and upstream source cannot be traced through the dependency manifest. The confirming evidence is: The reproducible build and software bill of materials identify the complete dependency lineage and a verified approved artifact digest.

C:

Focusing on vendor remote-support scope would leave this problem unresolved: A build includes a new transitive package whose maintainer and upstream source cannot be traced through the dependency manifest.

D:

Supplier security requirements concerns another aspect of the problem. Provenance and dependency inventory reduce software supply-chain uncertainty but do not by themselves prove a component is vulnerability-free.

Question 15

At fictional Ivymoor Transit, a software-security team is conducting a planned system modernization with an auditable vulnerability remediation process. The case observation is: A build includes a new transitive package whose maintainer and upstream source cannot be traced through the dependency manifest. The team must select a defensible control or assessment. Which repeatable engineering safeguard would most directly reduce recurrence?

  1. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Ivymoor Transit, require versioned component approval with scheduled advisories review and a documented replacement path.
  2. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Ivymoor Transit, maintain a supplier risk register with renewal reviews, evidence expiry dates, breach-notification tests, and documented exit triggers.
  3. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Ivymoor Transit, enforce dependency review, signed artifact policies, inventory monitoring, and exception expiry in the build pipeline.
  4. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Ivymoor Transit, automate data-sharing schema checks and periodically reassess third-party retention and access requirements.

Explanation

Writer-proposed answer: C (UNVERIFIED)

Preliminary individual option explanations — NOT expert validated

Correct Answer

C:

Provenance and dependency inventory reduce software supply-chain uncertainty but do not by themselves prove a component is vulnerability-free. The reproducible build and software bill of materials identify the complete dependency lineage and a verified approved artifact digest.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This response concerns open-source license and security review. Here, a build includes a new transitive package whose maintainer and upstream source cannot be traced through the dependency manifest. The confirming evidence is: The reproducible build and software bill of materials identify the complete dependency lineage and a verified approved artifact digest.

B:

Supplier security requirements concerns a different operational mechanism. Provenance and dependency inventory reduce software supply-chain uncertainty but do not by themselves prove a component is vulnerability-free.

D:

Third-party data processing boundary concerns another aspect of the problem. Provenance and dependency inventory reduce software supply-chain uncertainty but do not by themselves prove a component is vulnerability-free.

Question 16

At fictional Portside Payments, a software-security team is conducting a service integration assurance review under a specified incident response objective. The case observation is: A build includes a new transitive package whose maintainer and upstream source cannot be traced through the dependency manifest. The team must select a defensible control or assessment. Which security design action most directly addresses the documented problem?

  1. For the a service integration assurance review at fictional Portside Payments, minimize data shared with the processor, document permitted purposes, and test anonymization and data-retention controls.
  2. For the a service integration assurance review at fictional Portside Payments, evaluate supported migration choices, lifecycle dates, compensating controls, and a funded replacement decision before production adoption.
  3. For the a service integration assurance review at fictional Portside Payments, define incident notification channels, escalation timelines, evidence preservation, and shared responsibilities with the supplier.
  4. For the a service integration assurance review at fictional Portside Payments, resolve the dependency tree, establish trusted package provenance, pin an approved version, and block unverified artifacts until reviewed.

Explanation

Writer-proposed answer: D (UNVERIFIED)

Preliminary individual option explanations — NOT expert validated

Correct Answer

D:

Provenance and dependency inventory reduce software supply-chain uncertainty but do not by themselves prove a component is vulnerability-free. The reproducible build and software bill of materials identify the complete dependency lineage and a verified approved artifact digest.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This response concerns third-party data processing boundary. Here, a build includes a new transitive package whose maintainer and upstream source cannot be traced through the dependency manifest. The confirming evidence is: The reproducible build and software bill of materials identify the complete dependency lineage and a verified approved artifact digest.

B:

Software end-of-life dependency concerns a different operational mechanism. Provenance and dependency inventory reduce software supply-chain uncertainty but do not by themselves prove a component is vulnerability-free.

C:

Focusing on supplier incident escalation would leave this problem unresolved: A build includes a new transitive package whose maintainer and upstream source cannot be traced through the dependency manifest.

Question 17

At fictional Portside Payments, a software-security team is conducting a service integration assurance review under a specified incident response objective. The case observation is: A build includes a new transitive package whose maintainer and upstream source cannot be traced through the dependency manifest. The team must select a defensible control or assessment. Which independent verification evidence would most directly show that the proposed action succeeded?

  1. For the a service integration assurance review at fictional Portside Payments, the reproducible build and software bill of materials identify the complete dependency lineage and a verified approved artifact digest.
  2. For the a service integration assurance review at fictional Portside Payments, a completed vendor review maps each critical control to contract language, tested evidence, a responsible party, and an exit obligation.
  3. For the a service integration assurance review at fictional Portside Payments, an approval record includes license compatibility, supported versions, vulnerability disposition, and named maintenance owner.
  4. For the a service integration assurance review at fictional Portside Payments, session records show bounded permissions, expiration, approval identity, and independent review of support activity.

Explanation

Writer-proposed answer: A (UNVERIFIED)

Preliminary individual option explanations — NOT expert validated

Correct Answer

A:

Provenance and dependency inventory reduce software supply-chain uncertainty but do not by themselves prove a component is vulnerability-free. The reproducible build and software bill of materials identify the complete dependency lineage and a verified approved artifact digest.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Supplier security requirements concerns a different operational mechanism. Provenance and dependency inventory reduce software supply-chain uncertainty but do not by themselves prove a component is vulnerability-free.

C:

Focusing on open-source license and security review would leave this problem unresolved: A build includes a new transitive package whose maintainer and upstream source cannot be traced through the dependency manifest.

D:

Vendor remote-support scope concerns another aspect of the problem. Provenance and dependency inventory reduce software supply-chain uncertainty but do not by themselves prove a component is vulnerability-free.

Question 18

At fictional Portside Payments, a software-security team is conducting a service integration assurance review under a specified incident response objective. The case observation is: A build includes a new transitive package whose maintainer and upstream source cannot be traced through the dependency manifest. The team must select a defensible control or assessment. Which secure-design principle best explains the appropriate approach?

  1. For the a service integration assurance review at fictional Portside Payments, product lifecycle and support guarantees are security design inputs, not tasks deferred until a vulnerability appears.
  2. For the a service integration assurance review at fictional Portside Payments, provenance and dependency inventory reduce software supply-chain uncertainty but do not by themselves prove a component is vulnerability-free.
  3. For the a service integration assurance review at fictional Portside Payments, incident accountability must span contractual and operational boundaries between service consumer and supplier.
  4. For the a service integration assurance review at fictional Portside Payments, secure acquisition establishes assurance requirements before reliance on software outside the buyer's direct development control.

Explanation

Writer-proposed answer: B (UNVERIFIED)

Preliminary individual option explanations — NOT expert validated

Correct Answer

B:

Provenance and dependency inventory reduce software supply-chain uncertainty but do not by themselves prove a component is vulnerability-free. The reproducible build and software bill of materials identify the complete dependency lineage and a verified approved artifact digest.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This response concerns software end-of-life dependency. Here, a build includes a new transitive package whose maintainer and upstream source cannot be traced through the dependency manifest. The confirming evidence is: The reproducible build and software bill of materials identify the complete dependency lineage and a verified approved artifact digest.

C:

Focusing on supplier incident escalation would leave this problem unresolved: A build includes a new transitive package whose maintainer and upstream source cannot be traced through the dependency manifest.

D:

Supplier security requirements concerns another aspect of the problem. Provenance and dependency inventory reduce software supply-chain uncertainty but do not by themselves prove a component is vulnerability-free.

Question 19

At fictional Portside Payments, a software-security team is conducting a service integration assurance review under a specified incident response objective. The case observation is: A build includes a new transitive package whose maintainer and upstream source cannot be traced through the dependency manifest. The team must select a defensible control or assessment. Which consequence is most directly associated with leaving this documented problem unresolved?

  1. For the a service integration assurance review at fictional Portside Payments, late or unreliable notification may delay containment, breach assessment, and regulatory decisions.
  2. For the a service integration assurance review at fictional Portside Payments, excess personal data may be exposed through a breach or retained beyond legitimate processing needs.
  3. For the a service integration assurance review at fictional Portside Payments, an untrusted dependency could introduce malicious code or unsupported components into releases without an obvious direct dependency change.
  4. For the a service integration assurance review at fictional Portside Payments, the organization may deploy insecure defaults that supplier certifications did not evaluate.

Explanation

Writer-proposed answer: C (UNVERIFIED)

Preliminary individual option explanations — NOT expert validated

Correct Answer

C:

Provenance and dependency inventory reduce software supply-chain uncertainty but do not by themselves prove a component is vulnerability-free. The reproducible build and software bill of materials identify the complete dependency lineage and a verified approved artifact digest.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This response concerns supplier incident escalation. Here, a build includes a new transitive package whose maintainer and upstream source cannot be traced through the dependency manifest. The confirming evidence is: The reproducible build and software bill of materials identify the complete dependency lineage and a verified approved artifact digest.

B:

Third-party data processing boundary concerns a different operational mechanism. Provenance and dependency inventory reduce software supply-chain uncertainty but do not by themselves prove a component is vulnerability-free.

D:

Acquired software security testing concerns another aspect of the problem. Provenance and dependency inventory reduce software supply-chain uncertainty but do not by themselves prove a component is vulnerability-free.

Question 20

At fictional Portside Payments, a software-security team is conducting a service integration assurance review under a specified incident response objective. The case observation is: A build includes a new transitive package whose maintainer and upstream source cannot be traced through the dependency manifest. The team must select a defensible control or assessment. Which repeatable engineering safeguard would most directly reduce recurrence?

  1. For the a service integration assurance review at fictional Portside Payments, review external access quarterly and automatically revoke unused or expired privileged support grants.
  2. For the a service integration assurance review at fictional Portside Payments, maintain a supplier risk register with renewal reviews, evidence expiry dates, breach-notification tests, and documented exit triggers.
  3. For the a service integration assurance review at fictional Portside Payments, require versioned component approval with scheduled advisories review and a documented replacement path.
  4. For the a service integration assurance review at fictional Portside Payments, enforce dependency review, signed artifact policies, inventory monitoring, and exception expiry in the build pipeline.

Explanation

Writer-proposed answer: D (UNVERIFIED)

Preliminary individual option explanations — NOT expert validated

Correct Answer

D:

Provenance and dependency inventory reduce software supply-chain uncertainty but do not by themselves prove a component is vulnerability-free. The reproducible build and software bill of materials identify the complete dependency lineage and a verified approved artifact digest.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This response concerns vendor remote-support scope. Here, a build includes a new transitive package whose maintainer and upstream source cannot be traced through the dependency manifest. The confirming evidence is: The reproducible build and software bill of materials identify the complete dependency lineage and a verified approved artifact digest.

B:

Supplier security requirements concerns a different operational mechanism. Provenance and dependency inventory reduce software supply-chain uncertainty but do not by themselves prove a component is vulnerability-free.

C:

Focusing on open-source license and security review would leave this problem unresolved: A build includes a new transitive package whose maintainer and upstream source cannot be traced through the dependency manifest.

Secure Software Design (KEO1) Practice Tests