Question 120
At Baystone Health Systems, while validating an automation transaction, the data center fabric team observes: Two administrators apply incompatible pending edits to the same SR Linux device. Which recurring validation best prevents this failure mode?
Explanation
Correct Answer
At Baystone Health Systems, while validating an automation transaction, for Baystone Health Systems, include the safeguard: Serialize conflicting maintenance or require peer review of candidate differences. It reduces repeat risk from the original mechanism and complements a validation of: The final committed diff contains both approved intents and no overwritten change.
Incorrect Answers
At Baystone Health Systems, while validating an automation transaction, this option proposes: Cross-check VLAN-to-MAC-VRF mapping during tenant activation. The alternative focuses on The bridge subinterface was attached to the wrong MAC-VRF service context, not on the stated defect. For this scenario the expected acceptance result would be: The final committed diff contains both approved intents and no overwritten change.
At Baystone Health Systems, while validating an automation transaction, this option proposes: Alert on abnormal MAC-move events while reviewing multi-homing designs. This option assumes the other problem (A device reports repeated MAC moves between two attachment points during a suspected Layer 2 loop) is present. The case instead describes Two administrators apply incompatible pending edits to the same SR Linux device, for which the causal issue is The change process lacks candidate-change coordination and effective-diff review.
At Baystone Health Systems, while validating an automation transaction, this option proposes: Update physical-to-logical interface mappings after hardware changes. The option describes a different failure mode: A fabric team applies a new interface description to the wrong port after a chassis replacement. It would address The old physical port mapping was reused without reconciling current interface identifiers, but here the case reports Two administrators apply incompatible pending edits to the same SR Linux device. The current required evidence is: The final committed diff contains both approved intents and no overwritten change.