Question 610
For Linden Manufacturing, the security review of plant operations and product design information highlights this gap: A Key Vault deployment assigns broad access to all subscriptions because the team confuses resource management with data-plane secret permissions. The responsible team reports that it has applied the correction. Which evidence BEST verifies that the original issue was resolved?
Explanation
Correct Answer
A permitted identity retrieves only its allowed secret and an unrelated identity cannot read the vault contents. This is the relevant proof because it tests whether the selected corrective action (Apply least-privilege Key Vault data access with an appropriate Azure RBAC or supported access policy model) addressed the initiating problem (A Key Vault deployment assigns broad access to all subscriptions because the team confuses resource management with data-plane secret permissions) in Linden Manufacturing's plant operations and product design information environment, not merely whether a task was marked complete.
Incorrect Answers
The application reads the secret using its assigned identity while a developer without permission receives an access denial. This is useful evidence for a different situation (A web application embeds database passwords in configuration files and sends them through every developer deployment) and action (Store application secrets in Azure Key Vault and grant only approved identities access to retrieve them). For the reported issue at Linden Manufacturing, it does not establish the required outcome: A permitted identity retrieves only its allowed secret and an unrelated identity cannot read the vault contents.
An unapproved source cannot connect to the management port while legitimate workload traffic succeeds. This is useful evidence for a different situation (A subnet exposes RDP from the public internet because no network security group rules restrict management sources) and action (Apply least-privilege NSG rules to permit only required application traffic and restrict administration access). For the reported issue at Linden Manufacturing, it does not establish the required outcome: A permitted identity retrieves only its allowed secret and an unrelated identity cannot read the vault contents.
An accidental deletion can be recovered within the configured window and unauthorized early permanent purge is prevented. This is useful evidence for a different situation (A staff member accidentally deletes a secret and the vault has no recovery process aligned with regulatory retention needs) and action (Enable and govern supported soft-delete and purge-protection capabilities for the Key Vault deployment). For the reported issue at Linden Manufacturing, it does not establish the required outcome: A permitted identity retrieves only its allowed secret and an unrelated identity cannot read the vault contents.