McAfee-Secured Website

Exam Bundle

Exam Code: SC-900

Exam Name Microsoft Security, Compliance, and Identity Fundamentals

Certification Provider: Microsoft

Corresponding Certification: Microsoft Certified: Security, Compliance, and Identity Fundamentals

Microsoft SC-900 Bundle $44.99

100% Microsoft SC-900 Guaranteed Success With Testking Training Materials

Get Real SC-900 Exam Questions & Expert Verified Answers as Experienced on the Real Exam!

  • Questions & Answers

    SC-900 Questions & Answers

    259 Questions & Answers

    The ultimate exam preparation tool, Questions & Answers mirrors the actual SC-900 exam while allowing you to hone and measure every aspect of your test-taking ability.

  • SC-900 Video Course

    SC-900 Video Course

    147 Video Lectures

    SC-900 Video Course is developed by Microsoft Professionals to help you pass the SC-900 exam.

    Description

    This course will improve your knowledge and skills required to pass Microsoft Security, Compliance, and Identity Fundamentals exam.
  • Study Guide

    SC-900 Study Guide

    413 PDF Pages

    Developed by industry experts, this 413-page guide spells out in painstaking detail all of the information you need to ace SC-900 exam.

Microsoft Security, Compliance, and Identity Fundamentals (SC-900) Practice Tests

Satisfaction Guaranteed

Money Back Guarantee

Testking provides hassle-free money back guarantee with our products. That is because we have 100% trust in the abilities of our professional and experience product team, and our record is a proof of that.

99.6% PASS RATE
Total Cost: $194.97
Bundle Price: $149.98

Purchase Individually

  • Questions & Answers

    Questions & Answers

    259 Questions

    $124.99
  • SC-900 Video Course

    Video Course

    147 Video Lectures

    $39.99
  • Study Guide

    Study Guide

    413 PDF Pages

    $29.99

Microsoft SC-900 Practice Test 43

Question 420

An engineer reviewing Orion Network Services and its subscriber applications and remote operations services documents: A project manager manually grants partner guests access without a documented sponsor or reviewable request process. The responsible team reports that it has applied the correction. Which evidence BEST verifies that the original issue was resolved?

  1. A guest access request records an approver decision and a rejected request receives no entitlement.
  2. A guest marked for removal loses the reviewed resource access while an approved guest remains authorized.
  3. A requester cannot activate before approval and the role activation history includes the approving actor.
  4. An approved requester receives only the package resources and access expires at the configured end date.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

A guest access request records an approver decision and a rejected request receives no entitlement. This is the relevant proof because it tests whether the selected corrective action (Configure suitable entitlement request approval and sponsor accountability for external access) addressed the initiating problem (A project manager manually grants partner guests access without a documented sponsor or reviewable request process) in Orion Network Services's subscriber applications and remote operations environment, not merely whether a task was marked complete.

Incorrect Answers

B:

A guest marked for removal loses the reviewed resource access while an approved guest remains authorized. This is useful evidence for a different situation (External guests retain project access for years because no one periodically confirms whether collaboration is still necessary) and action (Run Microsoft Entra access reviews for the relevant guest users and apply the recorded decisions). For the reported issue at Orion Network Services, it does not establish the required outcome: A guest access request records an approver decision and a rejected request receives no entitlement.

C:

A requester cannot activate before approval and the role activation history includes the approving actor. This is useful evidence for a different situation (A PIM role can be activated instantly without business justification although a designated approver is required for sensitive elevation) and action (Configure PIM approval and justification requirements for the role activation process). For the reported issue at Orion Network Services, it does not establish the required outcome: A guest access request records an approver decision and a rejected request receives no entitlement.

D:

An approved requester receives only the package resources and access expires at the configured end date. This is useful evidence for a different situation (Staff join time-limited projects through informal email requests with inconsistent access approvals and no expiry) and action (Use Microsoft Entra entitlement management access packages with defined resource roles, approvals and expiry). For the reported issue at Orion Network Services, it does not establish the required outcome: A guest access request records an approver decision and a rejected request receives no entitlement.

Question 421

An engineer reviewing Linden Manufacturing and its plant operations and product design information services documents: HR creates new employee records but application permissions remain stale after people move between departments. Which action BEST addresses the described security, identity, or compliance gap?

  1. Review PIM alerts and audit records for anomalous assignments and act on unauthorized privilege changes.
  2. Set PIM maximum activation duration and monitor activation lifecycle events.
  3. Use supported identity lifecycle workflows and governance triggers for joiner and mover events.
  4. Build a leaver workflow that disables identities, revokes sessions and removes governed access.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Use supported identity lifecycle workflows and governance triggers for joiner and mover events. This directly addresses the observed weakness: HR creates new employee records but application permissions remain stale after people move between departments. For Linden Manufacturing and its plant operations and product design information, a meaningful acceptance check would be: A department-change test removes inappropriate previous access and provisions the approved new entitlement.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Review PIM alerts and audit records for anomalous assignments and act on unauthorized privilege changes. This addresses a different security or governance gap: An organization receives PIM alerts about role assignments but does not review or remediate suspicious long-lived elevation. For Linden Manufacturing and its plant operations and product design information, the issue is instead: HR creates new employee records but application permissions remain stale after people move between departments. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A department-change test removes inappropriate previous access and provisions the approved new entitlement.

B:

Set PIM maximum activation duration and monitor activation lifecycle events. This addresses a different security or governance gap: An elevated role remains active after the approved maintenance window because no automated role-expiry control was applied. For Linden Manufacturing and its plant operations and product design information, the issue is instead: HR creates new employee records but application permissions remain stale after people move between departments. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A department-change test removes inappropriate previous access and provisions the approved new entitlement.

D:

Build a leaver workflow that disables identities, revokes sessions and removes governed access. This addresses a different security or governance gap: Departed employees retain group permissions because termination processing changes HR status without disabling cloud identities and downstream access. For Linden Manufacturing and its plant operations and product design information, the issue is instead: HR creates new employee records but application permissions remain stale after people move between departments. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A department-change test removes inappropriate previous access and provisions the approved new entitlement.

Question 422

An engineer reviewing Linden Manufacturing and its plant operations and product design information services documents: HR creates new employee records but application permissions remain stale after people move between departments. The responsible team reports that it has applied the correction. Which evidence BEST verifies that the original issue was resolved?

  1. The elevated privilege expires after the configured duration and the activation record is retained.
  2. A simulated departure blocks subsequent sign-in and records removal of the person's protected application entitlements.
  3. A seeded unusual assignment produces a reviewable alert and the unauthorized privilege is revoked.
  4. A department-change test removes inappropriate previous access and provisions the approved new entitlement.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

A department-change test removes inappropriate previous access and provisions the approved new entitlement. This is the relevant proof because it tests whether the selected corrective action (Use supported identity lifecycle workflows and governance triggers for joiner and mover events) addressed the initiating problem (HR creates new employee records but application permissions remain stale after people move between departments) in Linden Manufacturing's plant operations and product design information environment, not merely whether a task was marked complete.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The elevated privilege expires after the configured duration and the activation record is retained. This is useful evidence for a different situation (An elevated role remains active after the approved maintenance window because no automated role-expiry control was applied) and action (Set PIM maximum activation duration and monitor activation lifecycle events). For the reported issue at Linden Manufacturing, it does not establish the required outcome: A department-change test removes inappropriate previous access and provisions the approved new entitlement.

B:

A simulated departure blocks subsequent sign-in and records removal of the person's protected application entitlements. This is useful evidence for a different situation (Departed employees retain group permissions because termination processing changes HR status without disabling cloud identities and downstream access) and action (Build a leaver workflow that disables identities, revokes sessions and removes governed access). For the reported issue at Linden Manufacturing, it does not establish the required outcome: A department-change test removes inappropriate previous access and provisions the approved new entitlement.

C:

A seeded unusual assignment produces a reviewable alert and the unauthorized privilege is revoked. This is useful evidence for a different situation (An organization receives PIM alerts about role assignments but does not review or remediate suspicious long-lived elevation) and action (Review PIM alerts and audit records for anomalous assignments and act on unauthorized privilege changes). For the reported issue at Linden Manufacturing, it does not establish the required outcome: A department-change test removes inappropriate previous access and provisions the approved new entitlement.

Question 423

Silver Cove Payments operates transaction data and fraud monitoring under a documented access review process. Its review records the following concern: HR creates new employee records but application permissions remain stale after people move between departments. Which action BEST addresses the described security, identity, or compliance gap?

  1. Use supported identity lifecycle workflows and governance triggers for joiner and mover events.
  2. Build a leaver workflow that disables identities, revokes sessions and removes governed access.
  3. Review PIM alerts and audit records for anomalous assignments and act on unauthorized privilege changes.
  4. Set PIM maximum activation duration and monitor activation lifecycle events.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Use supported identity lifecycle workflows and governance triggers for joiner and mover events. This directly addresses the observed weakness: HR creates new employee records but application permissions remain stale after people move between departments. For Silver Cove Payments and its transaction data and fraud monitoring, a meaningful acceptance check would be: A department-change test removes inappropriate previous access and provisions the approved new entitlement.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Build a leaver workflow that disables identities, revokes sessions and removes governed access. This addresses a different security or governance gap: Departed employees retain group permissions because termination processing changes HR status without disabling cloud identities and downstream access. For Silver Cove Payments and its transaction data and fraud monitoring, the issue is instead: HR creates new employee records but application permissions remain stale after people move between departments. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A department-change test removes inappropriate previous access and provisions the approved new entitlement.

C:

Review PIM alerts and audit records for anomalous assignments and act on unauthorized privilege changes. This addresses a different security or governance gap: An organization receives PIM alerts about role assignments but does not review or remediate suspicious long-lived elevation. For Silver Cove Payments and its transaction data and fraud monitoring, the issue is instead: HR creates new employee records but application permissions remain stale after people move between departments. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A department-change test removes inappropriate previous access and provisions the approved new entitlement.

D:

Set PIM maximum activation duration and monitor activation lifecycle events. This addresses a different security or governance gap: An elevated role remains active after the approved maintenance window because no automated role-expiry control was applied. For Silver Cove Payments and its transaction data and fraud monitoring, the issue is instead: HR creates new employee records but application permissions remain stale after people move between departments. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A department-change test removes inappropriate previous access and provisions the approved new entitlement.

Question 424

Silver Cove Payments operates transaction data and fraud monitoring under a documented access review process. Its review records the following concern: HR creates new employee records but application permissions remain stale after people move between departments. The responsible team reports that it has applied the correction. Which evidence BEST verifies that the original issue was resolved?

  1. A seeded unusual assignment produces a reviewable alert and the unauthorized privilege is revoked.
  2. The elevated privilege expires after the configured duration and the activation record is retained.
  3. A department-change test removes inappropriate previous access and provisions the approved new entitlement.
  4. A simulated departure blocks subsequent sign-in and records removal of the person's protected application entitlements.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

A department-change test removes inappropriate previous access and provisions the approved new entitlement. This is the relevant proof because it tests whether the selected corrective action (Use supported identity lifecycle workflows and governance triggers for joiner and mover events) addressed the initiating problem (HR creates new employee records but application permissions remain stale after people move between departments) in Silver Cove Payments's transaction data and fraud monitoring environment, not merely whether a task was marked complete.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A seeded unusual assignment produces a reviewable alert and the unauthorized privilege is revoked. This is useful evidence for a different situation (An organization receives PIM alerts about role assignments but does not review or remediate suspicious long-lived elevation) and action (Review PIM alerts and audit records for anomalous assignments and act on unauthorized privilege changes). For the reported issue at Silver Cove Payments, it does not establish the required outcome: A department-change test removes inappropriate previous access and provisions the approved new entitlement.

B:

The elevated privilege expires after the configured duration and the activation record is retained. This is useful evidence for a different situation (An elevated role remains active after the approved maintenance window because no automated role-expiry control was applied) and action (Set PIM maximum activation duration and monitor activation lifecycle events). For the reported issue at Silver Cove Payments, it does not establish the required outcome: A department-change test removes inappropriate previous access and provisions the approved new entitlement.

D:

A simulated departure blocks subsequent sign-in and records removal of the person's protected application entitlements. This is useful evidence for a different situation (Departed employees retain group permissions because termination processing changes HR status without disabling cloud identities and downstream access) and action (Build a leaver workflow that disables identities, revokes sessions and removes governed access). For the reported issue at Silver Cove Payments, it does not establish the required outcome: A department-change test removes inappropriate previous access and provisions the approved new entitlement.

Question 425

For Horizon Energy Services, the security review of remote field-worker sign-ins and operations highlights this gap: HR creates new employee records but application permissions remain stale after people move between departments. Which action BEST addresses the described security, identity, or compliance gap?

  1. Use supported identity lifecycle workflows and governance triggers for joiner and mover events.
  2. Build a leaver workflow that disables identities, revokes sessions and removes governed access.
  3. Review PIM alerts and audit records for anomalous assignments and act on unauthorized privilege changes.
  4. Set PIM maximum activation duration and monitor activation lifecycle events.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Use supported identity lifecycle workflows and governance triggers for joiner and mover events. This directly addresses the observed weakness: HR creates new employee records but application permissions remain stale after people move between departments. For Horizon Energy Services and its remote field-worker sign-ins and operations, a meaningful acceptance check would be: A department-change test removes inappropriate previous access and provisions the approved new entitlement.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Build a leaver workflow that disables identities, revokes sessions and removes governed access. This addresses a different security or governance gap: Departed employees retain group permissions because termination processing changes HR status without disabling cloud identities and downstream access. For Horizon Energy Services and its remote field-worker sign-ins and operations, the issue is instead: HR creates new employee records but application permissions remain stale after people move between departments. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A department-change test removes inappropriate previous access and provisions the approved new entitlement.

C:

Review PIM alerts and audit records for anomalous assignments and act on unauthorized privilege changes. This addresses a different security or governance gap: An organization receives PIM alerts about role assignments but does not review or remediate suspicious long-lived elevation. For Horizon Energy Services and its remote field-worker sign-ins and operations, the issue is instead: HR creates new employee records but application permissions remain stale after people move between departments. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A department-change test removes inappropriate previous access and provisions the approved new entitlement.

D:

Set PIM maximum activation duration and monitor activation lifecycle events. This addresses a different security or governance gap: An elevated role remains active after the approved maintenance window because no automated role-expiry control was applied. For Horizon Energy Services and its remote field-worker sign-ins and operations, the issue is instead: HR creates new employee records but application permissions remain stale after people move between departments. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A department-change test removes inappropriate previous access and provisions the approved new entitlement.

Question 426

For Horizon Energy Services, the security review of remote field-worker sign-ins and operations highlights this gap: HR creates new employee records but application permissions remain stale after people move between departments. The responsible team reports that it has applied the correction. Which evidence BEST verifies that the original issue was resolved?

  1. A seeded unusual assignment produces a reviewable alert and the unauthorized privilege is revoked.
  2. A simulated departure blocks subsequent sign-in and records removal of the person's protected application entitlements.
  3. A department-change test removes inappropriate previous access and provisions the approved new entitlement.
  4. The elevated privilege expires after the configured duration and the activation record is retained.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

A department-change test removes inappropriate previous access and provisions the approved new entitlement. This is the relevant proof because it tests whether the selected corrective action (Use supported identity lifecycle workflows and governance triggers for joiner and mover events) addressed the initiating problem (HR creates new employee records but application permissions remain stale after people move between departments) in Horizon Energy Services's remote field-worker sign-ins and operations environment, not merely whether a task was marked complete.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A seeded unusual assignment produces a reviewable alert and the unauthorized privilege is revoked. This is useful evidence for a different situation (An organization receives PIM alerts about role assignments but does not review or remediate suspicious long-lived elevation) and action (Review PIM alerts and audit records for anomalous assignments and act on unauthorized privilege changes). For the reported issue at Horizon Energy Services, it does not establish the required outcome: A department-change test removes inappropriate previous access and provisions the approved new entitlement.

B:

A simulated departure blocks subsequent sign-in and records removal of the person's protected application entitlements. This is useful evidence for a different situation (Departed employees retain group permissions because termination processing changes HR status without disabling cloud identities and downstream access) and action (Build a leaver workflow that disables identities, revokes sessions and removes governed access). For the reported issue at Horizon Energy Services, it does not establish the required outcome: A department-change test removes inappropriate previous access and provisions the approved new entitlement.

D:

The elevated privilege expires after the configured duration and the activation record is retained. This is useful evidence for a different situation (An elevated role remains active after the approved maintenance window because no automated role-expiry control was applied) and action (Set PIM maximum activation duration and monitor activation lifecycle events). For the reported issue at Horizon Energy Services, it does not establish the required outcome: A department-change test removes inappropriate previous access and provisions the approved new entitlement.

Question 427

For Cobalt Aerospace, the security review of engineering programs and secure collaboration highlights this gap: Departed employees retain group permissions because termination processing changes HR status without disabling cloud identities and downstream access. Which action BEST addresses the described security, identity, or compliance gap?

  1. Build a leaver workflow that disables identities, revokes sessions and removes governed access.
  2. Schedule access reviews of sensitive group memberships with accountable reviewers and decision follow-through.
  3. Use supported identity lifecycle workflows and governance triggers for joiner and mover events.
  4. Run Microsoft Entra access reviews for the relevant guest users and apply the recorded decisions.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Build a leaver workflow that disables identities, revokes sessions and removes governed access. This directly addresses the observed weakness: Departed employees retain group permissions because termination processing changes HR status without disabling cloud identities and downstream access. For Cobalt Aerospace and its engineering programs and secure collaboration, a meaningful acceptance check would be: A simulated departure blocks subsequent sign-in and records removal of the person's protected application entitlements.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Schedule access reviews of sensitive group memberships with accountable reviewers and decision follow-through. This addresses a different security or governance gap: A privileged security group grows indefinitely because group owners never reattest members' current job responsibilities. For Cobalt Aerospace and its engineering programs and secure collaboration, the issue is instead: Departed employees retain group permissions because termination processing changes HR status without disabling cloud identities and downstream access. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A simulated departure blocks subsequent sign-in and records removal of the person's protected application entitlements.

C:

Use supported identity lifecycle workflows and governance triggers for joiner and mover events. This addresses a different security or governance gap: HR creates new employee records but application permissions remain stale after people move between departments. For Cobalt Aerospace and its engineering programs and secure collaboration, the issue is instead: Departed employees retain group permissions because termination processing changes HR status without disabling cloud identities and downstream access. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A simulated departure blocks subsequent sign-in and records removal of the person's protected application entitlements.

D:

Run Microsoft Entra access reviews for the relevant guest users and apply the recorded decisions. This addresses a different security or governance gap: External guests retain project access for years because no one periodically confirms whether collaboration is still necessary. For Cobalt Aerospace and its engineering programs and secure collaboration, the issue is instead: Departed employees retain group permissions because termination processing changes HR status without disabling cloud identities and downstream access. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A simulated departure blocks subsequent sign-in and records removal of the person's protected application entitlements.

Question 428

For Cobalt Aerospace, the security review of engineering programs and secure collaboration highlights this gap: Departed employees retain group permissions because termination processing changes HR status without disabling cloud identities and downstream access. The responsible team reports that it has applied the correction. Which evidence BEST verifies that the original issue was resolved?

  1. Removed members can no longer invoke group-derived privileges and the review history records the decision.
  2. A guest marked for removal loses the reviewed resource access while an approved guest remains authorized.
  3. A simulated departure blocks subsequent sign-in and records removal of the person's protected application entitlements.
  4. A department-change test removes inappropriate previous access and provisions the approved new entitlement.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

A simulated departure blocks subsequent sign-in and records removal of the person's protected application entitlements. This is the relevant proof because it tests whether the selected corrective action (Build a leaver workflow that disables identities, revokes sessions and removes governed access) addressed the initiating problem (Departed employees retain group permissions because termination processing changes HR status without disabling cloud identities and downstream access) in Cobalt Aerospace's engineering programs and secure collaboration environment, not merely whether a task was marked complete.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Removed members can no longer invoke group-derived privileges and the review history records the decision. This is useful evidence for a different situation (A privileged security group grows indefinitely because group owners never reattest members' current job responsibilities) and action (Schedule access reviews of sensitive group memberships with accountable reviewers and decision follow-through). For the reported issue at Cobalt Aerospace, it does not establish the required outcome: A simulated departure blocks subsequent sign-in and records removal of the person's protected application entitlements.

B:

A guest marked for removal loses the reviewed resource access while an approved guest remains authorized. This is useful evidence for a different situation (External guests retain project access for years because no one periodically confirms whether collaboration is still necessary) and action (Run Microsoft Entra access reviews for the relevant guest users and apply the recorded decisions). For the reported issue at Cobalt Aerospace, it does not establish the required outcome: A simulated departure blocks subsequent sign-in and records removal of the person's protected application entitlements.

D:

A department-change test removes inappropriate previous access and provisions the approved new entitlement. This is useful evidence for a different situation (HR creates new employee records but application permissions remain stale after people move between departments) and action (Use supported identity lifecycle workflows and governance triggers for joiner and mover events). For the reported issue at Cobalt Aerospace, it does not establish the required outcome: A simulated departure blocks subsequent sign-in and records removal of the person's protected application entitlements.

Question 429

An engineer reviewing Northbridge University and its student collaboration and research access services documents: Departed employees retain group permissions because termination processing changes HR status without disabling cloud identities and downstream access. Which action BEST addresses the described security, identity, or compliance gap?

  1. Build a leaver workflow that disables identities, revokes sessions and removes governed access.
  2. Run Microsoft Entra access reviews for the relevant guest users and apply the recorded decisions.
  3. Schedule access reviews of sensitive group memberships with accountable reviewers and decision follow-through.
  4. Use supported identity lifecycle workflows and governance triggers for joiner and mover events.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Build a leaver workflow that disables identities, revokes sessions and removes governed access. This directly addresses the observed weakness: Departed employees retain group permissions because termination processing changes HR status without disabling cloud identities and downstream access. For Northbridge University and its student collaboration and research access, a meaningful acceptance check would be: A simulated departure blocks subsequent sign-in and records removal of the person's protected application entitlements.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Run Microsoft Entra access reviews for the relevant guest users and apply the recorded decisions. This addresses a different security or governance gap: External guests retain project access for years because no one periodically confirms whether collaboration is still necessary. For Northbridge University and its student collaboration and research access, the issue is instead: Departed employees retain group permissions because termination processing changes HR status without disabling cloud identities and downstream access. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A simulated departure blocks subsequent sign-in and records removal of the person's protected application entitlements.

C:

Schedule access reviews of sensitive group memberships with accountable reviewers and decision follow-through. This addresses a different security or governance gap: A privileged security group grows indefinitely because group owners never reattest members' current job responsibilities. For Northbridge University and its student collaboration and research access, the issue is instead: Departed employees retain group permissions because termination processing changes HR status without disabling cloud identities and downstream access. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A simulated departure blocks subsequent sign-in and records removal of the person's protected application entitlements.

D:

Use supported identity lifecycle workflows and governance triggers for joiner and mover events. This addresses a different security or governance gap: HR creates new employee records but application permissions remain stale after people move between departments. For Northbridge University and its student collaboration and research access, the issue is instead: Departed employees retain group permissions because termination processing changes HR status without disabling cloud identities and downstream access. This alternative alone would not demonstrate the needed result: A simulated departure blocks subsequent sign-in and records removal of the person's protected application entitlements.

Question 430

An engineer reviewing Northbridge University and its student collaboration and research access services documents: Departed employees retain group permissions because termination processing changes HR status without disabling cloud identities and downstream access. The responsible team reports that it has applied the correction. Which evidence BEST verifies that the original issue was resolved?

  1. A department-change test removes inappropriate previous access and provisions the approved new entitlement.
  2. A guest marked for removal loses the reviewed resource access while an approved guest remains authorized.
  3. Removed members can no longer invoke group-derived privileges and the review history records the decision.
  4. A simulated departure blocks subsequent sign-in and records removal of the person's protected application entitlements.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

A simulated departure blocks subsequent sign-in and records removal of the person's protected application entitlements. This is the relevant proof because it tests whether the selected corrective action (Build a leaver workflow that disables identities, revokes sessions and removes governed access) addressed the initiating problem (Departed employees retain group permissions because termination processing changes HR status without disabling cloud identities and downstream access) in Northbridge University's student collaboration and research access environment, not merely whether a task was marked complete.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A department-change test removes inappropriate previous access and provisions the approved new entitlement. This is useful evidence for a different situation (HR creates new employee records but application permissions remain stale after people move between departments) and action (Use supported identity lifecycle workflows and governance triggers for joiner and mover events). For the reported issue at Northbridge University, it does not establish the required outcome: A simulated departure blocks subsequent sign-in and records removal of the person's protected application entitlements.

B:

A guest marked for removal loses the reviewed resource access while an approved guest remains authorized. This is useful evidence for a different situation (External guests retain project access for years because no one periodically confirms whether collaboration is still necessary) and action (Run Microsoft Entra access reviews for the relevant guest users and apply the recorded decisions). For the reported issue at Northbridge University, it does not establish the required outcome: A simulated departure blocks subsequent sign-in and records removal of the person's protected application entitlements.

C:

Removed members can no longer invoke group-derived privileges and the review history records the decision. This is useful evidence for a different situation (A privileged security group grows indefinitely because group owners never reattest members' current job responsibilities) and action (Schedule access reviews of sensitive group memberships with accountable reviewers and decision follow-through). For the reported issue at Northbridge University, it does not establish the required outcome: A simulated departure blocks subsequent sign-in and records removal of the person's protected application entitlements.