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It confirms an unrelated service correction: The PE imported VPN routes using shared route targets instead of isolated tenant membership. The present case reports Provider-wide BGP policy accidentally imports the provider loopback into a customer VRF. Its completion test is Customer route tables exclude core loopbacks while customer service remains intact.

This result is useful in another case with evidence Customer multicast control signaling exists but payload delivery fails at a remote PE. It does not test recovery from provider-wide bgp policy accidentally imports the provider loopback into a customer vrf. Check instead whether customer route tables exclude core loopbacks while customer service remains intact.

That observation would verify a separate fault involving no authorized internet route leak or default path exists for the branch vrfs. Its symptom is Remote branches can reach each other but not the public Internet. For this case the actual issue is the import policy lacks explicit provider-infrastructure prefix exclusion, and the relevant success signal is Customer route tables exclude core loopbacks while customer service remains intact.

The PE imported VPN routes using shared route targets instead of isolated tenant membership. would normally be accompanied by traffic from one customer appears in the other's routing table. The observed symptom is different: Provider-wide BGP policy accidentally imports the provider loopback into a customer VRF. The likely cause is The import policy lacks explicit provider-infrastructure prefix exclusion.

The stated cause is possible elsewhere but explains remote branches can reach each other but not the public internet, not provider-wide bgp policy accidentally imports the provider loopback into a customer vrf. This incident is better attributed to the import policy lacks explicit provider-infrastructure prefix exclusion.

That explanation fits another condition: Customer multicast control signaling exists but payload delivery fails at a remote PE. The evidence here is Provider-wide BGP policy accidentally imports the provider loopback into a customer VRF. Its closer root cause is The import policy lacks explicit provider-infrastructure prefix exclusion.

The proposed control is tied to no authorized internet route leak or default path exists for the branch vrfs, typically observed when remote branches can reach each other but not the public Internet. Here the target is the import policy lacks explicit provider-infrastructure prefix exclusion; monitor customer route tables exclude core loopbacks while customer service remains intact.

This gate monitors a different failure, traffic from one customer appears in the other's routing table. It would not detect the current problem: Provider-wide BGP policy accidentally imports the provider loopback into a customer VRF. The appropriate check requires customer route tables exclude core loopbacks while customer service remains intact.

It is valid for another service scenario but checks customer multicast control signaling exists but payload delivery fails at a remote pe. This case instead needs a gate for provider-wide bgp policy accidentally imports the provider loopback into a customer vrf and evidence that customer route tables exclude core loopbacks while customer service remains intact.

The option may be useful when the customer route has a VPNv4 NLRI but is missing on a remote PE, but that is not the current evidence. Here, customer multicast control signaling exists but payload delivery fails at a remote PE, indicating mvpn provider-tunnel encapsulation or multicast transport mapping is inconsistent. The targeted action is Match the supported MVPN transport profile and customer multicast state.

This change belongs to a different Layer 3 VPNs issue: IPv6 routes leak into the global IPv6 table instead of the tenant's inet6 VRF. That issue involves the customer interface or routing family is associated with the wrong routing instance. The current symptom is Customer multicast control signaling exists but payload delivery fails at a remote PE. It instead requires match the supported MVPN transport profile and customer multicast state.

This remediates broad rt import/export policy exposed the default across unrelated vpns, normally indicated by One customer's default route is accidentally propagated to every tenant. It would leave the observed problem (Customer multicast control signaling exists but payload delivery fails at a remote PE) unresolved. Address it with match the supported MVPN transport profile and customer multicast state.

That observation would verify a separate fault involving the remote vrf does not import the route's export route target. Its symptom is The customer route has a VPNv4 NLRI but is missing on a remote PE. For this case the actual issue is mvpn provider-tunnel encapsulation or multicast transport mapping is inconsistent, and the relevant success signal is Receivers in the remote VPN get the correct multicast stream without cross-tenant delivery.

It confirms an unrelated service correction: The customer interface or routing family is associated with the wrong routing instance. The present case reports Customer multicast control signaling exists but payload delivery fails at a remote PE. Its completion test is Receivers in the remote VPN get the correct multicast stream without cross-tenant delivery.

This result is useful in another case with evidence One customer's default route is accidentally propagated to every tenant. It does not test recovery from customer multicast control signaling exists but payload delivery fails at a remote pe. Check instead whether receivers in the remote VPN get the correct multicast stream without cross-tenant delivery.

The customer interface or routing family is associated with the wrong routing instance. would normally be accompanied by ipv6 routes leak into the global ipv6 table instead of the tenant's inet6 vrf. The observed symptom is different: Customer multicast control signaling exists but payload delivery fails at a remote PE. The likely cause is MVPN provider-tunnel encapsulation or multicast transport mapping is inconsistent.

The stated cause is possible elsewhere but explains the customer route has a vpnv4 nlri but is missing on a remote pe, not customer multicast control signaling exists but payload delivery fails at a remote pe. This incident is better attributed to mvpn provider-tunnel encapsulation or multicast transport mapping is inconsistent.

That explanation fits another condition: One customer's default route is accidentally propagated to every tenant. The evidence here is Customer multicast control signaling exists but payload delivery fails at a remote PE. Its closer root cause is MVPN provider-tunnel encapsulation or multicast transport mapping is inconsistent.

This gate monitors a different failure, ipv6 routes leak into the global ipv6 table instead of the tenant's inet6 vrf. It would not detect the current problem: Customer multicast control signaling exists but payload delivery fails at a remote PE. The appropriate check requires receivers in the remote VPN get the correct multicast stream without cross-tenant delivery.

The proposed control is tied to the remote vrf does not import the route's export route target, typically observed when the customer route has a VPNv4 NLRI but is missing on a remote PE. Here the target is mvpn provider-tunnel encapsulation or multicast transport mapping is inconsistent; monitor receivers in the remote VPN get the correct multicast stream without cross-tenant delivery.

It is valid for another service scenario but checks one customer's default route is accidentally propagated to every tenant. This case instead needs a gate for customer multicast control signaling exists but payload delivery fails at a remote pe and evidence that receivers in the remote VPN get the correct multicast stream without cross-tenant delivery.

This change belongs to a different Layer 3 VPNs issue: The configured interface belongs to the master instance instead of its customer VRF. That issue involves the customer-facing logical interface was not bound to the intended routing instance. The current symptom is IPv6 routes leak into the global IPv6 table instead of the tenant's inet6 VRF. It instead requires assign inet6 routes to the proper tenant instance and explicitly control exports.

The option may be useful when both PEs advertise the same CE prefix with inconsistent site-of-origin tags, but that is not the current evidence. Here, iPv6 routes leak into the global IPv6 table instead of the tenant's inet6 VRF, indicating the customer interface or routing family is associated with the wrong routing instance. The targeted action is Assign inet6 routes to the proper tenant instance and explicitly control exports.

This remediates a route distinguisher provides nlri uniqueness, not import-policy membership, normally indicated by Operators expect the RD itself to enforce customer route isolation. It would leave the observed problem (IPv6 routes leak into the global IPv6 table instead of the tenant's inet6 VRF) unresolved. Address it with assign inet6 routes to the proper tenant instance and explicitly control exports.

It confirms an unrelated service correction: The customer-facing logical interface was not bound to the intended routing instance. The present case reports IPv6 routes leak into the global IPv6 table instead of the tenant's inet6 VRF. Its completion test is Global and tenant IPv6 RIBs remain separate and allowed customer routes work.

That observation would verify a separate fault involving site-of-origin extended-community filtering is missing and can cause routing feedback. Its symptom is Both PEs advertise the same CE prefix with inconsistent site-of-origin tags. For this case the actual issue is the customer interface or routing family is associated with the wrong routing instance, and the relevant success signal is Global and tenant IPv6 RIBs remain separate and allowed customer routes work.

This result is useful in another case with evidence Operators expect the RD itself to enforce customer route isolation. It does not test recovery from ipv6 routes leak into the global ipv6 table instead of the tenant's inet6 vrf. Check instead whether global and tenant IPv6 RIBs remain separate and allowed customer routes work.

The stated cause is possible elsewhere but explains both pes advertise the same ce prefix with inconsistent site-of-origin tags, not ipv6 routes leak into the global ipv6 table instead of the tenant's inet6 vrf. This incident is better attributed to the customer interface or routing family is associated with the wrong routing instance.

The customer-facing logical interface was not bound to the intended routing instance. would normally be accompanied by the configured interface belongs to the master instance instead of its customer vrf. The observed symptom is different: IPv6 routes leak into the global IPv6 table instead of the tenant's inet6 VRF. The likely cause is The customer interface or routing family is associated with the wrong routing instance.

That explanation fits another condition: Operators expect the RD itself to enforce customer route isolation. The evidence here is IPv6 routes leak into the global IPv6 table instead of the tenant's inet6 VRF. Its closer root cause is The customer interface or routing family is associated with the wrong routing instance.

It is valid for another service scenario but checks operators expect the rd itself to enforce customer route isolation. This case instead needs a gate for ipv6 routes leak into the global ipv6 table instead of the tenant's inet6 vrf and evidence that global and tenant IPv6 RIBs remain separate and allowed customer routes work.

The proposed control is tied to site-of-origin extended-community filtering is missing and can cause routing feedback, typically observed when both PEs advertise the same CE prefix with inconsistent site-of-origin tags. Here the target is the customer interface or routing family is associated with the wrong routing instance; monitor global and tenant IPv6 RIBs remain separate and allowed customer routes work.

This gate monitors a different failure, the configured interface belongs to the master instance instead of its customer vrf. It would not detect the current problem: IPv6 routes leak into the global IPv6 table instead of the tenant's inet6 VRF. The appropriate check requires global and tenant IPv6 RIBs remain separate and allowed customer routes work.