Question 20
During an approved SOC detection content review for Cobalt Utilities in its central logging workspace, a security telemetry analyst reviews the Falcon Next-Gen SIEM workflow. The concrete observation is: An external incident-response contractor sees sensitive third-party records outside the approved investigation scope. The authorized diagnostic packet is NGSIEM-LAB-0005. The change ticket contains a source owner, review date and rollback step. Maintain the intended search-domain and data-retention boundary. Which repeatable safeguard BEST prevents this specific SIEM engineering failure from recurring?
Explanation
Correct Answer
Option C is best answer to this recurrence prevention question. The repeatable safeguard is: Periodically audit access scope and service-user entitlements against contract and data-classification changes. It mitigates The user's Falcon SIEM role and accessible data scope were never reviewed against the contractual need-to-know, which produced the observed failure (An external incident-response contractor sees sensitive third-party records outside the approved investigation scope). It should continue to be monitored using direct evidence such as An approved test principal sees only authorized search results while a forbidden administrative operation remains denied.
Incorrect Answers
Option A would guard against a different condition: A duty analyst is expected to inspect connector health but receives an authorization error while opening ingestion monitoring. The failure mechanism here is: The user's Falcon SIEM role and accessible data scope were never reviewed against the contractual need-to-know. The directly relevant recurrence control is: Periodically audit access scope and service-user entitlements against contract and data-classification changes.
Option B would guard against a different condition: A former SIEM engineer transferred to reporting yet remains able to deploy third-party ingestion changes. The failure mechanism here is: The user's Falcon SIEM role and accessible data scope were never reviewed against the contractual need-to-know. The directly relevant recurrence control is: Periodically audit access scope and service-user entitlements against contract and data-classification changes.
Option D would guard against a different condition: A new SIEM operator can edit correlation rules and data connection settings although their responsibility is to run read-only investigations. The failure mechanism here is: The user's Falcon SIEM role and accessible data scope were never reviewed against the contractual need-to-know. The directly relevant recurrence control is: Periodically audit access scope and service-user entitlements against contract and data-classification changes.