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Exam Code: CAS-005

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CompTIA CAS-005 Practice Test 30

Question 290

Which test or documented result best shows that the underlying issue was properly addressed? A certificate-based Wi-Fi onboarding process fails for devices because server certificates have expired but all troubleshooting focuses on passwords.

  1. Renewed trusted certificates allow authorized 802.1X sessions and expired chains are rejected.
  2. Historical image credentials fail authentication while authorized workloads use renewed scoped secrets.
  3. A signed assertion for another service is rejected without creating a clinical user session.
  4. Trusted clients validate the full chain and unknown or expired issuers are denied.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

This is direct test evidence of the control objective in the case: A certificate-based Wi-Fi onboarding process fails for devices because server certificates have expired but all troubleshooting focuses on passwords. It demonstrates that the proposed response, check the EAP trust chain, certificate validity, and client trust configuration before changing authentication policy., produces the measurable result renewed trusted certificates allow authorized 802.1X sessions and expired chains are rejected. The observation tests a relevant security outcome rather than an unrelated control or reporting activity.

Incorrect Answers

B:

For the issue “A certificate-based Wi-Fi onboarding process fails for devices because server certificates have expired but all troubleshooting focuses on passwords”, measuring “Historical image credentials fail authentication while authorized workloads use renewed scoped secrets.” would validate “A company rotates application database secrets but leaves stale copies in container images and CI variable history” instead of the required control effect: renewed trusted certificates allow authorized 802.1X sessions and expired chains are rejected.

C:

“A signed assertion for another service is rejected without creating a clinical user session” would verify “Restrict accepted assertions to the intended service-provider entity ID and valid recipient” for the situation “A federated healthcare application validates an identity provider's signature but ignores the SAML assertion audience”. Here the required evidence is “Renewed trusted certificates allow authorized 802.1X sessions and expired chains are rejected” after “Check the EAP trust chain, certificate validity, and client trust configuration before changing authentication policy”; the alternative observation does not test that control.

D:

Observation “Trusted clients validate the full chain and unknown or expired issuers are denied.” would be useful for “An application gateway's TLS certificate chains to an unknown internal root after a PKI migration”, but it does not prove that the response to “A certificate-based Wi-Fi onboarding process fails for devices because server certificates have expired but all troubleshooting focuses on passwords” achieved the relevant outcome, renewed trusted certificates allow authorized 802.1X sessions and expired chains are rejected.

Question 291

A cross-functional security group is considering a decision: A contractor retains resource access because identity deprovisioning updates the directory but not issued cloud access tokens. What is the most appropriate control or investigation response?

  1. Implement asset-bound module attestation and tamper-evident receiving and change checks.
  2. Implement checked-out emergency access with individual authorization and privileged session capture.
  3. Implement token revocation and session invalidation bound to authoritative lifecycle events.
  4. Review attribute mapping and role assignment logic against least privilege and lifecycle policies.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Implement token revocation and session invalidation bound to authoritative lifecycle events. The acceptance check is that a terminated contractor's token no longer accesses protected APIs within the defined revocation SLA. That outcome checks whether the requirement is met, rather than treating completion of a security task as proof of effectiveness.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The option “Implement asset-bound module attestation and tamper-evident receiving and change checks.” assumes an issue like “A government workstation lacks a process to detect replacement of its trusted hardware security module during maintenance”, not the specific observed weakness “A contractor retains resource access because identity deprovisioning updates the directory but not issued cloud access tokens”; it leaves the evidence goal unmet: a terminated contractor's token no longer accesses protected APIs within the defined revocation SLA.

B:

“A break-glass test traces commands and approval to the requesting administrator” would be meaningful evidence for “Implement checked-out emergency access with individual authorization and privileged session capture” in the case “A PAM system stores administrative passwords safely but shared emergency accounts have no attributable session recording”. It does not replace “Implement token revocation and session invalidation bound to authoritative lifecycle events” to correct “A cross-functional security group is considering a decision: A contractor retains resource access because identity deprovisioning updates the directory but not issued cloud access tokens” and verify “A terminated contractor's token no longer accesses protected APIs within the defined revocation SLA”.

D:

Although “Review attribute mapping and role assignment logic against least privilege and lifecycle policies.” is a reasonable response to “An identity provisioning connector repeatedly grants elevated directory roles when a user changes departments”, this case instead concerns “A contractor retains resource access because identity deprovisioning updates the directory but not issued cloud access tokens”, for which success requires that a terminated contractor's token no longer accesses protected APIs within the defined revocation SLA.

Question 292

A follow-up assurance review considers this problem: A contractor retains resource access because identity deprovisioning updates the directory but not issued cloud access tokens. Which outcome best shows the intended improvement?

  1. Historical image credentials fail authentication while authorized workloads use renewed scoped secrets.
  2. A terminated contractor's token no longer accesses protected APIs within the defined revocation SLA.
  3. An access token from the untrusted tenant is denied despite cryptographic validity.
  4. Tampered ciphertext fails verification while authorized throughput meets the defined service budget.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

This is direct test evidence of the control objective in the case: A contractor retains resource access because identity deprovisioning updates the directory but not issued cloud access tokens. It demonstrates that the proposed response, implement token revocation and session invalidation bound to authoritative lifecycle events., produces the measurable result a terminated contractor's token no longer accesses protected APIs within the defined revocation SLA. The observation tests a relevant security outcome rather than an unrelated control or reporting activity.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Migrate to runtime secret retrieval, invalidate old credentials, and scan residual artifacts” should produce “Historical image credentials fail authentication while authorized workloads use renewed scoped secrets” in its own test case. The present requirement is instead checked by “A terminated contractor's token no longer accesses protected APIs within the defined revocation SLA”, which validates “Implement token revocation and session invalidation bound to authoritative lifecycle events” rather than the alternate control.

C:

In the problem “A contractor retains resource access because identity deprovisioning updates the directory but not issued cloud access tokens”, evidence “An access token from the untrusted tenant is denied despite cryptographic validity.” is not decisive because it tests “A cloud service accepts OAuth tokens with correct signatures even if the issuer is an unapproved partner tenant”; the requested validation is a terminated contractor's token no longer accesses protected APIs within the defined revocation SLA.

D:

For the issue “A contractor retains resource access because identity deprovisioning updates the directory but not issued cloud access tokens”, measuring “Tampered ciphertext fails verification while authorized throughput meets the defined service budget.” would validate “A software team wants to replace authenticated encryption with plain AES-CTR because it provides faster processing” instead of the required control effect: a terminated contractor's token no longer accesses protected APIs within the defined revocation SLA.

Question 293

In a control effectiveness review, the issue is: A cloud service accepts OAuth tokens with correct signatures even if the issuer is an unapproved partner tenant. Which intervention is most defensible for the situation?

  1. Validate token issuer, audience, scope, and tenant restrictions at the resource server.
  2. Implement token revocation and session invalidation bound to authoritative lifecycle events.
  3. Apply endpoint data controls and remote session restrictions according to classification.
  4. Scope cloud IAM actions and resources to the billing workload and remove unrelated destructive privileges.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Validate token issuer, audience, scope, and tenant restrictions at the resource server. The acceptance check is that an access token from the untrusted tenant is denied despite cryptographic validity. That outcome checks whether the requirement is met, rather than treating completion of a security task as proof of effectiveness.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Although “Implement token revocation and session invalidation bound to authoritative lifecycle events.” is a reasonable response to “A contractor retains resource access because identity deprovisioning updates the directory but not issued cloud access tokens”, this case instead concerns “A cloud service accepts OAuth tokens with correct signatures even if the issuer is an unapproved partner tenant”, for which success requires that an access token from the untrusted tenant is denied despite cryptographic validity.

C:

The option “Apply endpoint data controls and remote session restrictions according to classification.” assumes an issue like “A remote desktop host permits clipboard transfer of classified reports into an untrusted local session”, not the specific observed weakness “A cloud service accepts OAuth tokens with correct signatures even if the issuer is an unapproved partner tenant”; it leaves the evidence goal unmet: an access token from the untrusted tenant is denied despite cryptographic validity.

D:

This choice would be evaluated by “The service principal can read its required bucket but cannot delete another account's data” when dealing with “An enterprise faces this security constraint: A service principal used by billing has a role permitting deletion of every cloud storage account rather than its single billing bucket”. It does not deliver the distinct control “Validate token issuer, audience, scope, and tenant restrictions at the resource server” needed for “A cloud service accepts OAuth tokens with correct signatures even if the issuer is an unapproved partner tenant”.

Question 294

After the team responds to the following issue, which finding best demonstrates the desired security outcome? A cloud service accepts OAuth tokens with correct signatures even if the issuer is an unapproved partner tenant.

  1. Password-only sign-ins to privileged accounts are denied while registered passkeys function.
  2. An access token from the untrusted tenant is denied despite cryptographic validity.
  3. The application operates with enforcement enabled and prohibited file access remains blocked.
  4. A remediated device receives the intended access while the untrusted device still fails.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

This is direct test evidence of the control objective in the case: A cloud service accepts OAuth tokens with correct signatures even if the issuer is an unapproved partner tenant. It demonstrates that the proposed response, validate token issuer, audience, scope, and tenant restrictions at the resource server., produces the measurable result an access token from the untrusted tenant is denied despite cryptographic validity. The observation tests a relevant security outcome rather than an unrelated control or reporting activity.

Incorrect Answers

A:

In the problem “A cloud service accepts OAuth tokens with correct signatures even if the issuer is an unapproved partner tenant”, evidence “Password-only sign-ins to privileged accounts are denied while registered passkeys function.” is not decisive because it tests “A company introduces passkeys but privileged accounts still accept password-only legacy authentication from external networks”; the requested validation is an access token from the untrusted tenant is denied despite cryptographic validity.

C:

The observed “The application operates with enforcement enabled and prohibited file access remains blocked” validates the separate control “Troubleshoot policy denials and implement a narrowly scoped SELinux adjustment instead of globally disabling enforcement” under “A Linux server's mandatory access control is disabled to resolve an application permission error and no confinement remains”. The present decision calls for the different result “An access token from the untrusted tenant is denied despite cryptographic validity” from “Validate token issuer, audience, scope, and tenant restrictions at the resource server”.

D:

Observation “A remediated device receives the intended access while the untrusted device still fails.” would be useful for “An enterprise account is denied an app because device risk posture has changed, but support tries to bypass all conditional access policies”, but it does not prove that the response to “A cloud service accepts OAuth tokens with correct signatures even if the issuer is an unapproved partner tenant” achieved the relevant outcome, an access token from the untrusted tenant is denied despite cryptographic validity.

Question 295

A security architect is asked to resolve this problem: An identity provisioning connector repeatedly grants elevated directory roles when a user changes departments. Select the MOST directly relevant action.

  1. Add idempotent action identifiers and bounded retry logic with explicit status checks.
  2. Review attribute mapping and role assignment logic against least privilege and lifecycle policies.
  3. Restrict accepted assertions to the intended service-provider entity ID and valid recipient.
  4. Implement token revocation and session invalidation bound to authoritative lifecycle events.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Review attribute mapping and role assignment logic against least privilege and lifecycle policies. The acceptance check is that department transfers retain required permissions but do not add unapproved privileged roles. That outcome checks whether the requirement is met, rather than treating completion of a security task as proof of effectiveness.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The option “Add idempotent action identifiers and bounded retry logic with explicit status checks.” assumes an issue like “A SOC playbook's webhook retries duplicate the same account-disable action and break an incident recovery workflow”, not the specific observed weakness “An identity provisioning connector repeatedly grants elevated directory roles when a user changes departments”; it leaves the evidence goal unmet: department transfers retain required permissions but do not add unapproved privileged roles.

C:

“Restrict accepted assertions to the intended service-provider entity ID and valid recipient” addresses “A federated healthcare application validates an identity provider's signature but ignores the SAML assertion audience”, with “A signed assertion for another service is rejected without creating a clinical user session” as its acceptance test. Here the specific problem is “An identity provisioning connector repeatedly grants elevated directory roles when a user changes departments”: it requires “Review attribute mapping and role assignment logic against least privilege and lifecycle policies” and evidence that “Department transfers retain required permissions but do not add unapproved privileged roles”.

D:

Although “Implement token revocation and session invalidation bound to authoritative lifecycle events.” is a reasonable response to “A contractor retains resource access because identity deprovisioning updates the directory but not issued cloud access tokens”, this case instead concerns “An identity provisioning connector repeatedly grants elevated directory roles when a user changes departments”, for which success requires that department transfers retain required permissions but do not add unapproved privileged roles.

Question 296

Which test or documented result best shows that the underlying issue was properly addressed? An identity provisioning connector repeatedly grants elevated directory roles when a user changes departments.

  1. Department transfers retain required permissions but do not add unapproved privileged roles.
  2. Password-only sign-ins to privileged accounts are denied while registered passkeys function.
  3. A malformed or unapproved input cannot disable an unrelated account.
  4. The service principal can read its required bucket but cannot delete another account's data.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

This is direct test evidence of the control objective in the case: An identity provisioning connector repeatedly grants elevated directory roles when a user changes departments. It demonstrates that the proposed response, review attribute mapping and role assignment logic against least privilege and lifecycle policies., produces the measurable result department transfers retain required permissions but do not add unapproved privileged roles. The observation tests a relevant security outcome rather than an unrelated control or reporting activity.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Observation “Password-only sign-ins to privileged accounts are denied while registered passkeys function.” would be useful for “A company introduces passkeys but privileged accounts still accept password-only legacy authentication from external networks”, but it does not prove that the response to “An identity provisioning connector repeatedly grants elevated directory roles when a user changes departments” achieved the relevant outcome, department transfers retain required permissions but do not add unapproved privileged roles.

C:

In the problem “An identity provisioning connector repeatedly grants elevated directory roles when a user changes departments”, evidence “A malformed or unapproved input cannot disable an unrelated account.” is not decisive because it tests “A security analyst builds a PowerShell script that disables accounts from CSV input without validating identity or approval”; the requested validation is department transfers retain required permissions but do not add unapproved privileged roles.

D:

“Scope cloud IAM actions and resources to the billing workload and remove unrelated destructive privileges” should produce “The service principal can read its required bucket but cannot delete another account's data” in its own test case. The present requirement is instead checked by “Department transfers retain required permissions but do not add unapproved privileged roles”, which validates “Review attribute mapping and role assignment logic against least privilege and lifecycle policies” rather than the alternate control.

Question 297

A senior engineer examines the following finding: A PAM system stores administrative passwords safely but shared emergency accounts have no attributable session recording. Which action most directly addresses the requirement?

  1. Restrict legacy flows and require phishing-resistant authentication for privileged access.
  2. Implement checked-out emergency access with individual authorization and privileged session capture.
  3. Adopt separate minimally privileged service identities with restricted inter-host authentication.
  4. Implement token revocation and session invalidation bound to authoritative lifecycle events.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Implement checked-out emergency access with individual authorization and privileged session capture. The acceptance check is that a break-glass test traces commands and approval to the requesting administrator. That outcome checks whether the requirement is met, rather than treating completion of a security task as proof of effectiveness.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Restrict legacy flows and require phishing-resistant authentication for privileged access” addresses “A company introduces passkeys but privileged accounts still accept password-only legacy authentication from external networks”, with “Password-only sign-ins to privileged accounts are denied while registered passkeys function” as its acceptance test. Here the specific problem is “A PAM system stores administrative passwords safely but shared emergency accounts have no attributable session recording”: it requires “Implement checked-out emergency access with individual authorization and privileged session capture” and evidence that “A break-glass test traces commands and approval to the requesting administrator”.

C:

The option “Adopt separate minimally privileged service identities with restricted inter-host authentication.” assumes an issue like “A server runs the same service under a full administrator account on every host, enabling broad lateral movement if one host is breached”, not the specific observed weakness “A PAM system stores administrative passwords safely but shared emergency accounts have no attributable session recording”; it leaves the evidence goal unmet: a break-glass test traces commands and approval to the requesting administrator.

D:

“Implement token revocation and session invalidation bound to authoritative lifecycle events” addresses “A cross-functional security group is considering a decision: A contractor retains resource access because identity deprovisioning updates the directory but not issued cloud access tokens”, with “A terminated contractor's token no longer accesses protected APIs within the defined revocation SLA” as its acceptance test. Here the specific problem is “A PAM system stores administrative passwords safely but shared emergency accounts have no attributable session recording”: it requires “Implement checked-out emergency access with individual authorization and privileged session capture” and evidence that “A break-glass test traces commands and approval to the requesting administrator”.

Question 298

A follow-up assurance review considers this problem: A PAM system stores administrative passwords safely but shared emergency accounts have no attributable session recording. Which outcome best shows the intended improvement?

  1. A separate unprivileged test user cannot reuse the administrator's forwarded SSH identity.
  2. A break-glass test traces commands and approval to the requesting administrator.
  3. Password-only sign-ins to privileged accounts are denied while registered passkeys function.
  4. The service principal can read its required bucket but cannot delete another account's data.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

This is direct test evidence of the control objective in the case: A PAM system stores administrative passwords safely but shared emergency accounts have no attributable session recording. It demonstrates that the proposed response, implement checked-out emergency access with individual authorization and privileged session capture., produces the measurable result a break-glass test traces commands and approval to the requesting administrator. The observation tests a relevant security outcome rather than an unrelated control or reporting activity.

Incorrect Answers

A:

In the problem “A PAM system stores administrative passwords safely but shared emergency accounts have no attributable session recording”, evidence “A separate unprivileged test user cannot reuse the administrator's forwarded SSH identity.” is not decisive because it tests “A Linux administrative workstation stores SSH agent sockets in widely accessible directories shared among users”; the requested validation is a break-glass test traces commands and approval to the requesting administrator.

C:

In “A company introduces passkeys but privileged accounts still accept password-only legacy authentication from external networks”, “Password-only sign-ins to privileged accounts are denied while registered passkeys function” is the acceptance signal for “Restrict legacy flows and require phishing-resistant authentication for privileged access”. The required proof for the selected response “Implement checked-out emergency access with individual authorization and privileged session capture” is “A break-glass test traces commands and approval to the requesting administrator”.

D:

This measurement is tied to “An enterprise faces this security constraint: A service principal used by billing has a role permitting deletion of every cloud storage account rather than its single billing bucket” and the control “Scope cloud IAM actions and resources to the billing workload and remove unrelated destructive privileges”. It cannot confirm that “Implement checked-out emergency access with individual authorization and privileged session capture” has achieved “A break-glass test traces commands and approval to the requesting administrator” for the issue in this question.

Question 299

An enterprise faces this security constraint: A password-reset flow reuses identical recovery links after a user finishes an account recovery event. Which proposal best addresses the stated risk?

  1. Replace embedded keys with short-lived workload identities and redact sensitive request fields in automation logs.
  2. Investigate device compliance and conditional access evaluation before granting a narrowly justified exception.
  3. Review attribute mapping and role assignment logic against least privilege and lifecycle policies.
  4. Make recovery tokens short-lived, single-use, and invalidated after password change.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Make recovery tokens short-lived, single-use, and invalidated after password change. The acceptance check is that a replayed recovery link fails while a fresh authorized reset succeeds. That outcome checks whether the requirement is met, rather than treating completion of a security task as proof of effectiveness.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The option “Replace embedded keys with short-lived workload identities and redact sensitive request fields in automation logs.” assumes an issue like “A Python remediation script logs cloud API keys while fetching vulnerability results from a provider SDK”, not the specific observed weakness “A password-reset flow reuses identical recovery links after a user finishes an account recovery event”; it leaves the evidence goal unmet: a replayed recovery link fails while a fresh authorized reset succeeds.

B:

The proposal “Investigate device compliance and conditional access evaluation before granting a narrowly justified exception” manages “An enterprise account is denied an app because device risk posture has changed, but support tries to bypass all conditional access policies”, where successful operation means “A remediated device receives the intended access while the untrusted device still fails”. The present issue instead needs “Make recovery tokens short-lived, single-use, and invalidated after password change” to establish “A replayed recovery link fails while a fresh authorized reset succeeds”.

C:

For “An identity provisioning connector repeatedly grants elevated directory roles when a user changes departments”, “Review attribute mapping and role assignment logic against least privilege and lifecycle policies” has a clear validation signal: “Department transfers retain required permissions but do not add unapproved privileged roles”. But “An enterprise faces this security constraint: A password-reset flow reuses identical recovery links after a user finishes an account recovery event” calls for “Make recovery tokens short-lived, single-use, and invalidated after password change”; the other intervention cannot demonstrate “A replayed recovery link fails while a fresh authorized reset succeeds”.

Question 300

After the team responds to the following issue, which finding best demonstrates the desired security outcome? A password-reset flow reuses identical recovery links after a user finishes an account recovery event.

  1. Tampered ciphertext fails verification while authorized throughput meets the defined service budget.
  2. Renewed trusted certificates allow authorized 802.1X sessions and expired chains are rejected.
  3. A replayed recovery link fails while a fresh authorized reset succeeds.
  4. A remediated device receives the intended access while the untrusted device still fails.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

This is direct test evidence of the control objective in the case: A password-reset flow reuses identical recovery links after a user finishes an account recovery event. It demonstrates that the proposed response, make recovery tokens short-lived, single-use, and invalidated after password change., produces the measurable result a replayed recovery link fails while a fresh authorized reset succeeds. The observation tests a relevant security outcome rather than an unrelated control or reporting activity.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The observed “Tampered ciphertext fails verification while authorized throughput meets the defined service budget” validates the separate control “Use an authenticated encryption design that protects both confidentiality and integrity and benchmark its performance” under “An enterprise faces this security constraint: A software team wants to replace authenticated encryption with plain AES-CTR because it provides faster processing”. The present decision calls for the different result “A replayed recovery link fails while a fresh authorized reset succeeds” from “Make recovery tokens short-lived, single-use, and invalidated after password change”.

B:

Observation “Renewed trusted certificates allow authorized 802.1X sessions and expired chains are rejected.” would be useful for “A certificate-based Wi-Fi onboarding process fails for devices because server certificates have expired but all troubleshooting focuses on passwords”, but it does not prove that the response to “A password-reset flow reuses identical recovery links after a user finishes an account recovery event” achieved the relevant outcome, a replayed recovery link fails while a fresh authorized reset succeeds.

D:

For the issue “A password-reset flow reuses identical recovery links after a user finishes an account recovery event”, measuring “A remediated device receives the intended access while the untrusted device still fails.” would validate “An enterprise account is denied an app because device risk posture has changed, but support tries to bypass all conditional access policies” instead of the required control effect: a replayed recovery link fails while a fresh authorized reset succeeds.