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Exam Code: CAS-005

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CompTIA CAS-005 Practice Test 24

Question 230

Which test or documented result best shows that the underlying issue was properly addressed? A company manually distributes private keys to applications through email during quarterly certificate rotation.

  1. During a simulated policy service failure, sensitive operations deny access and recovery remains controlled.
  2. A simulated device-compliance failure revokes sensitive application access pending revalidation.
  3. A simulated edge outage reroutes through approved protection rather than uninspected direct egress.
  4. An automated rotation completes with no private key sent by email and no avoidable service outage.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

This is direct test evidence of the control objective in the case: A company manually distributes private keys to applications through email during quarterly certificate rotation. It demonstrates that the proposed response, adopt centrally governed certificate issuance and automated short-lived key distribution with least-privilege access., produces the measurable result an automated rotation completes with no private key sent by email and no avoidable service outage. The observation tests a relevant security outcome rather than an unrelated control or reporting activity.

Incorrect Answers

A:

In the problem “A company manually distributes private keys to applications through email during quarterly certificate rotation”, evidence “During a simulated policy service failure, sensitive operations deny access and recovery remains controlled.” is not decisive because it tests “An organization deploys a policy decision point but leaves enforcement points accepting requests when the decision service is unavailable”; the requested validation is an automated rotation completes with no private key sent by email and no avoidable service outage.

B:

For the issue “A company manually distributes private keys to applications through email during quarterly certificate rotation”, measuring “A simulated device-compliance failure revokes sensitive application access pending revalidation.” would validate “An identity provider treats a user session as trustworthy indefinitely after MFA, even when device posture becomes compromised” instead of the required control effect: an automated rotation completes with no private key sent by email and no avoidable service outage.

C:

“Define approved resilience paths that retain identity policy and inspection during SASE edge failover” should produce “A simulated edge outage reroutes through approved protection rather than uninspected direct egress” in its own test case. The present requirement is instead checked by “An automated rotation completes with no private key sent by email and no avoidable service outage”, which validates “Adopt centrally governed certificate issuance and automated short-lived key distribution with least-privilege access” rather than the alternate control.

Question 231

An enterprise security review reports: An external partner's federation metadata changes, but trust is updated by copying the partner's unsigned emailed XML. Which response best addresses the underlying security issue?

  1. Implement individually attributable automation identities with scoped delegated provisioning and approval evidence.
  2. Require strict SAML signature, audience, recipient, and freshness validation at the service provider.
  3. Generate and verify SBOMs and signed build attestations during trusted pipeline execution.
  4. Verify trusted metadata origin and signing certificates before applying federation changes.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Verify trusted metadata origin and signing certificates before applying federation changes. The acceptance check is that tampered metadata is rejected and a legitimate scheduled rollover is audited and accepted. That outcome checks whether the requirement is met, rather than treating completion of a security task as proof of effectiveness.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The option “Implement individually attributable automation identities with scoped delegated provisioning and approval evidence.” assumes an issue like “A company uses a single shared service account to provision and deprovision contractors across all its customers”, not the specific observed weakness “An external partner's federation metadata changes, but trust is updated by copying the partner's unsigned emailed XML”; it leaves the evidence goal unmet: tampered metadata is rejected and a legitimate scheduled rollover is audited and accepted.

B:

This choice would be evaluated by “A signed assertion intended for another application is rejected without creating a user session” when dealing with “A service provider's customer SSO integration accepts a SAML assertion without validating the destination audience”. It does not deliver the distinct control “Verify trusted metadata origin and signing certificates before applying federation changes” needed for “An external partner's federation metadata changes, but trust is updated by copying the partner's unsigned emailed XML”.

C:

“A release artifact can be traced to source, dependency versions, builder identity, and verified signatures” would be meaningful evidence for “Generate and verify SBOMs and signed build attestations during trusted pipeline execution” in the case “A CI pipeline imports dependencies without a software bill of materials or cryptographic provenance”. It does not replace “Verify trusted metadata origin and signing certificates before applying federation changes” to correct “An external partner's federation metadata changes, but trust is updated by copying the partner's unsigned emailed XML” and verify “Tampered metadata is rejected and a legitimate scheduled rollover is audited and accepted”.

Question 232

A follow-up assurance review considers this problem: An external partner's federation metadata changes, but trust is updated by copying the partner's unsigned emailed XML. Which outcome best shows the intended improvement?

  1. Tampered metadata is rejected and a legitimate scheduled rollover is audited and accepted.
  2. A crafted serialized object is rejected during CI and a recorded defect is linked to the change.
  3. A signed assertion intended for another application is rejected without creating a user session.
  4. A read-only partner token cannot perform a write despite being cryptographically valid.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

This is direct test evidence of the control objective in the case: An external partner's federation metadata changes, but trust is updated by copying the partner's unsigned emailed XML. It demonstrates that the proposed response, verify trusted metadata origin and signing certificates before applying federation changes., produces the measurable result tampered metadata is rejected and a legitimate scheduled rollover is audited and accepted. The observation tests a relevant security outcome rather than an unrelated control or reporting activity.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Observation “A crafted serialized object is rejected during CI and a recorded defect is linked to the change.” would be useful for “A code reviewer finds unsafe deserialization in a critical service but only a documentation ticket is created”, but it does not prove that the response to “An external partner's federation metadata changes, but trust is updated by copying the partner's unsigned emailed XML” achieved the relevant outcome, tampered metadata is rejected and a legitimate scheduled rollover is audited and accepted.

C:

The observed “A signed assertion intended for another application is rejected without creating a user session” validates the separate control “Require strict SAML signature, audience, recipient, and freshness validation at the service provider” under “A service provider's customer SSO integration accepts a SAML assertion without validating the destination audience”. The present decision calls for the different result “Tampered metadata is rejected and a legitimate scheduled rollover is audited and accepted” from “Verify trusted metadata origin and signing certificates before applying federation changes”.

D:

For the issue “An external partner's federation metadata changes, but trust is updated by copying the partner's unsigned emailed XML”, measuring “A read-only partner token cannot perform a write despite being cryptographically valid.” would validate “A partner API trusts an access token with a correct signature but never confirms its authorized resource scopes” instead of the required control effect: tampered metadata is rejected and a legitimate scheduled rollover is audited and accepted.

Question 233

During an authorized security assessment, the team discovers: A SaaS company allows serverless functions to assume a cloud role with unrestricted storage read permissions across all projects. What should be prioritized?

  1. Enforce trusted artifact signatures and image digest policies before cluster scheduling.
  2. Add drift detection and gated reconciliation against reviewed IaC state for network policies.
  3. Add risk-based continuous authorization and context-triggered reauthentication for sensitive actions.
  4. Restrict each function's role to its required resources and actions using reviewed cloud IAM policies.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Restrict each function's role to its required resources and actions using reviewed cloud IAM policies. The acceptance check is that a test function accesses approved objects but is denied unrelated project storage. That outcome checks whether the requirement is met, rather than treating completion of a security task as proof of effectiveness.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Enforce trusted artifact signatures and image digest policies before cluster scheduling” addresses “A container deployment uses a publicly accessible image registry with no signature verification in production admission”, with “An unsigned or altered image fails admission while the verified release is deployed” as its acceptance test. Here the specific problem is “A SaaS company allows serverless functions to assume a cloud role with unrestricted storage read permissions across all projects”: it requires “Restrict each function's role to its required resources and actions using reviewed cloud IAM policies” and evidence that “A test function accesses approved objects but is denied unrelated project storage”.

B:

Although “Add drift detection and gated reconciliation against reviewed IaC state for network policies.” is a reasonable response to “An infrastructure-as-code pipeline permits manual console changes without alerting owners to network security group drift”, this case instead concerns “A SaaS company allows serverless functions to assume a cloud role with unrestricted storage read permissions across all projects”, for which success requires that a test function accesses approved objects but is denied unrelated project storage.

C:

The option “Add risk-based continuous authorization and context-triggered reauthentication for sensitive actions.” assumes an issue like “An identity provider treats a user session as trustworthy indefinitely after MFA, even when device posture becomes compromised”, not the specific observed weakness “A SaaS company allows serverless functions to assume a cloud role with unrestricted storage read permissions across all projects”; it leaves the evidence goal unmet: a test function accesses approved objects but is denied unrelated project storage.

Question 234

After the team responds to the following issue, which finding best demonstrates the desired security outcome? A SaaS company allows serverless functions to assume a cloud role with unrestricted storage read permissions across all projects.

  1. A developer's attempt to schedule key deletion is denied with audited approval requirements.
  2. A test remote user can reach approved applications but not unrelated sensitive server subnets.
  3. An unauthorized open ingress rule triggers detection and approved rollback before the next production build.
  4. A test function accesses approved objects but is denied unrelated project storage.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

This is direct test evidence of the control objective in the case: A SaaS company allows serverless functions to assume a cloud role with unrestricted storage read permissions across all projects. It demonstrates that the proposed response, restrict each function's role to its required resources and actions using reviewed cloud IAM policies., produces the measurable result a test function accesses approved objects but is denied unrelated project storage. The observation tests a relevant security outcome rather than an unrelated control or reporting activity.

Incorrect Answers

A:

In the problem “A SaaS company allows serverless functions to assume a cloud role with unrestricted storage read permissions across all projects”, evidence “A developer's attempt to schedule key deletion is denied with audited approval requirements.” is not decisive because it tests “A multinational uses customer-managed encryption keys but grants every developer the ability to disable or delete them”; the requested validation is a test function accesses approved objects but is denied unrelated project storage.

B:

For the issue “A SaaS company allows serverless functions to assume a cloud role with unrestricted storage read permissions across all projects”, measuring “A test remote user can reach approved applications but not unrelated sensitive server subnets.” would validate “A branch network terminates remote-access VPN sessions in the same unrestricted user VLAN as internal database servers” instead of the required control effect: a test function accesses approved objects but is denied unrelated project storage.

C:

The observed “An unauthorized open ingress rule triggers detection and approved rollback before the next production build” validates the separate control “Add drift detection and gated reconciliation against reviewed IaC state for network policies” under “An infrastructure-as-code pipeline permits manual console changes without alerting owners to network security group drift”. The present decision calls for the different result “A test function accesses approved objects but is denied unrelated project storage” from “Restrict each function's role to its required resources and actions using reviewed cloud IAM policies”.

Question 235

A cross-functional security group is considering a decision: A shipping company configures cloud logging under the provider's shared-responsibility model but assumes the provider will review tenant IAM misuse. What is the most appropriate control or investigation response?

  1. Add drift detection and gated reconciliation against reviewed IaC state for network policies.
  2. Apply contextual API gateway rate limits, anomaly thresholds, and least-privilege key lifecycle controls.
  3. Architect a restricted evidence repository with immutable audit history, access approval, and retention controls.
  4. Assign tenant-side detection and audit ownership, integrating provider control-plane evidence into the SOC.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Assign tenant-side detection and audit ownership, integrating provider control-plane evidence into the SOC. The acceptance check is that a simulated tenant privilege escalation produces an accountable incident case and linked audit events. That outcome checks whether the requirement is met, rather than treating completion of a security task as proof of effectiveness.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The option “Add drift detection and gated reconciliation against reviewed IaC state for network policies.” assumes an issue like “An infrastructure-as-code pipeline permits manual console changes without alerting owners to network security group drift”, not the specific observed weakness “A shipping company configures cloud logging under the provider's shared-responsibility model but assumes the provider will review tenant IAM misuse”; it leaves the evidence goal unmet: a simulated tenant privilege escalation produces an accountable incident case and linked audit events.

B:

The proposal “Apply contextual API gateway rate limits, anomaly thresholds, and least-privilege key lifecycle controls” manages “A cloud API allows unlimited token requests, and a compromised key causes cost and service exhaustion”, where successful operation means “High-volume unauthorized requests are throttled and affected credentials can be promptly revoked”. The present issue instead needs “Assign tenant-side detection and audit ownership, integrating provider control-plane evidence into the SOC” to establish “A simulated tenant privilege escalation produces an accountable incident case and linked audit events”.

C:

“A sample evidence transfer records recipient, hash, permission, timestamp, and access revocation” would be meaningful evidence for “Architect a restricted evidence repository with immutable audit history, access approval, and retention controls” in the case “A multinational shares incident evidence with external legal counsel through ordinary shared mailboxes with no chain of custody”. It does not replace “Assign tenant-side detection and audit ownership, integrating provider control-plane evidence into the SOC” to correct “A cross-functional security group is considering a decision: A shipping company configures cloud logging under the provider's shared-responsibility model but assumes the provider will review tenant IAM misuse” and verify “A simulated tenant privilege escalation produces an accountable incident case and linked audit events”.

Question 236

Which test or documented result best shows that the underlying issue was properly addressed? A shipping company configures cloud logging under the provider's shared-responsibility model but assumes the provider will review tenant IAM misuse.

  1. A developer's attempt to schedule key deletion is denied with audited approval requirements.
  2. A simulated tenant privilege escalation produces an accountable incident case and linked audit events.
  3. External callers cannot reach the API; approved private clients authenticate through the intended path.
  4. A simulated upstream failure stays within the dependent workload's error budget and does not cascade.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

This is direct test evidence of the control objective in the case: A shipping company configures cloud logging under the provider's shared-responsibility model but assumes the provider will review tenant IAM misuse. It demonstrates that the proposed response, assign tenant-side detection and audit ownership, integrating provider control-plane evidence into the SOC., produces the measurable result a simulated tenant privilege escalation produces an accountable incident case and linked audit events. The observation tests a relevant security outcome rather than an unrelated control or reporting activity.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This measurement is tied to “An enterprise faces this security constraint: A multinational uses customer-managed encryption keys but grants every developer the ability to disable or delete them” and the control “Separate key administrators from data users, enforce deletion protections, and require dual approval for destructive key actions”. It cannot confirm that “Assign tenant-side detection and audit ownership, integrating provider control-plane evidence into the SOC” has achieved “A simulated tenant privilege escalation produces an accountable incident case and linked audit events” for the issue in this question.

C:

In the problem “A shipping company configures cloud logging under the provider's shared-responsibility model but assumes the provider will review tenant IAM misuse”, evidence “External callers cannot reach the API; approved private clients authenticate through the intended path.” is not decisive because it tests “A cloud integration exposes a private API through an unrestricted public endpoint rather than the expected private service connection”; the requested validation is a simulated tenant privilege escalation produces an accountable incident case and linked audit events.

D:

For the issue “A shipping company configures cloud logging under the provider's shared-responsibility model but assumes the provider will review tenant IAM misuse”, measuring “A simulated upstream failure stays within the dependent workload's error budget and does not cascade.” would validate “An industrial analytics service adds a second upstream API without defining failure limits and propagates timeouts to core production systems” instead of the required control effect: a simulated tenant privilege escalation produces an accountable incident case and linked audit events.

Question 237

In a control effectiveness review, the issue is: A container deployment uses a publicly accessible image registry with no signature verification in production admission. Which intervention is most defensible for the situation?

  1. Add drift detection and gated reconciliation against reviewed IaC state for network policies.
  2. Assign authenticated workload identities and enforce per-service policy at internal API boundaries.
  3. Separate key administrators from data users, enforce deletion protections, and require dual approval for destructive key actions.
  4. Enforce trusted artifact signatures and image digest policies before cluster scheduling.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Enforce trusted artifact signatures and image digest policies before cluster scheduling. The acceptance check is that an unsigned or altered image fails admission while the verified release is deployed. That outcome checks whether the requirement is met, rather than treating completion of a security task as proof of effectiveness.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The proposal “Add drift detection and gated reconciliation against reviewed IaC state for network policies” manages “An infrastructure-as-code pipeline permits manual console changes without alerting owners to network security group drift”, where successful operation means “An unauthorized open ingress rule triggers detection and approved rollback before the next production build”. The present issue instead needs “Enforce trusted artifact signatures and image digest policies before cluster scheduling” to establish “An unsigned or altered image fails admission while the verified release is deployed”.

B:

Although “Assign authenticated workload identities and enforce per-service policy at internal API boundaries.” is a reasonable response to “An enterprise tracks users but not service-to-service identities, leaving internal APIs trusting all traffic from an office subnet”, this case instead concerns “A container deployment uses a publicly accessible image registry with no signature verification in production admission”, for which success requires that an unsigned or altered image fails admission while the verified release is deployed.

C:

The option “Separate key administrators from data users, enforce deletion protections, and require dual approval for destructive key actions.” assumes an issue like “A multinational uses customer-managed encryption keys but grants every developer the ability to disable or delete them”, not the specific observed weakness “A container deployment uses a publicly accessible image registry with no signature verification in production admission”; it leaves the evidence goal unmet: an unsigned or altered image fails admission while the verified release is deployed.

Question 238

A follow-up assurance review considers this problem: A container deployment uses a publicly accessible image registry with no signature verification in production admission. Which outcome best shows the intended improvement?

  1. An unsigned or altered image fails admission while the verified release is deployed.
  2. A deployment to a disallowed region fails policy evaluation and permitted replicas stay within contract scope.
  3. Test activity identifies unsanctioned file sharing without mislabeling approved supplier services.
  4. A release artifact can be traced to source, dependency versions, builder identity, and verified signatures.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

This is direct test evidence of the control objective in the case: A container deployment uses a publicly accessible image registry with no signature verification in production admission. It demonstrates that the proposed response, enforce trusted artifact signatures and image digest policies before cluster scheduling., produces the measurable result an unsigned or altered image fails admission while the verified release is deployed. The observation tests a relevant security outcome rather than an unrelated control or reporting activity.

Incorrect Answers

B:

For the issue “A container deployment uses a publicly accessible image registry with no signature verification in production admission”, measuring “A deployment to a disallowed region fails policy evaluation and permitted replicas stay within contract scope.” would validate “A cloud team stores application data in a region that meets latency requirements but breaches the signed customer residency agreement” instead of the required control effect: an unsigned or altered image fails admission while the verified release is deployed.

C:

In “A cloud security broker reports shadow IT services but cannot distinguish approved supplier SaaS from unknown personal file sharing”, “Test activity identifies unsanctioned file sharing without mislabeling approved supplier services” is the acceptance signal for “Combine CASB inventory with sanctioned vendor registry, identity context, and classification signals”. The required proof for the selected response “Enforce trusted artifact signatures and image digest policies before cluster scheduling” is “An unsigned or altered image fails admission while the verified release is deployed”.

D:

Observation “A release artifact can be traced to source, dependency versions, builder identity, and verified signatures.” would be useful for “A CI pipeline imports dependencies without a software bill of materials or cryptographic provenance”, but it does not prove that the response to “A container deployment uses a publicly accessible image registry with no signature verification in production admission” achieved the relevant outcome, an unsigned or altered image fails admission while the verified release is deployed.

Question 239

A security architect is asked to resolve this problem: A cloud data lake stores confidential exports in a bucket that allows anonymous public listing. Select the MOST directly relevant action.

  1. Replace the public route with authenticated private endpoint connectivity and explicit egress restrictions.
  2. Model event input validation, dependency risk, IAM scope, and downstream resource access for the function.
  3. Restrict effective object access, remove public grants, and continuously test external-principal authorization.
  4. Implement server-side object-level authorization checks with automated cross-user negative tests.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Restrict effective object access, remove public grants, and continuously test external-principal authorization. The acceptance check is that an external account cannot list or read protected data and access-control findings clear after verification. That outcome checks whether the requirement is met, rather than treating completion of a security task as proof of effectiveness.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The option “Replace the public route with authenticated private endpoint connectivity and explicit egress restrictions.” assumes an issue like “A cloud integration exposes a private API through an unrestricted public endpoint rather than the expected private service connection”, not the specific observed weakness “A cloud data lake stores confidential exports in a bucket that allows anonymous public listing”; it leaves the evidence goal unmet: an external account cannot list or read protected data and access-control findings clear after verification.

B:

This choice would be evaluated by “A crafted event cannot invoke unauthorized actions and vulnerable package versions are detected in the build” when dealing with “An enterprise faces this security constraint: A software team assumes a serverless function cannot be attacked because it has no managed operating system”. It does not deliver the distinct control “Restrict effective object access, remove public grants, and continuously test external-principal authorization” needed for “A cloud data lake stores confidential exports in a bucket that allows anonymous public listing”.

D:

Although “Implement server-side object-level authorization checks with automated cross-user negative tests.” is a reasonable response to “A product's code review finds missing authorization on resource APIs, but a general security awareness course is proposed as remediation”, this case instead concerns “A cloud data lake stores confidential exports in a bucket that allows anonymous public listing”, for which success requires that an external account cannot list or read protected data and access-control findings clear after verification.

Question 240

After the team responds to the following issue, which finding best demonstrates the desired security outcome? A cloud data lake stores confidential exports in a bucket that allows anonymous public listing.

  1. A test pod without API duties has no mounted token and cannot list unrelated cluster resources.
  2. External callers cannot reach the API; approved private clients authenticate through the intended path.
  3. An external account cannot list or read protected data and access-control findings clear after verification.
  4. Contract expiry ends access to the protected application even before the VPN session expires.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

This is direct test evidence of the control objective in the case: A cloud data lake stores confidential exports in a bucket that allows anonymous public listing. It demonstrates that the proposed response, restrict effective object access, remove public grants, and continuously test external-principal authorization., produces the measurable result an external account cannot list or read protected data and access-control findings clear after verification. The observation tests a relevant security outcome rather than an unrelated control or reporting activity.

Incorrect Answers

A:

In “A cross-functional security group is considering a decision: A Kubernetes service account is mounted automatically into pods that never invoke the cluster API”, “A test pod without API duties has no mounted token and cannot list unrelated cluster resources” is the acceptance signal for “Disable unneeded token automount and apply workload-specific RBAC to the remaining service accounts”. The required proof for the selected response “Restrict effective object access, remove public grants, and continuously test external-principal authorization” is “An external account cannot list or read protected data and access-control findings clear after verification”.

B:

Observation “External callers cannot reach the API; approved private clients authenticate through the intended path.” would be useful for “A cloud integration exposes a private API through an unrestricted public endpoint rather than the expected private service connection”, but it does not prove that the response to “A cloud data lake stores confidential exports in a bucket that allows anonymous public listing” achieved the relevant outcome, an external account cannot list or read protected data and access-control findings clear after verification.

D:

For the issue “A cloud data lake stores confidential exports in a bucket that allows anonymous public listing”, measuring “Contract expiry ends access to the protected application even before the VPN session expires.” would validate “A company grants temporary external contractors standing application access because the VPN login remains valid for 30 days” instead of the required control effect: an external account cannot list or read protected data and access-control findings clear after verification.