Exam Bundle

That observation verifies copp bgp keepalive drop in a different situation, such as when an overly strict CoPP policer drops BGP keepalives and neighbors repeatedly expire their hold timers. For the reported copp verify counter incident at a health system WAN in Toronto, the required acceptance evidence is: The affected class records conform/exceed outcomes that explain the packet drops. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies copp hardware offload visibility in a different situation, such as when a platform shows low software CoPP counters and the team concludes no packets were dropped despite hardware policing. For the reported copp verify counter incident at a health system WAN in Toronto, the required acceptance evidence is: The affected class records conform/exceed outcomes that explain the packet drops. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies copp default class in a different situation, such as when a newly applied CoPP policy unintentionally polices all otherwise-unmatched routing traffic at an extremely low default-class rate. For the reported copp verify counter incident at a health system WAN in Toronto, the required acceptance evidence is: The affected class records conform/exceed outcomes that explain the packet drops. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That approach is relevant to tunnel ipsec profile binding, such as when spoke-to-hub GRE packets are being sent without the required encryption because no tunnel protection profile is attached. That is a different root cause from the gre ipsec mtu fault observed at a manufacturing group in Copenhagen. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: Large application transfers succeed without repeated fragmentation or blackholing.

That approach is relevant to dmvpn tunnel key inconsistency, such as when gRE-encapsulated packets are rejected because the DMVPN endpoints use incompatible tunnel key settings. That is a different root cause from the gre ipsec mtu fault observed at a manufacturing group in Copenhagen. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: Large application transfers succeed without repeated fragmentation or blackholing.

That approach is relevant to dmvpn mgre hub, such as when a single-hub DMVPN must support many dynamically registered spokes, but the hub tunnel is configured as a fixed point-to-point GRE tunnel. That is a different root cause from the gre ipsec mtu fault observed at a manufacturing group in Copenhagen. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: Large application transfers succeed without repeated fragmentation or blackholing.

That observation verifies spoke multicast static mapping in a different situation, such as when a DMVPN spoke reaches the hub by unicast but its multicast routing hellos never reach the hub tunnel. For the reported gre ipsec mtu incident at a manufacturing group in Copenhagen, the required acceptance evidence is: Large application transfers succeed without repeated fragmentation or blackholing. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies hub dynamic multicast mappings in a different situation, such as when a DMVPN hub sees NHRP registrations but no EIGRP neighbors because tunneled multicast control packets cannot reach newly joined spokes. For the reported gre ipsec mtu incident at a manufacturing group in Copenhagen, the required acceptance evidence is: Large application transfers succeed without repeated fragmentation or blackholing. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies tunnel ipsec profile binding in a different situation, such as when spoke-to-hub GRE packets are being sent without the required encryption because no tunnel protection profile is attached. For the reported gre ipsec mtu incident at a manufacturing group in Copenhagen, the required acceptance evidence is: Large application transfers succeed without repeated fragmentation or blackholing. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That approach is relevant to ospf external subnets redistribution, such as when a redistribution statement is intended to carry multiple classless subnets into OSPF but only classful behavior is observed in the configured IOS context. That is a different root cause from the redistribution route-map omission fault observed at a carrier-adjacent enterprise in Tokyo. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: Only approved static prefixes are originated into OSPF external advertisements.

That approach is relevant to ospf default originate conditional, such as when the border router should originate an OSPF default only while it has a usable upstream default but neighbors receive none. That is a different root cause from the redistribution route-map omission fault observed at a carrier-adjacent enterprise in Tokyo. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: Only approved static prefixes are originated into OSPF external advertisements.

That approach is relevant to bgp network statement exact match, such as when a BGP network statement for a /24 originates nothing because only a /16 exists in the local RIB. That is a different root cause from the redistribution route-map omission fault observed at a carrier-adjacent enterprise in Tokyo. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: Only approved static prefixes are originated into OSPF external advertisements.

That observation verifies ospf default originate conditional in a different situation, such as when the border router should originate an OSPF default only while it has a usable upstream default but neighbors receive none. For the reported redistribution route-map omission incident at a carrier-adjacent enterprise in Tokyo, the required acceptance evidence is: Only approved static prefixes are originated into OSPF external advertisements. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies ospf e1 versus e2 metric type in a different situation, such as when traffic toward a redistributed external prefix should account for internal path cost, but all paths are evaluated only on the external metric. For the reported redistribution route-map omission incident at a carrier-adjacent enterprise in Tokyo, the required acceptance evidence is: Only approved static prefixes are originated into OSPF external advertisements. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies ospf external subnets redistribution in a different situation, such as when a redistribution statement is intended to carry multiple classless subnets into OSPF but only classful behavior is observed in the configured IOS context. For the reported redistribution route-map omission incident at a carrier-adjacent enterprise in Tokyo, the required acceptance evidence is: Only approved static prefixes are originated into OSPF external advertisements. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That approach is relevant to syslog transport acl, such as when local logs are correct but the central UDP syslog collector never sees packets due to the WAN filtering policy. That is a different root cause from the flexible netflow exporter target fault observed at a financial services WAN in Toronto. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: The collector receives the expected exported flow records from the router.

That approach is relevant to netflow v9 template information, such as when the collector receives NetFlow v9 data records but cannot decode fields because the template has not been received. That is a different root cause from the flexible netflow exporter target fault observed at a financial services WAN in Toronto. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: The collector receives the expected exported flow records from the router.

That approach is relevant to syslog remote destination, such as when a router logs events locally but nothing reaches the central collector because logging host was never configured. That is a different root cause from the flexible netflow exporter target fault observed at a financial services WAN in Toronto. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: The collector receives the expected exported flow records from the router.

That observation verifies flow record key fields in a different situation, such as when a traffic analyzer needs conversations by source/destination IP and ports but the custom flow record does not match those keys. For the reported flexible netflow exporter target incident at a financial services WAN in Toronto, the required acceptance evidence is: The collector receives the expected exported flow records from the router. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies flow monitor interface direction in a different situation, such as when netFlow statistics are empty for inbound traffic because the flow monitor was applied only in the outbound direction. For the reported flexible netflow exporter target incident at a financial services WAN in Toronto, the required acceptance evidence is: The collector receives the expected exported flow records from the router. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies netflow v9 template information in a different situation, such as when the collector receives NetFlow v9 data records but cannot decode fields because the template has not been received. For the reported flexible netflow exporter target incident at a financial services WAN in Toronto, the required acceptance evidence is: The collector receives the expected exported flow records from the router. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That approach is relevant to dmvpn tunnel key inconsistency, such as when gRE-encapsulated packets are rejected because the DMVPN endpoints use incompatible tunnel key settings. That is a different root cause from the dmvpn wrong tunnel source fault observed at a multisite enterprise WAN in Houston. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: The spoke can establish transport to the hub's NBMA address through the approved WAN path.

That approach is relevant to dmvpn front-door vrf, such as when the tunnel's physical WAN interface belongs to a transport VRF but tunnel underlay lookups incorrectly use the global table. That is a different root cause from the dmvpn wrong tunnel source fault observed at a multisite enterprise WAN in Houston. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: The spoke can establish transport to the hub's NBMA address through the approved WAN path.

That approach is relevant to dmvpn mgre hub, such as when a single-hub DMVPN must support many dynamically registered spokes, but the hub tunnel is configured as a fixed point-to-point GRE tunnel. That is a different root cause from the dmvpn wrong tunnel source fault observed at a multisite enterprise WAN in Houston. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: The spoke can establish transport to the hub's NBMA address through the approved WAN path.

That observation verifies dmvpn nhrp network id mismatch in a different situation, such as when the hub and spoke use different NHRP network identifiers despite otherwise consistent tunnel addressing. For the reported dmvpn wrong tunnel source incident at a multisite enterprise WAN in Houston, the required acceptance evidence is: The spoke can establish transport to the hub's NBMA address through the approved WAN path. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies dmvpn front-door vrf in a different situation, such as when the tunnel's physical WAN interface belongs to a transport VRF but tunnel underlay lookups incorrectly use the global table. For the reported dmvpn wrong tunnel source incident at a multisite enterprise WAN in Houston, the required acceptance evidence is: The spoke can establish transport to the hub's NBMA address through the approved WAN path. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies nhrp cache verification in a different situation, such as when a direct spoke route exists but its tunnel next hop lacks a corresponding NHRP resolution entry. For the reported dmvpn wrong tunnel source incident at a multisite enterprise WAN in Houston, the required acceptance evidence is: The spoke can establish transport to the hub's NBMA address through the approved WAN path. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That approach is relevant to bgp remote as incorrect, such as when a BGP peer sends an OPEN notification and rejects the relationship because the configured remote-as does not match its actual ASN. That is a different root cause from the ibgp loopback update-source fault observed at a cloud interconnect team in Toronto. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: Both iBGP peers form a stable loopback-sourced Established session.

That approach is relevant to ebgp nonconnected loopback, such as when bGP TCP connectivity over loopbacks fails because a multihop eBGP peer relies on a default one-hop TTL. That is a different root cause from the ibgp loopback update-source fault observed at a cloud interconnect team in Toronto. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: Both iBGP peers form a stable loopback-sourced Established session.

That approach is relevant to bgp weight precedence, such as when a local router chooses an unexpected egress because a neighbor-specific Cisco weight overrides a higher local preference on another path. That is a different root cause from the ibgp loopback update-source fault observed at a cloud interconnect team in Toronto. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: Both iBGP peers form a stable loopback-sourced Established session.

That observation verifies ibgp next-hop preservation in a different situation, such as when a router learns an eBGP route through iBGP but its NEXT_HOP points at an unreachable border address. For the reported ibgp loopback update-source incident at a cloud interconnect team in Toronto, the required acceptance evidence is: Both iBGP peers form a stable loopback-sourced Established session. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies ebgp nonconnected loopback in a different situation, such as when bGP TCP connectivity over loopbacks fails because a multihop eBGP peer relies on a default one-hop TTL. For the reported ibgp loopback update-source incident at a cloud interconnect team in Toronto, the required acceptance evidence is: Both iBGP peers form a stable loopback-sourced Established session. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies route reflector ibgp split horizon in a different situation, such as when an iBGP speaker learns a route from another iBGP peer but does not advertise it to a third peer because normal iBGP split-horizon rules apply. For the reported ibgp loopback update-source incident at a cloud interconnect team in Toronto, the required acceptance evidence is: Both iBGP peers form a stable loopback-sourced Established session. This other result does not test that condition directly.