Exam Bundle

That observation verifies eigrp delay/bandwidth metric in a different situation, such as when an interface's documented bandwidth differs from its configured EIGRP bandwidth and delay inputs, creating unexpected path costs. For the reported eigrp k-value disagreement incident at a hospital enterprise WAN in Melbourne, the required acceptance evidence is: The peers agree on metric parameters and establish a stable adjacency. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies eigrp ipv6 address family in a different situation, such as when iPv4 EIGRP is healthy but IPv6 routes are absent because the appropriate IPv6 routing address family was never activated. For the reported eigrp k-value disagreement incident at a hospital enterprise WAN in Melbourne, the required acceptance evidence is: The peers agree on metric parameters and establish a stable adjacency. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies eigrp neighbor churn in a different situation, such as when an EIGRP peer repeatedly expires its hold time on a congested link with dropped control traffic. For the reported eigrp k-value disagreement incident at a hospital enterprise WAN in Melbourne, the required acceptance evidence is: The peers agree on metric parameters and establish a stable adjacency. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That approach is relevant to dmvpn mgre hub, such as when a single-hub DMVPN must support many dynamically registered spokes, but the hub tunnel is configured as a fixed point-to-point GRE tunnel. That is a different root cause from the phase 2 hub split horizon fault observed at a manufacturing group in Copenhagen. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: Other spokes learn remote-spoke prefixes without inappropriate route filtering.

That approach is relevant to eigrp dmvpn peer issue, such as when dMVPN peers have protected tunnel reachability but EIGRP never forms because routing is not active on tunnel interfaces. That is a different root cause from the phase 2 hub split horizon fault observed at a manufacturing group in Copenhagen. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: Other spokes learn remote-spoke prefixes without inappropriate route filtering.

That approach is relevant to dmvpn front-door vrf, such as when the tunnel's physical WAN interface belongs to a transport VRF but tunnel underlay lookups incorrectly use the global table. That is a different root cause from the phase 2 hub split horizon fault observed at a manufacturing group in Copenhagen. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: Other spokes learn remote-spoke prefixes without inappropriate route filtering.

That observation verifies static hub mapping at spoke in a different situation, such as when a spoke cannot send initial NHRP requests because it has no mapping from the hub's tunnel address to the reachable NBMA address. For the reported phase 2 hub split horizon incident at a manufacturing group in Copenhagen, the required acceptance evidence is: Other spokes learn remote-spoke prefixes without inappropriate route filtering. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies spoke multicast static mapping in a different situation, such as when a DMVPN spoke reaches the hub by unicast but its multicast routing hellos never reach the hub tunnel. For the reported phase 2 hub split horizon incident at a manufacturing group in Copenhagen, the required acceptance evidence is: Other spokes learn remote-spoke prefixes without inappropriate route filtering. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies dmvpn nhrp network id mismatch in a different situation, such as when the hub and spoke use different NHRP network identifiers despite otherwise consistent tunnel addressing. For the reported phase 2 hub split horizon incident at a manufacturing group in Copenhagen, the required acceptance evidence is: Other spokes learn remote-spoke prefixes without inappropriate route filtering. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That approach is relevant to dhcp duplicate leased ip, such as when the DHCP server offers an IPv4 address already in use and hosts report duplicate-address alerts. That is a different root cause from the ipv4 dhcp excluded range fault observed at a regional network operations center in Bristol. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: New leases avoid protected static addresses while using the permitted pool.

That approach is relevant to dhcp relay helper address, such as when broadcast DHCPDISCOVER packets from remote VLAN clients never reach the central DHCP server. That is a different root cause from the ipv4 dhcp excluded range fault observed at a regional network operations center in Bristol. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: New leases avoid protected static addresses while using the permitted pool.

That approach is relevant to dhcpv6 duid identity, such as when an administrator assumes DHCPv6 reservations use only a client MAC address and the intended client consistently misses its reserved lease. That is a different root cause from the ipv4 dhcp excluded range fault observed at a regional network operations center in Bristol. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: New leases avoid protected static addresses while using the permitted pool.

That observation verifies dhcp default router option in a different situation, such as when clients obtain an IPv4 address and mask but have no valid default gateway because the pool's default-router option is incorrect. For the reported ipv4 dhcp excluded range incident at a regional network operations center in Bristol, the required acceptance evidence is: New leases avoid protected static addresses while using the permitted pool. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies dhcp giaddr subnet selection in a different situation, such as when a central DHCP server selects the wrong scope for remote clients because the relay's gateway address is unexpected. For the reported ipv4 dhcp excluded range incident at a regional network operations center in Bristol, the required acceptance evidence is: New leases avoid protected static addresses while using the permitted pool. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies dhcp duplicate leased ip in a different situation, such as when the DHCP server offers an IPv4 address already in use and hosts report duplicate-address alerts. For the reported ipv4 dhcp excluded range incident at a regional network operations center in Bristol, the required acceptance evidence is: New leases avoid protected static addresses while using the permitted pool. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That approach is relevant to acl first-match ordering, such as when a broad permit appears before a targeted deny, so traffic to a prohibited TCP port passes. That is a different root cause from the acl counter troubleshooting fault observed at a service provider support center in Paris. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: Packets hit the expected ACL entry and the policy outcome matches the flow.

That approach is relevant to acl applied wrong direction, such as when an extended IPv4 ACL correctly describes unwanted inbound traffic but was attached outbound on the wrong router interface. That is a different root cause from the acl counter troubleshooting fault observed at a service provider support center in Paris. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: Packets hit the expected ACL entry and the policy outcome matches the flow.

That approach is relevant to ipv6 traffic-filter attachment, such as when an IPv6 access list is configured but never filters a routed interface because only IPv4 ip access-group was applied. That is a different root cause from the acl counter troubleshooting fault observed at a service provider support center in Paris. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: Packets hit the expected ACL entry and the policy outcome matches the flow.

That observation verifies time-based acl inactive in a different situation, such as when a time-range ACL permits scheduled maintenance only during a defined window, but the rule is ineffective due to clock drift. For the reported acl counter troubleshooting incident at a service provider support center in Paris, the required acceptance evidence is: Packets hit the expected ACL entry and the policy outcome matches the flow. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies router control-plane versus interface acl in a different situation, such as when an engineer relies on a transit ACL to protect all router CPU services even though router-destined flows use different paths. For the reported acl counter troubleshooting incident at a service provider support center in Paris, the required acceptance evidence is: Packets hit the expected ACL entry and the policy outcome matches the flow. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies ipv4 wildcard calculation in a different situation, such as when a subnet 10.24.8.0/21 is matched with a 0.0.0.255 wildcard, excluding the remaining component networks. For the reported acl counter troubleshooting incident at a service provider support center in Paris, the required acceptance evidence is: Packets hit the expected ACL entry and the policy outcome matches the flow. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That approach is relevant to ospf backbone connectivity, such as when an ABR connects two nonbackbone areas without an Area 0 backbone path, and interarea advertisements are missing. That is a different root cause from the ospf dr bdr network type fault observed at a retail network core in Chicago. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: The neighbors reach Full without an inappropriate broadcast DR election.

That approach is relevant to ospf area mismatch, such as when two OSPF routers on one link receive hellos but use different area identifiers, preventing adjacency. That is a different root cause from the ospf dr bdr network type fault observed at a retail network core in Chicago. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: The neighbors reach Full without an inappropriate broadcast DR election.

That approach is relevant to ospfv3 router id, such as when oSPFv3 IPv6 adjacency does not initialize properly because a unique 32-bit router ID has not been configured in the routing process. That is a different root cause from the ospf dr bdr network type fault observed at a retail network core in Chicago. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: The neighbors reach Full without an inappropriate broadcast DR election.

That observation verifies ospf virtual link transit in a different situation, such as when an attempted virtual link traverses a stub transit area, causing backbone repair to fail. For the reported ospf dr bdr network type incident at a retail network core in Chicago, the required acceptance evidence is: The neighbors reach Full without an inappropriate broadcast DR election. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies ospf stub flag mismatch in a different situation, such as when an OSPF adjacency fails because one side is configured stub and the other side treats the area as normal. For the reported ospf dr bdr network type incident at a retail network core in Chicago, the required acceptance evidence is: The neighbors reach Full without an inappropriate broadcast DR election. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies ospf exstart mtu in a different situation, such as when oSPF neighbors get stuck in Exstart/Exchange and database description packets advertise incompatible MTUs. For the reported ospf dr bdr network type incident at a retail network core in Chicago, the required acceptance evidence is: The neighbors reach Full without an inappropriate broadcast DR election. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That approach is relevant to ip sla source interface, such as when an SLA probe reports failure because it leaves from the wrong source address or VRF compared with production application flows. That is a different root cause from the ip sla jitter measurement fault observed at a research institution in Helsinki. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: Results include delay variation and packet loss relevant to the voice service quality.

That approach is relevant to ip sla schedule omitted, such as when an IP SLA ICMP echo operation has been defined but never executes because its schedule was not activated. That is a different root cause from the ip sla jitter measurement fault observed at a research institution in Helsinki. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: Results include delay variation and packet loss relevant to the voice service quality.

That approach is relevant to ip sla track debounce, such as when a tracked SLA path flaps briefly and repeatedly changes the preferred route due to momentary packet loss. That is a different root cause from the ip sla jitter measurement fault observed at a research institution in Helsinki. Applying that approach alone would not establish the required result: Results include delay variation and packet loss relevant to the voice service quality.

That observation verifies ip sla source interface in a different situation, such as when an SLA probe reports failure because it leaves from the wrong source address or VRF compared with production application flows. For the reported ip sla jitter measurement incident at a research institution in Helsinki, the required acceptance evidence is: Results include delay variation and packet loss relevant to the voice service quality. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies ip sla schedule omitted in a different situation, such as when an IP SLA ICMP echo operation has been defined but never executes because its schedule was not activated. For the reported ip sla jitter measurement incident at a research institution in Helsinki, the required acceptance evidence is: Results include delay variation and packet loss relevant to the voice service quality. This other result does not test that condition directly.

That observation verifies ip sla tracked floating default in a different situation, such as when a static primary route remains in the RIB after upstream reachability fails because it tracks interface status only. For the reported ip sla jitter measurement incident at a research institution in Helsinki, the required acceptance evidence is: Results include delay variation and packet loss relevant to the voice service quality. This other result does not test that condition directly.