Question 570
At fictional Riverwick Foundation, a software-security team is conducting a quarterly architecture change assessment while preserving independent evidence of control effectiveness. The case observation is: A pull-request build from an untrusted fork can access deployment tokens and production signing credentials. The team must select a defensible control or assessment. Which repeatable engineering safeguard would most directly reduce recurrence?
Explanation
Writer-proposed answer: B (UNVERIFIED)
Preliminary individual option explanations — NOT expert validated
Correct Answer
CI/CD pipelines are privileged software supply-chain systems requiring explicit trust boundaries. Untrusted contributions cannot access release secrets, while approved builds still publish traceable signed artifacts.
Incorrect Answers
This response concerns infrastructure as code drift. Here, a pull-request build from an untrusted fork can access deployment tokens and production signing credentials. The confirming evidence is: Untrusted contributions cannot access release secrets, while approved builds still publish traceable signed artifacts.
Focusing on release signing identity would leave this problem unresolved: A pull-request build from an untrusted fork can access deployment tokens and production signing credentials.
Build artifact provenance concerns another aspect of the problem. CI/CD pipelines are privileged software supply-chain systems requiring explicit trust boundaries.