McAfee-Secured Website

Exam Code: KEO1

Exam Name: Secure Software Design

Certification Provider: WGU University

100% WGU University KEO1 Guaranteed Success With Testking Training Materials

Get Real KEO1 Exam Questions & Expert Verified Answers as Experienced on the Real Exam!

66 Questions & Answers with Testing Engine

"Secure Software Design Exam", also known as KEO1 exam, is a WGU University certification exam.

Pass your tests with the always up-to-date KEO1 Exam Engine. Your KEO1 training materials keep you at the head of the pack!

Satisfaction Guaranteed

Money Back Guarantee

Testking provides hassle-free money back guarantee with our products. That is because we have 100% trust in the abilities of our professional and experience product team, and our record is a proof of that.

99.6% PASS RATE
Was: $137.49
Now: $124.99

WGU University KEO1 Practice Test 30

Question 290

At fictional Westmarch Digital, a software-security team is conducting a security incident follow-up assessment without placing confidential information in build artifacts. The case observation is: A calendar integration requests write access to all user files although it needs to read free-busy time only. The team must select a defensible control or assessment. Which repeatable engineering safeguard would most directly reduce recurrence?

  1. For the a security incident follow-up assessment at fictional Westmarch Digital, prohibit client-asserted privileges in secure coding standards and continuously probe role-bound endpoints.
  2. For the a security incident follow-up assessment at fictional Westmarch Digital, review scopes when APIs change and revoke unused grants and refresh tokens.
  3. For the a security incident follow-up assessment at fictional Westmarch Digital, test and inventory tenant-context propagation paths and detect inconsistent identity claims.
  4. For the a security incident follow-up assessment at fictional Westmarch Digital, include object-level permission tests in endpoint contracts and data-access abstractions.

Explanation

Writer-proposed answer: B (UNVERIFIED)

Preliminary individual option explanations — NOT expert validated

Correct Answer

B:

Delegated authorization should constrain authority to the minimal purpose granted by the user. Consent and API traces show only calendar free-busy access, and unrelated file requests fail.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This response concerns privilege escalation by role flags. Here, a calendar integration requests write access to all user files although it needs to read free-busy time only. The confirming evidence is: Consent and API traces show only calendar free-busy access, and unrelated file requests fail.

C:

Focusing on tenant identity propagation would leave this problem unresolved: A calendar integration requests write access to all user files although it needs to read free-busy time only.

D:

Server side object authorization concerns another aspect of the problem. Delegated authorization should constrain authority to the minimal purpose granted by the user.

Question 291

At fictional Deepwood Tourism, a software-security team is conducting a DevSecOps security control gate under a documented customer-data protection mandate. The case observation is: A service deploys strong multifactor authentication but permits a helpdesk agent to disable it using only a caller's email address. The team must select a defensible control or assessment. Which security design action most directly addresses the documented problem?

  1. For the a DevSecOps security control gate at fictional Deepwood Tourism, use single-use short-lived tokens, uniform outward responses, rate controls and secure recovery-channel verification.
  2. For the a DevSecOps security control gate at fictional Deepwood Tourism, move privilege decisions to a server-authoritative policy using verified identity and current entitlements.
  3. For the a DevSecOps security control gate at fictional Deepwood Tourism, apply risk-adaptive recovery verification, dual control for sensitive resets, and alerting to the account holder.
  4. For the a DevSecOps security control gate at fictional Deepwood Tourism, enforce authorization using the authenticated principal's permitted project membership for every object access.

Explanation

Writer-proposed answer: C (UNVERIFIED)

Preliminary individual option explanations — NOT expert validated

Correct Answer

C:

Weak fallback authentication can undermine stronger primary authentication controls. Simulated social-engineering requests fail, approved recoveries produce attributable records and notifications.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This response concerns password reset account takeover. Here, a service deploys strong multifactor authentication but permits a helpdesk agent to disable it using only a caller's email address. The confirming evidence is: Simulated social-engineering requests fail, approved recoveries produce attributable records and notifications.

B:

Privilege escalation by role flags concerns a different operational mechanism. Weak fallback authentication can undermine stronger primary authentication controls.

D:

Server side object authorization concerns another aspect of the problem. Weak fallback authentication can undermine stronger primary authentication controls.

Question 292

At fictional Deepwood Tourism, a software-security team is conducting a DevSecOps security control gate under a documented customer-data protection mandate. The case observation is: A service deploys strong multifactor authentication but permits a helpdesk agent to disable it using only a caller's email address. The team must select a defensible control or assessment. Which independent verification evidence would most directly show that the proposed action succeeded?

  1. For the a DevSecOps security control gate at fictional Deepwood Tourism, header-spoofing tests cannot change the tenant scope, and each downstream access logs verified identity provenance.
  2. For the a DevSecOps security control gate at fictional Deepwood Tourism, access tests confirm necessary reporting queries work while schema changes and unrelated table reads fail.
  3. For the a DevSecOps security control gate at fictional Deepwood Tourism, cross-project test requests consistently return denial while authorized users can access only approved reports.
  4. For the a DevSecOps security control gate at fictional Deepwood Tourism, simulated social-engineering requests fail, approved recoveries produce attributable records and notifications.

Explanation

Writer-proposed answer: D (UNVERIFIED)

Preliminary individual option explanations — NOT expert validated

Correct Answer

D:

Weak fallback authentication can undermine stronger primary authentication controls. Simulated social-engineering requests fail, approved recoveries produce attributable records and notifications.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This response concerns tenant identity propagation. Here, a service deploys strong multifactor authentication but permits a helpdesk agent to disable it using only a caller's email address. The confirming evidence is: Simulated social-engineering requests fail, approved recoveries produce attributable records and notifications.

B:

Service account least privilege concerns a different operational mechanism. Weak fallback authentication can undermine stronger primary authentication controls.

C:

Focusing on server side object authorization would leave this problem unresolved: A service deploys strong multifactor authentication but permits a helpdesk agent to disable it using only a caller's email address.

Question 293

At fictional Deepwood Tourism, a software-security team is conducting a DevSecOps security control gate under a documented customer-data protection mandate. The case observation is: A service deploys strong multifactor authentication but permits a helpdesk agent to disable it using only a caller's email address. The team must select a defensible control or assessment. Which secure-design principle best explains the appropriate approach?

  1. For the a DevSecOps security control gate at fictional Deepwood Tourism, weak fallback authentication can undermine stronger primary authentication controls.
  2. For the a DevSecOps security control gate at fictional Deepwood Tourism, session lifetime and revocation policies are necessary parts of the identity security model.
  3. For the a DevSecOps security control gate at fictional Deepwood Tourism, delegated authorization should constrain authority to the minimal purpose granted by the user.
  4. For the a DevSecOps security control gate at fictional Deepwood Tourism, authentication establishes identity, but object authorization constrains which resources an identity may access.

Explanation

Writer-proposed answer: A (UNVERIFIED)

Preliminary individual option explanations — NOT expert validated

Correct Answer

A:

Weak fallback authentication can undermine stronger primary authentication controls. Simulated social-engineering requests fail, approved recoveries produce attributable records and notifications.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Session revocation after termination concerns a different operational mechanism. Weak fallback authentication can undermine stronger primary authentication controls.

C:

Focusing on oauth scope overreach would leave this problem unresolved: A service deploys strong multifactor authentication but permits a helpdesk agent to disable it using only a caller's email address.

D:

Server side object authorization concerns another aspect of the problem. Weak fallback authentication can undermine stronger primary authentication controls.

Question 294

At fictional Deepwood Tourism, a software-security team is conducting a DevSecOps security control gate under a documented customer-data protection mandate. The case observation is: A service deploys strong multifactor authentication but permits a helpdesk agent to disable it using only a caller's email address. The team must select a defensible control or assessment. Which consequence is most directly associated with leaving this documented problem unresolved?

  1. For the a DevSecOps security control gate at fictional Deepwood Tourism, worker compromise may lead to full database modification or credential reuse across environments.
  2. For the a DevSecOps security control gate at fictional Deepwood Tourism, attackers can bypass multifactor defenses through a poorly controlled support process.
  3. For the a DevSecOps security control gate at fictional Deepwood Tourism, a former authorized user could retain access after employment or contract termination.
  4. For the a DevSecOps security control gate at fictional Deepwood Tourism, an ordinary account may retrieve another customer's confidential project records.

Explanation

Writer-proposed answer: B (UNVERIFIED)

Preliminary individual option explanations — NOT expert validated

Correct Answer

B:

Weak fallback authentication can undermine stronger primary authentication controls. Simulated social-engineering requests fail, approved recoveries produce attributable records and notifications.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This response concerns service account least privilege. Here, a service deploys strong multifactor authentication but permits a helpdesk agent to disable it using only a caller's email address. The confirming evidence is: Simulated social-engineering requests fail, approved recoveries produce attributable records and notifications.

C:

Focusing on session revocation after termination would leave this problem unresolved: A service deploys strong multifactor authentication but permits a helpdesk agent to disable it using only a caller's email address.

D:

Server side object authorization concerns another aspect of the problem. Weak fallback authentication can undermine stronger primary authentication controls.

Question 295

At fictional Deepwood Tourism, a software-security team is conducting a DevSecOps security control gate under a documented customer-data protection mandate. The case observation is: A service deploys strong multifactor authentication but permits a helpdesk agent to disable it using only a caller's email address. The team must select a defensible control or assessment. Which repeatable engineering safeguard would most directly reduce recurrence?

  1. For the a DevSecOps security control gate at fictional Deepwood Tourism, prohibit client-asserted privileges in secure coding standards and continuously probe role-bound endpoints.
  2. For the a DevSecOps security control gate at fictional Deepwood Tourism, include object-level permission tests in endpoint contracts and data-access abstractions.
  3. For the a DevSecOps security control gate at fictional Deepwood Tourism, audit recovery exceptions, train support agents and test high-risk workflow abuse.
  4. For the a DevSecOps security control gate at fictional Deepwood Tourism, review scopes when APIs change and revoke unused grants and refresh tokens.

Explanation

Writer-proposed answer: C (UNVERIFIED)

Preliminary individual option explanations — NOT expert validated

Correct Answer

C:

Weak fallback authentication can undermine stronger primary authentication controls. Simulated social-engineering requests fail, approved recoveries produce attributable records and notifications.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This response concerns privilege escalation by role flags. Here, a service deploys strong multifactor authentication but permits a helpdesk agent to disable it using only a caller's email address. The confirming evidence is: Simulated social-engineering requests fail, approved recoveries produce attributable records and notifications.

B:

Server side object authorization concerns a different operational mechanism. Weak fallback authentication can undermine stronger primary authentication controls.

D:

Oauth scope overreach concerns another aspect of the problem. Weak fallback authentication can undermine stronger primary authentication controls.

Question 296

At fictional Kestrel Works, a software-security team is conducting a planned system modernization within the approved release and rollback constraints. The case observation is: A service deploys strong multifactor authentication but permits a helpdesk agent to disable it using only a caller's email address. The team must select a defensible control or assessment. Which security design action most directly addresses the documented problem?

  1. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Kestrel Works, request the narrowest authorized OAuth scopes and validate tokens, audiences, and resource-specific permissions.
  2. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Kestrel Works, use single-use short-lived tokens, uniform outward responses, rate controls and secure recovery-channel verification.
  3. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Kestrel Works, bind tenant context to verified identity claims, protect propagation integrity, and enforce tenancy at the data layer.
  4. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Kestrel Works, apply risk-adaptive recovery verification, dual control for sensitive resets, and alerting to the account holder.

Explanation

Writer-proposed answer: D (UNVERIFIED)

Preliminary individual option explanations — NOT expert validated

Correct Answer

D:

Weak fallback authentication can undermine stronger primary authentication controls. Simulated social-engineering requests fail, approved recoveries produce attributable records and notifications.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This response concerns oauth scope overreach. Here, a service deploys strong multifactor authentication but permits a helpdesk agent to disable it using only a caller's email address. The confirming evidence is: Simulated social-engineering requests fail, approved recoveries produce attributable records and notifications.

B:

Password reset account takeover concerns a different operational mechanism. Weak fallback authentication can undermine stronger primary authentication controls.

C:

Focusing on tenant identity propagation would leave this problem unresolved: A service deploys strong multifactor authentication but permits a helpdesk agent to disable it using only a caller's email address.

Question 297

At fictional Kestrel Works, a software-security team is conducting a planned system modernization within the approved release and rollback constraints. The case observation is: A service deploys strong multifactor authentication but permits a helpdesk agent to disable it using only a caller's email address. The team must select a defensible control or assessment. Which independent verification evidence would most directly show that the proposed action succeeded?

  1. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Kestrel Works, simulated social-engineering requests fail, approved recoveries produce attributable records and notifications.
  2. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Kestrel Works, cross-project test requests consistently return denial while authorized users can access only approved reports.
  3. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Kestrel Works, direct forged API requests fail without the required server-side role, and role revocation takes effect promptly.
  4. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Kestrel Works, post-disable token tests show denied access within the documented revocation objective on all relevant services.

Explanation

Writer-proposed answer: A (UNVERIFIED)

Preliminary individual option explanations — NOT expert validated

Correct Answer

A:

Weak fallback authentication can undermine stronger primary authentication controls. Simulated social-engineering requests fail, approved recoveries produce attributable records and notifications.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Server side object authorization concerns a different operational mechanism. Weak fallback authentication can undermine stronger primary authentication controls.

C:

Focusing on privilege escalation by role flags would leave this problem unresolved: A service deploys strong multifactor authentication but permits a helpdesk agent to disable it using only a caller's email address.

D:

Session revocation after termination concerns another aspect of the problem. Weak fallback authentication can undermine stronger primary authentication controls.

Question 298

At fictional Kestrel Works, a software-security team is conducting a planned system modernization within the approved release and rollback constraints. The case observation is: A service deploys strong multifactor authentication but permits a helpdesk agent to disable it using only a caller's email address. The team must select a defensible control or assessment. Which secure-design principle best explains the appropriate approach?

  1. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Kestrel Works, recovery functions are alternate authentication entry points requiring protections comparable to primary sign-in.
  2. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Kestrel Works, weak fallback authentication can undermine stronger primary authentication controls.
  3. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Kestrel Works, cross-service identity propagation must preserve trustworthy authorization context through every hop.
  4. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Kestrel Works, authentication establishes identity, but object authorization constrains which resources an identity may access.

Explanation

Writer-proposed answer: B (UNVERIFIED)

Preliminary individual option explanations — NOT expert validated

Correct Answer

B:

Weak fallback authentication can undermine stronger primary authentication controls. Simulated social-engineering requests fail, approved recoveries produce attributable records and notifications.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This response concerns password reset account takeover. Here, a service deploys strong multifactor authentication but permits a helpdesk agent to disable it using only a caller's email address. The confirming evidence is: Simulated social-engineering requests fail, approved recoveries produce attributable records and notifications.

C:

Focusing on tenant identity propagation would leave this problem unresolved: A service deploys strong multifactor authentication but permits a helpdesk agent to disable it using only a caller's email address.

D:

Server side object authorization concerns another aspect of the problem. Weak fallback authentication can undermine stronger primary authentication controls.

Question 299

At fictional Kestrel Works, a software-security team is conducting a planned system modernization within the approved release and rollback constraints. The case observation is: A service deploys strong multifactor authentication but permits a helpdesk agent to disable it using only a caller's email address. The team must select a defensible control or assessment. Which consequence is most directly associated with leaving this documented problem unresolved?

  1. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Kestrel Works, a forged tenant header may allow one customer to access another customer's resources.
  2. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Kestrel Works, excess delegated privileges enlarge damage if the integration token is stolen.
  3. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Kestrel Works, attackers can bypass multifactor defenses through a poorly controlled support process.
  4. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Kestrel Works, worker compromise may lead to full database modification or credential reuse across environments.

Explanation

Writer-proposed answer: C (UNVERIFIED)

Preliminary individual option explanations — NOT expert validated

Correct Answer

C:

Weak fallback authentication can undermine stronger primary authentication controls. Simulated social-engineering requests fail, approved recoveries produce attributable records and notifications.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This response concerns tenant identity propagation. Here, a service deploys strong multifactor authentication but permits a helpdesk agent to disable it using only a caller's email address. The confirming evidence is: Simulated social-engineering requests fail, approved recoveries produce attributable records and notifications.

B:

Oauth scope overreach concerns a different operational mechanism. Weak fallback authentication can undermine stronger primary authentication controls.

D:

Service account least privilege concerns another aspect of the problem. Weak fallback authentication can undermine stronger primary authentication controls.

Question 300

At fictional Kestrel Works, a software-security team is conducting a planned system modernization within the approved release and rollback constraints. The case observation is: A service deploys strong multifactor authentication but permits a helpdesk agent to disable it using only a caller's email address. The team must select a defensible control or assessment. Which repeatable engineering safeguard would most directly reduce recurrence?

  1. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Kestrel Works, automate deprovisioning tests and monitor orphaned sessions after access removals.
  2. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Kestrel Works, include object-level permission tests in endpoint contracts and data-access abstractions.
  3. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Kestrel Works, prohibit client-asserted privileges in secure coding standards and continuously probe role-bound endpoints.
  4. For the a planned system modernization at fictional Kestrel Works, audit recovery exceptions, train support agents and test high-risk workflow abuse.

Explanation

Writer-proposed answer: D (UNVERIFIED)

Preliminary individual option explanations — NOT expert validated

Correct Answer

D:

Weak fallback authentication can undermine stronger primary authentication controls. Simulated social-engineering requests fail, approved recoveries produce attributable records and notifications.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This response concerns session revocation after termination. Here, a service deploys strong multifactor authentication but permits a helpdesk agent to disable it using only a caller's email address. The confirming evidence is: Simulated social-engineering requests fail, approved recoveries produce attributable records and notifications.

B:

Server side object authorization concerns a different operational mechanism. Weak fallback authentication can undermine stronger primary authentication controls.

C:

Focusing on privilege escalation by role flags would leave this problem unresolved: A service deploys strong multifactor authentication but permits a helpdesk agent to disable it using only a caller's email address.

Secure Software Design (KEO1) Practice Tests