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Exam Code: KEO1

Exam Name: Secure Software Design

Certification Provider: WGU University

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WGU University KEO1 Practice Test 26

Question 250

At fictional Larkstone Media, a software-security team is conducting a new feature threat-model workshop with an auditable vulnerability remediation process. The case observation is: A project-management API allows any authenticated user to fetch reports by changing a numeric project ID. The team must select a defensible control or assessment. Which repeatable engineering safeguard would most directly reduce recurrence?

  1. For the a new feature threat-model workshop at fictional Larkstone Media, audit recovery exceptions, train support agents and test high-risk workflow abuse.
  2. For the a new feature threat-model workshop at fictional Larkstone Media, include object-level permission tests in endpoint contracts and data-access abstractions.
  3. For the a new feature threat-model workshop at fictional Larkstone Media, automate deprovisioning tests and monitor orphaned sessions after access removals.
  4. For the a new feature threat-model workshop at fictional Larkstone Media, prohibit client-asserted privileges in secure coding standards and continuously probe role-bound endpoints.

Explanation

Writer-proposed answer: B (UNVERIFIED)

Preliminary individual option explanations — NOT expert validated

Correct Answer

B:

Authentication establishes identity, but object authorization constrains which resources an identity may access. Cross-project test requests consistently return denial while authorized users can access only approved reports.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This response concerns mfa recovery gap. Here, a project-management API allows any authenticated user to fetch reports by changing a numeric project ID. The confirming evidence is: Cross-project test requests consistently return denial while authorized users can access only approved reports.

C:

Focusing on session revocation after termination would leave this problem unresolved: A project-management API allows any authenticated user to fetch reports by changing a numeric project ID.

D:

Privilege escalation by role flags concerns another aspect of the problem. Authentication establishes identity, but object authorization constrains which resources an identity may access.

Question 251

At fictional Riverwick Foundation, a software-security team is conducting a supplier and application control assessment without placing confidential information in build artifacts. The case observation is: A web admin console hides advanced actions unless a client-provided role flag is set, but the API trusts that flag. The team must select a defensible control or assessment. Which security design action most directly addresses the documented problem?

  1. For the a supplier and application control assessment at fictional Riverwick Foundation, bind tenant context to verified identity claims, protect propagation integrity, and enforce tenancy at the data layer.
  2. For the a supplier and application control assessment at fictional Riverwick Foundation, request the narrowest authorized OAuth scopes and validate tokens, audiences, and resource-specific permissions.
  3. For the a supplier and application control assessment at fictional Riverwick Foundation, move privilege decisions to a server-authoritative policy using verified identity and current entitlements.
  4. For the a supplier and application control assessment at fictional Riverwick Foundation, enforce authorization using the authenticated principal's permitted project membership for every object access.

Explanation

Writer-proposed answer: C (UNVERIFIED)

Preliminary individual option explanations — NOT expert validated

Correct Answer

C:

Authorization cannot depend on user-controlled role declarations or presentation-layer restrictions. Direct forged API requests fail without the required server-side role, and role revocation takes effect promptly.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This response concerns tenant identity propagation. Here, a web admin console hides advanced actions unless a client-provided role flag is set, but the API trusts that flag. The confirming evidence is: Direct forged API requests fail without the required server-side role, and role revocation takes effect promptly.

B:

Oauth scope overreach concerns a different operational mechanism. Authorization cannot depend on user-controlled role declarations or presentation-layer restrictions.

D:

Server side object authorization concerns another aspect of the problem. Authorization cannot depend on user-controlled role declarations or presentation-layer restrictions.

Question 252

At fictional Riverwick Foundation, a software-security team is conducting a supplier and application control assessment without placing confidential information in build artifacts. The case observation is: A web admin console hides advanced actions unless a client-provided role flag is set, but the API trusts that flag. The team must select a defensible control or assessment. Which independent verification evidence would most directly show that the proposed action succeeded?

  1. For the a supplier and application control assessment at fictional Riverwick Foundation, enumeration attempts disclose no account-state difference and used or expired tokens cannot reset a password.
  2. For the a supplier and application control assessment at fictional Riverwick Foundation, post-disable token tests show denied access within the documented revocation objective on all relevant services.
  3. For the a supplier and application control assessment at fictional Riverwick Foundation, access tests confirm necessary reporting queries work while schema changes and unrelated table reads fail.
  4. For the a supplier and application control assessment at fictional Riverwick Foundation, direct forged API requests fail without the required server-side role, and role revocation takes effect promptly.

Explanation

Writer-proposed answer: D (UNVERIFIED)

Preliminary individual option explanations — NOT expert validated

Correct Answer

D:

Authorization cannot depend on user-controlled role declarations or presentation-layer restrictions. Direct forged API requests fail without the required server-side role, and role revocation takes effect promptly.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This response concerns password reset account takeover. Here, a web admin console hides advanced actions unless a client-provided role flag is set, but the API trusts that flag. The confirming evidence is: Direct forged API requests fail without the required server-side role, and role revocation takes effect promptly.

B:

Session revocation after termination concerns a different operational mechanism. Authorization cannot depend on user-controlled role declarations or presentation-layer restrictions.

C:

Focusing on service account least privilege would leave this problem unresolved: A web admin console hides advanced actions unless a client-provided role flag is set, but the API trusts that flag.

Question 253

At fictional Riverwick Foundation, a software-security team is conducting a supplier and application control assessment without placing confidential information in build artifacts. The case observation is: A web admin console hides advanced actions unless a client-provided role flag is set, but the API trusts that flag. The team must select a defensible control or assessment. Which secure-design principle best explains the appropriate approach?

  1. For the a supplier and application control assessment at fictional Riverwick Foundation, authorization cannot depend on user-controlled role declarations or presentation-layer restrictions.
  2. For the a supplier and application control assessment at fictional Riverwick Foundation, workload identities should have minimal authority independent of human administrator privileges.
  3. For the a supplier and application control assessment at fictional Riverwick Foundation, cross-service identity propagation must preserve trustworthy authorization context through every hop.
  4. For the a supplier and application control assessment at fictional Riverwick Foundation, authentication establishes identity, but object authorization constrains which resources an identity may access.

Explanation

Writer-proposed answer: A (UNVERIFIED)

Preliminary individual option explanations — NOT expert validated

Correct Answer

A:

Authorization cannot depend on user-controlled role declarations or presentation-layer restrictions. Direct forged API requests fail without the required server-side role, and role revocation takes effect promptly.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Service account least privilege concerns a different operational mechanism. Authorization cannot depend on user-controlled role declarations or presentation-layer restrictions.

C:

Focusing on tenant identity propagation would leave this problem unresolved: A web admin console hides advanced actions unless a client-provided role flag is set, but the API trusts that flag.

D:

Server side object authorization concerns another aspect of the problem. Authorization cannot depend on user-controlled role declarations or presentation-layer restrictions.

Question 254

At fictional Riverwick Foundation, a software-security team is conducting a supplier and application control assessment without placing confidential information in build artifacts. The case observation is: A web admin console hides advanced actions unless a client-provided role flag is set, but the API trusts that flag. The team must select a defensible control or assessment. Which consequence is most directly associated with leaving this documented problem unresolved?

  1. For the a supplier and application control assessment at fictional Riverwick Foundation, a former authorized user could retain access after employment or contract termination.
  2. For the a supplier and application control assessment at fictional Riverwick Foundation, a user could grant themselves administrative capability by modifying request content.
  3. For the a supplier and application control assessment at fictional Riverwick Foundation, attackers can bypass multifactor defenses through a poorly controlled support process.
  4. For the a supplier and application control assessment at fictional Riverwick Foundation, attackers can enumerate users or replay recovery links to seize accounts.

Explanation

Writer-proposed answer: B (UNVERIFIED)

Preliminary individual option explanations — NOT expert validated

Correct Answer

B:

Authorization cannot depend on user-controlled role declarations or presentation-layer restrictions. Direct forged API requests fail without the required server-side role, and role revocation takes effect promptly.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This response concerns session revocation after termination. Here, a web admin console hides advanced actions unless a client-provided role flag is set, but the API trusts that flag. The confirming evidence is: Direct forged API requests fail without the required server-side role, and role revocation takes effect promptly.

C:

Focusing on mfa recovery gap would leave this problem unresolved: A web admin console hides advanced actions unless a client-provided role flag is set, but the API trusts that flag.

D:

Password reset account takeover concerns another aspect of the problem. Authorization cannot depend on user-controlled role declarations or presentation-layer restrictions.

Question 255

At fictional Riverwick Foundation, a software-security team is conducting a supplier and application control assessment without placing confidential information in build artifacts. The case observation is: A web admin console hides advanced actions unless a client-provided role flag is set, but the API trusts that flag. The team must select a defensible control or assessment. Which repeatable engineering safeguard would most directly reduce recurrence?

  1. For the a supplier and application control assessment at fictional Riverwick Foundation, audit recovery exceptions, train support agents and test high-risk workflow abuse.
  2. For the a supplier and application control assessment at fictional Riverwick Foundation, threat-model recovery journeys and rerun replay, enumeration, and token-expiry tests each release.
  3. For the a supplier and application control assessment at fictional Riverwick Foundation, prohibit client-asserted privileges in secure coding standards and continuously probe role-bound endpoints.
  4. For the a supplier and application control assessment at fictional Riverwick Foundation, include object-level permission tests in endpoint contracts and data-access abstractions.

Explanation

Writer-proposed answer: C (UNVERIFIED)

Preliminary individual option explanations — NOT expert validated

Correct Answer

C:

Authorization cannot depend on user-controlled role declarations or presentation-layer restrictions. Direct forged API requests fail without the required server-side role, and role revocation takes effect promptly.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This response concerns mfa recovery gap. Here, a web admin console hides advanced actions unless a client-provided role flag is set, but the API trusts that flag. The confirming evidence is: Direct forged API requests fail without the required server-side role, and role revocation takes effect promptly.

B:

Password reset account takeover concerns a different operational mechanism. Authorization cannot depend on user-controlled role declarations or presentation-layer restrictions.

D:

Server side object authorization concerns another aspect of the problem. Authorization cannot depend on user-controlled role declarations or presentation-layer restrictions.

Question 256

At fictional Zephyrcloud Studio, a software-security team is conducting a secure acquisition and deployment review without interrupting essential service availability. The case observation is: A web admin console hides advanced actions unless a client-provided role flag is set, but the API trusts that flag. The team must select a defensible control or assessment. Which security design action most directly addresses the documented problem?

  1. For the a secure acquisition and deployment review at fictional Zephyrcloud Studio, enforce authorization using the authenticated principal's permitted project membership for every object access.
  2. For the a secure acquisition and deployment review at fictional Zephyrcloud Studio, create a workload-specific identity with read-only permissions, secret rotation, and scoped network access.
  3. For the a secure acquisition and deployment review at fictional Zephyrcloud Studio, bind tenant context to verified identity claims, protect propagation integrity, and enforce tenancy at the data layer.
  4. For the a secure acquisition and deployment review at fictional Zephyrcloud Studio, move privilege decisions to a server-authoritative policy using verified identity and current entitlements.

Explanation

Writer-proposed answer: D (UNVERIFIED)

Preliminary individual option explanations — NOT expert validated

Correct Answer

D:

Authorization cannot depend on user-controlled role declarations or presentation-layer restrictions. Direct forged API requests fail without the required server-side role, and role revocation takes effect promptly.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This response concerns server side object authorization. Here, a web admin console hides advanced actions unless a client-provided role flag is set, but the API trusts that flag. The confirming evidence is: Direct forged API requests fail without the required server-side role, and role revocation takes effect promptly.

B:

Service account least privilege concerns a different operational mechanism. Authorization cannot depend on user-controlled role declarations or presentation-layer restrictions.

C:

Focusing on tenant identity propagation would leave this problem unresolved: A web admin console hides advanced actions unless a client-provided role flag is set, but the API trusts that flag.

Question 257

At fictional Zephyrcloud Studio, a software-security team is conducting a secure acquisition and deployment review without interrupting essential service availability. The case observation is: A web admin console hides advanced actions unless a client-provided role flag is set, but the API trusts that flag. The team must select a defensible control or assessment. Which independent verification evidence would most directly show that the proposed action succeeded?

  1. For the a secure acquisition and deployment review at fictional Zephyrcloud Studio, direct forged API requests fail without the required server-side role, and role revocation takes effect promptly.
  2. For the a secure acquisition and deployment review at fictional Zephyrcloud Studio, consent and API traces show only calendar free-busy access, and unrelated file requests fail.
  3. For the a secure acquisition and deployment review at fictional Zephyrcloud Studio, post-disable token tests show denied access within the documented revocation objective on all relevant services.
  4. For the a secure acquisition and deployment review at fictional Zephyrcloud Studio, cross-project test requests consistently return denial while authorized users can access only approved reports.

Explanation

Writer-proposed answer: A (UNVERIFIED)

Preliminary individual option explanations — NOT expert validated

Correct Answer

A:

Authorization cannot depend on user-controlled role declarations or presentation-layer restrictions. Direct forged API requests fail without the required server-side role, and role revocation takes effect promptly.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Oauth scope overreach concerns a different operational mechanism. Authorization cannot depend on user-controlled role declarations or presentation-layer restrictions.

C:

Focusing on session revocation after termination would leave this problem unresolved: A web admin console hides advanced actions unless a client-provided role flag is set, but the API trusts that flag.

D:

Server side object authorization concerns another aspect of the problem. Authorization cannot depend on user-controlled role declarations or presentation-layer restrictions.

Question 258

At fictional Zephyrcloud Studio, a software-security team is conducting a secure acquisition and deployment review without interrupting essential service availability. The case observation is: A web admin console hides advanced actions unless a client-provided role flag is set, but the API trusts that flag. The team must select a defensible control or assessment. Which secure-design principle best explains the appropriate approach?

  1. For the a secure acquisition and deployment review at fictional Zephyrcloud Studio, cross-service identity propagation must preserve trustworthy authorization context through every hop.
  2. For the a secure acquisition and deployment review at fictional Zephyrcloud Studio, authorization cannot depend on user-controlled role declarations or presentation-layer restrictions.
  3. For the a secure acquisition and deployment review at fictional Zephyrcloud Studio, session lifetime and revocation policies are necessary parts of the identity security model.
  4. For the a secure acquisition and deployment review at fictional Zephyrcloud Studio, delegated authorization should constrain authority to the minimal purpose granted by the user.

Explanation

Writer-proposed answer: B (UNVERIFIED)

Preliminary individual option explanations — NOT expert validated

Correct Answer

B:

Authorization cannot depend on user-controlled role declarations or presentation-layer restrictions. Direct forged API requests fail without the required server-side role, and role revocation takes effect promptly.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This response concerns tenant identity propagation. Here, a web admin console hides advanced actions unless a client-provided role flag is set, but the API trusts that flag. The confirming evidence is: Direct forged API requests fail without the required server-side role, and role revocation takes effect promptly.

C:

Focusing on session revocation after termination would leave this problem unresolved: A web admin console hides advanced actions unless a client-provided role flag is set, but the API trusts that flag.

D:

Oauth scope overreach concerns another aspect of the problem. Authorization cannot depend on user-controlled role declarations or presentation-layer restrictions.

Question 259

At fictional Zephyrcloud Studio, a software-security team is conducting a secure acquisition and deployment review without interrupting essential service availability. The case observation is: A web admin console hides advanced actions unless a client-provided role flag is set, but the API trusts that flag. The team must select a defensible control or assessment. Which consequence is most directly associated with leaving this documented problem unresolved?

  1. For the a secure acquisition and deployment review at fictional Zephyrcloud Studio, attackers can enumerate users or replay recovery links to seize accounts.
  2. For the a secure acquisition and deployment review at fictional Zephyrcloud Studio, a forged tenant header may allow one customer to access another customer's resources.
  3. For the a secure acquisition and deployment review at fictional Zephyrcloud Studio, a user could grant themselves administrative capability by modifying request content.
  4. For the a secure acquisition and deployment review at fictional Zephyrcloud Studio, worker compromise may lead to full database modification or credential reuse across environments.

Explanation

Writer-proposed answer: C (UNVERIFIED)

Preliminary individual option explanations — NOT expert validated

Correct Answer

C:

Authorization cannot depend on user-controlled role declarations or presentation-layer restrictions. Direct forged API requests fail without the required server-side role, and role revocation takes effect promptly.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This response concerns password reset account takeover. Here, a web admin console hides advanced actions unless a client-provided role flag is set, but the API trusts that flag. The confirming evidence is: Direct forged API requests fail without the required server-side role, and role revocation takes effect promptly.

B:

Tenant identity propagation concerns a different operational mechanism. Authorization cannot depend on user-controlled role declarations or presentation-layer restrictions.

D:

Service account least privilege concerns another aspect of the problem. Authorization cannot depend on user-controlled role declarations or presentation-layer restrictions.

Question 260

At fictional Zephyrcloud Studio, a software-security team is conducting a secure acquisition and deployment review without interrupting essential service availability. The case observation is: A web admin console hides advanced actions unless a client-provided role flag is set, but the API trusts that flag. The team must select a defensible control or assessment. Which repeatable engineering safeguard would most directly reduce recurrence?

  1. For the a secure acquisition and deployment review at fictional Zephyrcloud Studio, review service credentials and permission grants alongside each deployment change.
  2. For the a secure acquisition and deployment review at fictional Zephyrcloud Studio, audit recovery exceptions, train support agents and test high-risk workflow abuse.
  3. For the a secure acquisition and deployment review at fictional Zephyrcloud Studio, include object-level permission tests in endpoint contracts and data-access abstractions.
  4. For the a secure acquisition and deployment review at fictional Zephyrcloud Studio, prohibit client-asserted privileges in secure coding standards and continuously probe role-bound endpoints.

Explanation

Writer-proposed answer: D (UNVERIFIED)

Preliminary individual option explanations — NOT expert validated

Correct Answer

D:

Authorization cannot depend on user-controlled role declarations or presentation-layer restrictions. Direct forged API requests fail without the required server-side role, and role revocation takes effect promptly.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This response concerns service account least privilege. Here, a web admin console hides advanced actions unless a client-provided role flag is set, but the API trusts that flag. The confirming evidence is: Direct forged API requests fail without the required server-side role, and role revocation takes effect promptly.

B:

Mfa recovery gap concerns a different operational mechanism. Authorization cannot depend on user-controlled role declarations or presentation-layer restrictions.

C:

Focusing on server side object authorization would leave this problem unresolved: A web admin console hides advanced actions unless a client-provided role flag is set, but the API trusts that flag.

Secure Software Design (KEO1) Practice Tests