Question 750
An attacker modifies privileged AD DS group membership but security logs are disabled on domain controllers. Which security design most directly closes the described gap?
Explanation
Correct Answer
Directory governance needs tamper-resistant evidence of privilege changes. Therefore, the targeted architectural decision is enable protected directory audit policies and forward high-value change events. Confirm that an unauthorized privileged group change creates an attributable security event.
Incorrect Answers
The alternative focuses on A privileged account uses weak legacy NTLM authentication for critical AD DS management. Legacy authentication may expose credentials to relay and replay attacks. It is not the direct response needed to demonstrate an unauthorized privileged group change creates an attributable security event.
This measure is suited to a different threat model: An AD DS environment retains legacy unconstrained delegation on systems reachable from user workstations. Legacy delegation can expose reusable elevated authentication material. It does not directly establish that an unauthorized privileged group change creates an attributable security event.
It addresses a neighboring control requirement, not this one: An enterprise's domain controllers permit broad interactive logon by ordinary service engineers. Domain controller hardening reduces direct paths to directory compromise. The present scenario specifically needs an unauthorized privileged group change creates an attributable security event.