Question 450
A deployment needs to identify which source revision created a Foundry production resource after an incident. What should automation record?
Explanation
Correct Answer
Source and deployment provenance support reconstructing approved infrastructure state from a historical release.
Incorrect Answers
Keep reusable Bicep modules with approved environment-specific region and model parameters. This is useful for the distinct issue: Different regions require different model deployment configurations but the team wants one shared infrastructure source. The relevant technical rationale or evidence for that issue is: Parameter files separate permitted environment variations from the centrally reviewed provisioning logic. Here the reported issue is: A deployment needs to identify which source revision created a Foundry production resource after an incident. The relevant response is: Capture the IaC commit SHA, deployment ID, parameter set, and resulting resource IDs. The first result cannot verify this different correction: Source and deployment provenance support reconstructing approved infrastructure state from a historical release.
Select the approved subscription and resource-group deployment scope explicitly. It addresses another case: An Azure CLI deployment targets the wrong subscription because a developer last logged in to their sandbox. For that case, the distinguishing justification or acceptance check is: CLI context determines where resources are provisioned; a validated template can still deploy into the wrong subscription. The present case instead states: A deployment needs to identify which source revision created a Foundry production resource after an incident. It calls for Capture the IaC commit SHA, deployment ID, parameter set, and resulting resource IDs. Showing success for the other case would not establish: Source and deployment provenance support reconstructing approved infrastructure state from a historical release.
The alternative, Use secure parameters and approved secret management or managed identity instead of checked-in keys, belongs to a different technical condition: A security architect sees plaintext API keys in infrastructure parameter files stored in Git. There the source-specific mechanism or proof is: Infrastructure source history should not distribute credentials; sensitive values must be injected securely at deployment. The condition asked about here is: A deployment needs to identify which source revision created a Foundry production resource after an incident. A suitable correction is Capture the IaC commit SHA, deployment ID, parameter set, and resulting resource IDs; the targeted justification or result is: Source and deployment provenance support reconstructing approved infrastructure state from a historical release.