Question 100
A deployment job succeeds locally but GitHub Actions cannot authenticate because the Azure identity lacks a matching audience claim. Which configuration should be validated?
Explanation
Correct Answer
OIDC federation requires all trust claims to match; resource-group permission changes cannot fix token-claim rejection.
Incorrect Answers
Grant only the required workspace or resource-group actions to its deployment identity. That operation would be relevant if: A GitHub pipeline may update one Azure ML workspace but is currently assigned subscription Owner. Its corresponding reason or verification is: Scoped RBAC limits the blast radius while retaining permissions needed for the authorized ML deployment steps. However the problem in this question is: A deployment job succeeds locally but GitHub Actions cannot authenticate because the Azure identity lacks a matching audience claim. The requirement instead calls for Verify issuer, audience, and subject on the federated credential against the GitHub-issued token; the question-specific check is: OIDC federation requires all trust claims to match; resource-group permission changes cannot fix token-claim rejection.
Require an approved protected GitHub environment and reviewers before production deployment jobs. A separate source case supports that approach when: A pipeline has correct Azure credentials but users can run it manually on unreviewed experimental branches to deploy production models. The supporting rationale or observable result is: GitHub environment protection can gate sensitive workflow jobs independently from possession of a valid Azure deployment identity. This question describes a different issue: A deployment job succeeds locally but GitHub Actions cannot authenticate because the Azure identity lacks a matching audience claim. Address it through Verify issuer, audience, and subject on the federated credential against the GitHub-issued token, with the required justification or evidence: OIDC federation requires all trust claims to match; resource-group permission changes cannot fix token-claim rejection.
Remove secrets from source and authenticate using identity federation or an approved secret service. This is useful for the distinct issue: An ML operations job includes cloud credentials directly in its checked-in YAML for convenience. The relevant technical rationale or evidence for that issue is: Tracked workflow files are widely replicated and reviewed; embedding credentials creates unnecessary exposure beyond the intended deployment run. Here the reported issue is: A deployment job succeeds locally but GitHub Actions cannot authenticate because the Azure identity lacks a matching audience claim. The relevant response is: Verify issuer, audience, and subject on the federated credential against the GitHub-issued token. The first result cannot verify this different correction: OIDC federation requires all trust claims to match; resource-group permission changes cannot fix token-claim rejection.