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The proposed control is tied to mp-bgp vpnv6 family and vrf ipv6 route exchange were not enabled consistently, typically observed when iPv4 L3VPN works but VPNv6 routes do not reach remote PEs. Here the target is the service label maps to an unexpected forwarding table or vrf; monitor inbound labeled packets resolve into the intended customer's VRF.

This gate monitors a different failure, core transit traffic starts following a customer internet gateway. It would not detect the current problem: Customer VPN packets arrive with a valid label but are dropped during VRF lookup. The appropriate check requires inbound labeled packets resolve into the intended customer's VRF.

It is valid for another service scenario but checks the vpn intermittently chooses the slower ce even though the primary is healthy. This case instead needs a gate for customer vpn packets arrive with a valid label but are dropped during vrf lookup and evidence that inbound labeled packets resolve into the intended customer's VRF.

This remediates no authorized internet route leak or default path exists for the branch vrfs, normally indicated by Remote branches can reach each other but not the public Internet. It would leave the observed problem (IPv4 L3VPN works but VPNv6 routes do not reach remote PEs) unresolved. Address it with configure supported inet6 VPN family and per-VRF IPv6 routing policies.

This change belongs to a different Layer 3 VPNs issue: The remote PE sees valid VPN reachability but data plane drops occur after ECMP change. That issue involves service-label forwarding and transport next-hop resolution disagree on one path. The current symptom is IPv4 L3VPN works but VPNv6 routes do not reach remote PEs. It instead requires configure supported inet6 VPN family and per-VRF IPv6 routing policies.

The option may be useful when customer VPN prefixes reach the ASBR but fail beyond the boundary, but that is not the current evidence. Here, iPv4 L3VPN works but VPNv6 routes do not reach remote PEs, indicating mp-bgp vpnv6 family and vrf ipv6 route exchange were not enabled consistently. The targeted action is Configure supported inet6 VPN family and per-VRF IPv6 routing policies.

This result is useful in another case with evidence Remote branches can reach each other but not the public Internet. It does not test recovery from ipv4 l3vpn works but vpnv6 routes do not reach remote pes. Check instead whether vPNv6 reachability appears only at authorized remote IPv6 sites.

It confirms an unrelated service correction: Service-label forwarding and transport next-hop resolution disagree on one path. The present case reports IPv4 L3VPN works but VPNv6 routes do not reach remote PEs. Its completion test is VPNv6 reachability appears only at authorized remote IPv6 sites.

That observation would verify a separate fault involving asbr mp-bgp labeled vpn route handling and next-hop resolution are incomplete. Its symptom is Customer VPN prefixes reach the ASBR but fail beyond the boundary. For this case the actual issue is mp-bgp vpnv6 family and vrf ipv6 route exchange were not enabled consistently, and the relevant success signal is VPNv6 reachability appears only at authorized remote IPv6 sites.

Service-label forwarding and transport next-hop resolution disagree on one path. would normally be accompanied by the remote pe sees valid vpn reachability but data plane drops occur after ecmp change. The observed symptom is different: IPv4 L3VPN works but VPNv6 routes do not reach remote PEs. The likely cause is MP-BGP VPNv6 family and VRF IPv6 route exchange were not enabled consistently.

That explanation fits another condition: Remote branches can reach each other but not the public Internet. The evidence here is IPv4 L3VPN works but VPNv6 routes do not reach remote PEs. Its closer root cause is MP-BGP VPNv6 family and VRF IPv6 route exchange were not enabled consistently.

The stated cause is possible elsewhere but explains customer vpn prefixes reach the asbr but fail beyond the boundary, not ipv4 l3vpn works but vpnv6 routes do not reach remote pes. This incident is better attributed to mp-bgp vpnv6 family and vrf ipv6 route exchange were not enabled consistently.

It is valid for another service scenario but checks remote branches can reach each other but not the public internet. This case instead needs a gate for ipv4 l3vpn works but vpnv6 routes do not reach remote pes and evidence that vPNv6 reachability appears only at authorized remote IPv6 sites.

This gate monitors a different failure, the remote pe sees valid vpn reachability but data plane drops occur after ecmp change. It would not detect the current problem: IPv4 L3VPN works but VPNv6 routes do not reach remote PEs. The appropriate check requires vPNv6 reachability appears only at authorized remote IPv6 sites.

The proposed control is tied to asbr mp-bgp labeled vpn route handling and next-hop resolution are incomplete, typically observed when customer VPN prefixes reach the ASBR but fail beyond the boundary. Here the target is mp-bgp vpnv6 family and vrf ipv6 route exchange were not enabled consistently; monitor vPNv6 reachability appears only at authorized remote IPv6 sites.

The option may be useful when the reflector does not redistribute one customer's VPN NLRI to other PEs, but that is not the current evidence. Here, remote branches can reach each other but not the public Internet, indicating no authorized internet route leak or default path exists for the branch vrfs. The targeted action is Add a controlled Internet-service VRF/default route import with security enforcement.

This remediates the pe imported vpn routes using shared route targets instead of isolated tenant membership, normally indicated by Traffic from one customer appears in the other's routing table. It would leave the observed problem (Remote branches can reach each other but not the public Internet) unresolved. Address it with add a controlled Internet-service VRF/default route import with security enforcement.

This change belongs to a different Layer 3 VPNs issue: One customer's default route is accidentally propagated to every tenant. That issue involves broad rt import/export policy exposed the default across unrelated vpns. The current symptom is Remote branches can reach each other but not the public Internet. It instead requires add a controlled Internet-service VRF/default route import with security enforcement.

This result is useful in another case with evidence Traffic from one customer appears in the other's routing table. It does not test recovery from remote branches can reach each other but not the public internet. Check instead whether branch Internet flows use the approved breakout without cross-VPN leakage.

It confirms an unrelated service correction: Broad RT import/export policy exposed the default across unrelated VPNs. The present case reports Remote branches can reach each other but not the public Internet. Its completion test is Branch Internet flows use the approved breakout without cross-VPN leakage.

That observation would verify a separate fault involving the reflector's vpn address family or customer route filtering is incomplete. Its symptom is The reflector does not redistribute one customer's VPN NLRI to other PEs. For this case the actual issue is no authorized internet route leak or default path exists for the branch vrfs, and the relevant success signal is Branch Internet flows use the approved breakout without cross-VPN leakage.

That explanation fits another condition: Traffic from one customer appears in the other's routing table. The evidence here is Remote branches can reach each other but not the public Internet. Its closer root cause is No authorized Internet route leak or default path exists for the branch VRFs.

Broad RT import/export policy exposed the default across unrelated VPNs. would normally be accompanied by one customer's default route is accidentally propagated to every tenant. The observed symptom is different: Remote branches can reach each other but not the public Internet. The likely cause is No authorized Internet route leak or default path exists for the branch VRFs.

The stated cause is possible elsewhere but explains the reflector does not redistribute one customer's vpn nlri to other pes, not remote branches can reach each other but not the public internet. This incident is better attributed to no authorized internet route leak or default path exists for the branch vrfs.

This gate monitors a different failure, one customer's default route is accidentally propagated to every tenant. It would not detect the current problem: Remote branches can reach each other but not the public Internet. The appropriate check requires branch Internet flows use the approved breakout without cross-VPN leakage.

It is valid for another service scenario but checks traffic from one customer appears in the other's routing table. This case instead needs a gate for remote branches can reach each other but not the public internet and evidence that branch Internet flows use the approved breakout without cross-VPN leakage.

The proposed control is tied to the reflector's vpn address family or customer route filtering is incomplete, typically observed when the reflector does not redistribute one customer's VPN NLRI to other PEs. Here the target is no authorized internet route leak or default path exists for the branch vrfs; monitor branch Internet flows use the approved breakout without cross-VPN leakage.

This remediates the import policy lacks explicit provider-infrastructure prefix exclusion, normally indicated by Provider-wide BGP policy accidentally imports the provider loopback into a customer VRF. It would leave the observed problem (One customer's default route is accidentally propagated to every tenant) unresolved. Address it with scope Internet default RT membership to contracted tenant VRFs only.

This change belongs to a different Layer 3 VPNs issue: The customer route has a VPNv4 NLRI but is missing on a remote PE. That issue involves the remote vrf does not import the route's export route target. The current symptom is One customer's default route is accidentally propagated to every tenant. It instead requires scope Internet default RT membership to contracted tenant VRFs only.

The option may be useful when the configured interface belongs to the master instance instead of its customer VRF, but that is not the current evidence. Here, one customer's default route is accidentally propagated to every tenant, indicating broad rt import/export policy exposed the default across unrelated vpns. The targeted action is Scope Internet default RT membership to contracted tenant VRFs only.

That observation would verify a separate fault involving the customer-facing logical interface was not bound to the intended routing instance. Its symptom is The configured interface belongs to the master instance instead of its customer VRF. For this case the actual issue is broad rt import/export policy exposed the default across unrelated vpns, and the relevant success signal is Only subscribed customers receive the shared breakout route.

This result is useful in another case with evidence Provider-wide BGP policy accidentally imports the provider loopback into a customer VRF. It does not test recovery from one customer's default route is accidentally propagated to every tenant. Check instead whether only subscribed customers receive the shared breakout route.

It confirms an unrelated service correction: The remote VRF does not import the route's export route target. The present case reports One customer's default route is accidentally propagated to every tenant. Its completion test is Only subscribed customers receive the shared breakout route.