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Exam Code: HPE7-A01

Exam Name HPE Network Campus Access Professional

Certification Provider: HP

Corresponding Certification: HPE Aruba Networking Certified Professional - Campus Access

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HP HPE7-A01 Practice Test 59

Question 580

At a regional hospital campus in Richmond, engineers report that a route reflector design lacks the expected internal BGP peer relationship. The work affects clinical scheduling and bedside devices. Which test result most directly confirms the required behavior?

  1. The selected OSPF path reflects approved cost policy and a controlled link failure converges to the intended backup
  2. The BGP session establishes and only the intended network prefixes appear with accepted next hops
  3. Each VRF resolves only its authorized prefixes, with controlled tests proving isolation and allowed shared services
  4. DHCP broadcasts reach the approved remote server through relay and clients receive valid leases with their intended options

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

This observation tests the BGP peer state and AS compatibility requirement at a regional hospital campus in Richmond. The expected result is that the BGP session establishes and only the intended network prefixes appear with accepted next hops. The necessary correction is to validate BGP neighbor reachability and the local/remote AS relationship, then confirm authorized prefix advertisement; a saved configuration alone would not prove it is working. In this case, the observed fault is that a route reflector design lacks the expected internal BGP peer relationship.

Incorrect Answers

A:

At a regional hospital campus in Richmond, this measures a different network requirement, OSPF path metric and convergence. The case describes that a route reflector design lacks the expected internal BGP peer relationship, so accepting this result would leave the primary fault without direct verification.

C:

At a regional hospital campus in Richmond, the observation may be useful for a separate VRF segmentation and routing isolation test, but it does not establish that a route reflector design lacks the expected internal BGP peer relationship has been resolved. The relevant check is the BGP peer state and AS compatibility outcome.

D:

At a regional hospital campus in Richmond, this measures a different network requirement, DHCP relay and inter-subnet services. The case describes that a route reflector design lacks the expected internal BGP peer relationship, so accepting this result would leave the primary fault without direct verification.

Question 581

During a planned campus-network change at a hotel campus in Vancouver, operators discover that a route reflector design lacks the expected internal BGP peer relationship. The design must preserve guest access and property operations. What configuration or diagnostic step is the best next move?

  1. Align OSPF participation, area, reachability and neighbor authentication before troubleshooting downstream learned routes
  2. Use explicit route filters or redistribution policy so only authorized prefixes cross routing-domain boundaries
  3. Validate BGP neighbor reachability and the local/remote AS relationship, then confirm authorized prefix advertisement
  4. Configure DHCP relay on the correct routed client VLAN interface toward the authorized server and verify return-path reachability

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The crucial symptom at a hotel campus in Vancouver is that a route reflector design lacks the expected internal BGP peer relationship. The best response is to validate BGP neighbor reachability and the local/remote AS relationship, then confirm authorized prefix advertisement. Confirm success by checking that the BGP session establishes and only the intended network prefixes appear with accepted next hops.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Although this is a valid design approach for OSPF neighbor prerequisites and states in an appropriate case, it leaves the BGP peer state and AS compatibility dependency untested. The observed condition at a hotel campus in Vancouver is that a route reflector design lacks the expected internal BGP peer relationship.

B:

At a hotel campus in Vancouver, the option addresses Dynamic route filtering and redistribution rather than the reported issue. For the stated symptom, the expected evidence is that the BGP session establishes and only the intended network prefixes appear with accepted next hops.

D:

Although this is a valid design approach for DHCP relay and inter-subnet services in an appropriate case, it leaves the BGP peer state and AS compatibility dependency untested. The observed condition at a hotel campus in Vancouver is that a route reflector design lacks the expected internal BGP peer relationship.

Question 582

During a planned campus-network change at a hotel campus in Vancouver, operators discover that a route reflector design lacks the expected internal BGP peer relationship. The design must preserve guest access and property operations. What evidence should the engineer request after the repair?

  1. The selected OSPF path reflects approved cost policy and a controlled link failure converges to the intended backup
  2. Each VRF resolves only its authorized prefixes, with controlled tests proving isolation and allowed shared services
  3. Neighbor route tables contain approved routes and do not receive protected management or unrelated tenant prefixes
  4. The BGP session establishes and only the intended network prefixes appear with accepted next hops

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

This observation tests the BGP peer state and AS compatibility requirement at a hotel campus in Vancouver. The expected result is that the BGP session establishes and only the intended network prefixes appear with accepted next hops. The necessary correction is to validate BGP neighbor reachability and the local/remote AS relationship, then confirm authorized prefix advertisement; a saved configuration alone would not prove it is working. In this case, the observed fault is that a route reflector design lacks the expected internal BGP peer relationship.

Incorrect Answers

A:

At a hotel campus in Vancouver, this measures a different network requirement, OSPF path metric and convergence. The case describes that a route reflector design lacks the expected internal BGP peer relationship, so accepting this result would leave the primary fault without direct verification.

B:

At a hotel campus in Vancouver, this would verify VRF segmentation and routing isolation, not the failure reported in this scenario. The requested closure criterion instead concerns BGP peer state and AS compatibility: the BGP session establishes and only the intended network prefixes appear with accepted next hops.

C:

At a hotel campus in Vancouver, the observation may be useful for a separate Dynamic route filtering and redistribution test, but it does not establish that a route reflector design lacks the expected internal BGP peer relationship has been resolved. The relevant check is the BGP peer state and AS compatibility outcome.

Question 583

At a manufacturing complex in Detroit, engineers report that a newly installed border switch establishes BGP but sends no permitted campus summary prefix. The work affects production and maintenance endpoints. Which change most directly addresses the stated failure?

  1. Configure DHCP relay on the correct routed client VLAN interface toward the authorized server and verify return-path reachability
  2. Validate BGP neighbor reachability and the local/remote AS relationship, then confirm authorized prefix advertisement
  3. Assign routed interfaces and routes to their intended VRFs and use only explicitly approved cross-VRF connectivity
  4. Install the correct destination prefix and reachable next hop, then validate route preference before expecting application reachability

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The crucial symptom at a manufacturing complex in Detroit is that a newly installed border switch establishes BGP but sends no permitted campus summary prefix. The best response is to validate BGP neighbor reachability and the local/remote AS relationship, then confirm authorized prefix advertisement. Confirm success by checking that the BGP session establishes and only the intended network prefixes appear with accepted next hops.

Incorrect Answers

A:

At a manufacturing complex in Detroit, the option addresses DHCP relay and inter-subnet services rather than the reported issue. For the stated symptom, the expected evidence is that the BGP session establishes and only the intended network prefixes appear with accepted next hops.

C:

Although this is a valid design approach for VRF segmentation and routing isolation in an appropriate case, it leaves the BGP peer state and AS compatibility dependency untested. The observed condition at a manufacturing complex in Detroit is that a newly installed border switch establishes BGP but sends no permitted campus summary prefix.

D:

At a manufacturing complex in Detroit, the option addresses Static/default route and route preference rather than the reported issue. For the stated symptom, the expected evidence is that the BGP session establishes and only the intended network prefixes appear with accepted next hops.

Question 584

At a manufacturing complex in Detroit, engineers report that a newly installed border switch establishes BGP but sends no permitted campus summary prefix. The work affects production and maintenance endpoints. Which post-change observation is the strongest acceptance evidence?

  1. The BGP session establishes and only the intended network prefixes appear with accepted next hops
  2. Each VRF resolves only its authorized prefixes, with controlled tests proving isolation and allowed shared services
  3. DHCP broadcasts reach the approved remote server through relay and clients receive valid leases with their intended options
  4. Neighbor route tables contain approved routes and do not receive protected management or unrelated tenant prefixes

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

This observation tests the BGP peer state and AS compatibility requirement at a manufacturing complex in Detroit. The expected result is that the BGP session establishes and only the intended network prefixes appear with accepted next hops. The necessary correction is to validate BGP neighbor reachability and the local/remote AS relationship, then confirm authorized prefix advertisement; a saved configuration alone would not prove it is working. In this case, the observed fault is that a newly installed border switch establishes BGP but sends no permitted campus summary prefix.

Incorrect Answers

B:

At a manufacturing complex in Detroit, the observation may be useful for a separate VRF segmentation and routing isolation test, but it does not establish that a newly installed border switch establishes BGP but sends no permitted campus summary prefix has been resolved. The relevant check is the BGP peer state and AS compatibility outcome.

C:

At a manufacturing complex in Detroit, this measures a different network requirement, DHCP relay and inter-subnet services. The case describes that a newly installed border switch establishes BGP but sends no permitted campus summary prefix, so accepting this result would leave the primary fault without direct verification.

D:

At a manufacturing complex in Detroit, this would verify Dynamic route filtering and redistribution, not the failure reported in this scenario. The requested closure criterion instead concerns BGP peer state and AS compatibility: the BGP session establishes and only the intended network prefixes appear with accepted next hops.

Question 585

During a planned campus-network change at a public safety training center in Oslo, operators discover that a newly installed border switch establishes BGP but sends no permitted campus summary prefix. The design must preserve learning simulations and voice services. Which implementation choice meets this requirement without broadening access?

  1. Validate BGP neighbor reachability and the local/remote AS relationship, then confirm authorized prefix advertisement
  2. Verify OSPF costs and advertised prefix reachability on the intended paths, then tune metric or failover requirements
  3. Install the correct destination prefix and reachable next hop, then validate route preference before expecting application reachability
  4. Assign routed interfaces and routes to their intended VRFs and use only explicitly approved cross-VRF connectivity

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The crucial symptom at a public safety training center in Oslo is that a newly installed border switch establishes BGP but sends no permitted campus summary prefix. The best response is to validate BGP neighbor reachability and the local/remote AS relationship, then confirm authorized prefix advertisement. Confirm success by checking that the BGP session establishes and only the intended network prefixes appear with accepted next hops.

Incorrect Answers

B:

At a public safety training center in Oslo, that change is aimed at OSPF path metric and convergence, not at the actual fault: a newly installed border switch establishes BGP but sends no permitted campus summary prefix. A successful repair here must show that the BGP session establishes and only the intended network prefixes appear with accepted next hops.

C:

Although this is a valid design approach for Static/default route and route preference in an appropriate case, it leaves the BGP peer state and AS compatibility dependency untested. The observed condition at a public safety training center in Oslo is that a newly installed border switch establishes BGP but sends no permitted campus summary prefix.

D:

At a public safety training center in Oslo, the option addresses VRF segmentation and routing isolation rather than the reported issue. For the stated symptom, the expected evidence is that the BGP session establishes and only the intended network prefixes appear with accepted next hops.

Question 586

During a planned campus-network change at a public safety training center in Oslo, operators discover that a newly installed border switch establishes BGP but sends no permitted campus summary prefix. The design must preserve learning simulations and voice services. Which test result most directly confirms the required behavior?

  1. The selected OSPF path reflects approved cost policy and a controlled link failure converges to the intended backup
  2. The BGP session establishes and only the intended network prefixes appear with accepted next hops
  3. Neighbor route tables contain approved routes and do not receive protected management or unrelated tenant prefixes
  4. Each VRF resolves only its authorized prefixes, with controlled tests proving isolation and allowed shared services

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

This observation tests the BGP peer state and AS compatibility requirement at a public safety training center in Oslo. The expected result is that the BGP session establishes and only the intended network prefixes appear with accepted next hops. The necessary correction is to validate BGP neighbor reachability and the local/remote AS relationship, then confirm authorized prefix advertisement; a saved configuration alone would not prove it is working. In this case, the observed fault is that a newly installed border switch establishes BGP but sends no permitted campus summary prefix.

Incorrect Answers

A:

At a public safety training center in Oslo, this would verify OSPF path metric and convergence, not the failure reported in this scenario. The requested closure criterion instead concerns BGP peer state and AS compatibility: the BGP session establishes and only the intended network prefixes appear with accepted next hops.

C:

At a public safety training center in Oslo, this measures a different network requirement, Dynamic route filtering and redistribution. The case describes that a newly installed border switch establishes BGP but sends no permitted campus summary prefix, so accepting this result would leave the primary fault without direct verification.

D:

At a public safety training center in Oslo, this would verify VRF segmentation and routing isolation, not the failure reported in this scenario. The requested closure criterion instead concerns BGP peer state and AS compatibility: the BGP session establishes and only the intended network prefixes appear with accepted next hops.

Question 587

At a design studio in Berlin, engineers report that a peering security change produces an authentication mismatch even though the transport path is active. The work affects wireless workstations and video conferences. What configuration or diagnostic step is the best next move?

  1. Validate BGP neighbor reachability and the local/remote AS relationship, then confirm authorized prefix advertisement
  2. Use explicit route filters or redistribution policy so only authorized prefixes cross routing-domain boundaries
  3. Assign routed interfaces and routes to their intended VRFs and use only explicitly approved cross-VRF connectivity
  4. Align OSPF participation, area, reachability and neighbor authentication before troubleshooting downstream learned routes

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The crucial symptom at a design studio in Berlin is that a peering security change produces an authentication mismatch even though the transport path is active. The best response is to validate BGP neighbor reachability and the local/remote AS relationship, then confirm authorized prefix advertisement. Confirm success by checking that the BGP session establishes and only the intended network prefixes appear with accepted next hops.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Although this is a valid design approach for Dynamic route filtering and redistribution in an appropriate case, it leaves the BGP peer state and AS compatibility dependency untested. The observed condition at a design studio in Berlin is that a peering security change produces an authentication mismatch even though the transport path is active.

C:

At a design studio in Berlin, the option addresses VRF segmentation and routing isolation rather than the reported issue. For the stated symptom, the expected evidence is that the BGP session establishes and only the intended network prefixes appear with accepted next hops.

D:

At a design studio in Berlin, that change is aimed at OSPF neighbor prerequisites and states, not at the actual fault: a peering security change produces an authentication mismatch even though the transport path is active. A successful repair here must show that the BGP session establishes and only the intended network prefixes appear with accepted next hops.

Question 588

At a design studio in Berlin, engineers report that a peering security change produces an authentication mismatch even though the transport path is active. The work affects wireless workstations and video conferences. What evidence should the engineer request after the repair?

  1. The selected OSPF path reflects approved cost policy and a controlled link failure converges to the intended backup
  2. The intended destination resolves through the authorized next hop and no unwanted default-route black hole remains
  3. Each VRF resolves only its authorized prefixes, with controlled tests proving isolation and allowed shared services
  4. The BGP session establishes and only the intended network prefixes appear with accepted next hops

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

This observation tests the BGP peer state and AS compatibility requirement at a design studio in Berlin. The expected result is that the BGP session establishes and only the intended network prefixes appear with accepted next hops. The necessary correction is to validate BGP neighbor reachability and the local/remote AS relationship, then confirm authorized prefix advertisement; a saved configuration alone would not prove it is working. In this case, the observed fault is that a peering security change produces an authentication mismatch even though the transport path is active.

Incorrect Answers

A:

At a design studio in Berlin, the observation may be useful for a separate OSPF path metric and convergence test, but it does not establish that a peering security change produces an authentication mismatch even though the transport path is active has been resolved. The relevant check is the BGP peer state and AS compatibility outcome.

B:

At a design studio in Berlin, this measures a different network requirement, Static/default route and route preference. The case describes that a peering security change produces an authentication mismatch even though the transport path is active, so accepting this result would leave the primary fault without direct verification.

C:

At a design studio in Berlin, this would verify VRF segmentation and routing isolation, not the failure reported in this scenario. The requested closure criterion instead concerns BGP peer state and AS compatibility: the BGP session establishes and only the intended network prefixes appear with accepted next hops.

Question 589

During a planned campus-network change at a university faculty building in Boston, operators discover that a peering security change produces an authentication mismatch even though the transport path is active. The design must preserve teaching tools and shared printers. Which change most directly addresses the stated failure?

  1. Use explicit route filters or redistribution policy so only authorized prefixes cross routing-domain boundaries
  2. Align OSPF participation, area, reachability and neighbor authentication before troubleshooting downstream learned routes
  3. Validate BGP neighbor reachability and the local/remote AS relationship, then confirm authorized prefix advertisement
  4. Verify OSPF costs and advertised prefix reachability on the intended paths, then tune metric or failover requirements

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The crucial symptom at a university faculty building in Boston is that a peering security change produces an authentication mismatch even though the transport path is active. The best response is to validate BGP neighbor reachability and the local/remote AS relationship, then confirm authorized prefix advertisement. Confirm success by checking that the BGP session establishes and only the intended network prefixes appear with accepted next hops.

Incorrect Answers

A:

At a university faculty building in Boston, that change is aimed at Dynamic route filtering and redistribution, not at the actual fault: a peering security change produces an authentication mismatch even though the transport path is active. A successful repair here must show that the BGP session establishes and only the intended network prefixes appear with accepted next hops.

B:

Although this is a valid design approach for OSPF neighbor prerequisites and states in an appropriate case, it leaves the BGP peer state and AS compatibility dependency untested. The observed condition at a university faculty building in Boston is that a peering security change produces an authentication mismatch even though the transport path is active.

D:

At a university faculty building in Boston, that change is aimed at OSPF path metric and convergence, not at the actual fault: a peering security change produces an authentication mismatch even though the transport path is active. A successful repair here must show that the BGP session establishes and only the intended network prefixes appear with accepted next hops.

Question 590

During a planned campus-network change at a university faculty building in Boston, operators discover that a peering security change produces an authentication mismatch even though the transport path is active. The design must preserve teaching tools and shared printers. Which post-change observation is the strongest acceptance evidence?

  1. The selected OSPF path reflects approved cost policy and a controlled link failure converges to the intended backup
  2. Neighbor route tables contain approved routes and do not receive protected management or unrelated tenant prefixes
  3. The BGP session establishes and only the intended network prefixes appear with accepted next hops
  4. The expected neighbor reaches the required state and the authorized OSPF routes enter the routing table

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

This observation tests the BGP peer state and AS compatibility requirement at a university faculty building in Boston. The expected result is that the BGP session establishes and only the intended network prefixes appear with accepted next hops. The necessary correction is to validate BGP neighbor reachability and the local/remote AS relationship, then confirm authorized prefix advertisement; a saved configuration alone would not prove it is working. In this case, the observed fault is that a peering security change produces an authentication mismatch even though the transport path is active.

Incorrect Answers

A:

At a university faculty building in Boston, the observation may be useful for a separate OSPF path metric and convergence test, but it does not establish that a peering security change produces an authentication mismatch even though the transport path is active has been resolved. The relevant check is the BGP peer state and AS compatibility outcome.

B:

At a university faculty building in Boston, this measures a different network requirement, Dynamic route filtering and redistribution. The case describes that a peering security change produces an authentication mismatch even though the transport path is active, so accepting this result would leave the primary fault without direct verification.

D:

At a university faculty building in Boston, the observation may be useful for a separate OSPF neighbor prerequisites and states test, but it does not establish that a peering security change produces an authentication mismatch even though the transport path is active has been resolved. The relevant check is the BGP peer state and AS compatibility outcome.