Question 120
A Windows application runs from a writable directory but claims its installer is signed. What observation would best confirm the intended security outcome?
Explanation
Correct Answer
The installed directory ACL denies unprivileged replacement of program files. This answer directly addresses the described constraint. Signed installers do not guarantee continued integrity after deployment. Successful validation requires: The installed directory ACL denies unprivileged replacement of program files.
Incorrect Answers
That approach concerns a different situation: a scheduled Linux maintenance script is writable by a nonprivileged group but runs from root cron. Root-run scheduled code must be protected against untrusted modification. The required result is that the installed directory ACL denies unprivileged replacement of program files. The relevant evidence is: The installed directory ACL denies unprivileged replacement of program files.
It would address a workstation has a sensitive LSASS process dump file stored in a world-readable diagnostics directory. The relevant reason in that case is: Credential memory dumps can contain reusable authentication material. Here the required success condition is the installed directory ACL denies unprivileged replacement of program files. The relevant evidence is: The installed directory ACL denies unprivileged replacement of program files.
This result applies to a different case: An endpoint accepts unsigned drivers from a normal user context in an authorized lab. Unsigned kernel components can threaten host integrity. It does not establish the present requirement, where the installed directory ACL denies unprivileged replacement of program files. The relevant evidence is: The installed directory ACL denies unprivileged replacement of program files.